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Abstract
This is a predictive Note that will examine the doctrine relating to war-time detention and
endeavor to decipher who currently maintains a right to challenge executive detention in the wake
of Boumediene. This Note therefore does not centrally discuss the authority of the United States
to detain wartime prisoners, what procedure is due to detainees, the wisdom of the Boumediene
approach to constitutional domain, or any other related issues. Instead, this Note will attempt to
define the outer contours of the Suspension Clause by looking through the Boumediene prism to
determine who may presently invoke the protections of the Suspension Clause and in what contexts outside of Guantánamo Bay those protections apply. This Note proceeds in three parts. Part
I provides a background on habeas corpus, the heart of the protection preserved in the Suspension
Clause, and its semblance in the extraterritorial arena. Part II outlines the history leading up to
Boumediene and the law surrounding this decision. Part III will then critically analyze Boumediene and its progeny against the Court’s prior precedent in order to develop a framework for
analyzing the Suspension Clause. Part III finally uses these concepts in several hypothetical scenarios in order to better illustrate the length and strength of the Suspension Clause, as it stands
today.
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NOTES
FROM BAGHDAD TO BAGRAM: THE LENGTH &
STRENGTH OF THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE
AFTER BOUMEDIENE
Justin D. D’Aloia*
INTRODUCTION
Hafizullah Shahbaz Khiel is an Afghan father of seven.1 After
serving five years away from his family as a prisoner in the
detention camp run by the U.S. Navy at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba,
Khiel was released to Afghan authorities.2 He was soon cleared of
all charges and finally reunited with his family in Afghanistan in
December 2007.3 But less than a year later, U.S. forces raided
Khiel’s home and he was once again taken into custody.4 Since
then, he has been held at a U.S.-operated Afghan internment
camp with nearly 600 others, notwithstanding documents from
Afghan authorities proclaiming his innocence.5
The U.S. Constitution sets out the basic structure for a
democratic form of government. Yet it provides little, if any,
guidance as to whether, or under what circumstances, any of its
* Editor-in-Chief, Fordham International Law Journal; J.D. Candidate, 2010,
Fordham University School of Law; B.S., 2006, Rutgers University. The author wishes to
thank Liz Shura and Jared Limbach for their thoughtful comments and guidance
throughout the drafting process. Special thanks are also due to my parents, Susan and
David, Kristen D’Aloia, and Mary Katherine Houston for their continuous support and
encouragement.
1. See Kathy Gannon, Guantanamo Prisoner Freed, Arrested Again, MSNBC, Feb. 7,
2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29071536 (“Hafizullah was a village elder and a
father of seven . . . .”).
2. Id. (stating that “[t]he first time Hafizullah was seized, in 2002, he spent five
years at Guantanamo” and that “[u]pon Hafizullah’s release in 2007, the Afghan
government held him for three months and then cleared him of all charges”).
3. Id. (“[T]he Afghan government cleared him of all charges in December 2007”).
4. Id. (indicating that “Hafizullah and 13 others were arrested” in a September raid
but that “[t]he others were later released”).
5. Id. (“Afghan officials have signed documents attesting to his innocence, but he is
still in custody at Bagram Air Base, along with about 600 other prisoners.”).
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provisions have force beyond the sovereign territory of the
United States. Throughout important episodes of American
history, the U.S. judiciary has been called upon to answer
discrete
questions
concerning
the
Constitution’s
“extraterritorial” application.6 Nevertheless, the law in this area
remains unsettled and no clear rubric exists for answering
questions of this nature.7 Notwithstanding the common adage
that the Constitution applies in toto within the territory of the
United States,8 the more accurate approximation is that its
application is circumstantial, both domestically and abroad.9
In June 2008, the Supreme Court extended a right to alien
prisoners held by the U.S. military at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, to
challenge the legality of their detentions under the Suspension
Clause of the U.S. Constitution in the landmark case of
Boumediene v. Bush.10 The case offers a significant contribution to
U.S. constitutionalism by indicating that aliens located beyond
the strict borders of the United States can receive constitutional
6. See José A. Cabranes, Our Imperial Criminal Procedure: Problems in the
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Constitutional Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1660, 1660–62 (2009)
(identifying “continental expansion, colonial administration, and conventional war”
and, more recently, “initiatives undertaken to combat international terrorism” as
periods that produced questions concerning the reach of the Constitution beyond the
borders of the United States). See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in
Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power
over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002) (outlining the evolution of extraterritorial
constitutional jurisprudence within context of U.S. history); Gerald L. Neuman, Who’s
Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991) (same).
7. See Cabranes, supra note 6, at 1660 (“Despite nearly two centuries of decisions on
this issue, the law remains unsettled, and no framework for analyzing these claims is
clearly defined, much less well established.”); Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case
Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 467–72 (2007) (recognizing the debate
circling the Constitution’s coverage); Neuman, supra note 6, at 944 (summarizing that
the current state of the Constitution’s scope is the result of “a mosaic of inconsistent
rules and rationales rather than a true synthesis”).
8. See, e.g., Christina Duffy Burnett, United States: American Expansion and Territorial
Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 808 n.40 (2005) (collecting authority indicating
that Constitution does not always apply within the United States); see also Cleveland,
supra note 6, at 17–18 (observing that express text of several constitutional clauses limit
their application domestically to only “states” or “citizens”).
9. See, e.g., Cabranes, supra note 6, at 1664 (summarizing the juridical approach to
the extraterritorial application of the Constitution as “context-specific, tailored to the
needs of the case, and sensitive to the practical limitations of enforcing a particular
rule”); Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After
Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 977 (2009) (providing examples where
constitutional protections sometimes do not inhere domestically).
10. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
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protection. Nevertheless, there remains wide speculation as to
who else, such as Khiel, may be entitled to this right because of
the Court’s limited holding.11
This is a predictive Note that will examine the doctrine
relating to war-time detention and endeavor to decipher who
currently maintains a right to challenge executive detention in
the wake of Boumediene. This Note therefore does not centrally
discuss the authority of the United States to detain wartime
prisoners, what procedure is due to detainees, the wisdom of the
Boumediene approach to constitutional domain, or any other
related issues. Instead, this Note will attempt to define the outer
contours of the Suspension Clause by looking through the
Boumediene prism to determine who may presently invoke the
protections of the Suspension Clause and in what contexts
outside of Guantánamo Bay those protections apply.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a
background on habeas corpus, the heart of the protection
preserved in the Suspension Clause, and its semblance in the
extraterritorial arena. Part II outlines the history leading up to
Boumediene and the law surrounding this decision. Part III will
then critically analyze Boumediene and its progeny against the
Court’s prior precedent in order to develop a framework for
analyzing the Suspension Clause. Part III finally uses these
concepts in several hypothetical scenarios in order to better
illustrate the length and strength of the Suspension Clause, as it
stands today.
I.

HABEAS CORPUS: DOMESTIC ORIGINS AND
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

The Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution12 has
enjoyed a relatively unremarkable inspection since it was ratified
11. E.g., Del Quentin Wilber, In Courts, Afghanistan Air Base May Become Next
Guantanamo, WASH. POST, June 29, 2008, at A14 (quoting Professor David Cole of
Georgetown University Law Center as stating “Kennedy’s decision in Boumediene leaves
open the question as to what other places the [right extended in Boumediene] extends”);
see also Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S.
CAL. L. REV. 259, 279 (2009) (“As for detention in other locations . . . several passages
[in Boumediene] foreshadow the possibility that functionalism may often lead to the
denial of habeas rights.”).
12. See infra note 29 and accompanying text (reproducing the text of the
Suspension Clause).
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into permanency as part of the original Constitution in 1788.13
But several recent acts of Congress14 have propelled this
historically dormant constitutional provision back into the
spotlight15 and, more broadly, caused the U.S. Supreme Court to
reevaluate its jurisprudence relating to the general reach of the
Constitution outside of the sovereign territory of the United
States. In order to fully appreciate these innovations, a brief
overview of the law relating to habeas corpus and the
extraterritorial scope of the Constitution is necessary. Part I.A
begins by exploring the basics of U.S. law relating to the writ of
habeas corpus. Part I.B will then outline the handful of cases to
address the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution. Finally,
Part I.C will take up the issue of standing that arises when habeas
corpus is invoked extraterritorially, beyond U.S. borders.

13. The dearth of case law on the Suspension Clause is the result of several factors.
First, the writ of habeas corpus, which the Suspension Clause safeguards, was enacted
into positive law by the first Congress, leaving little need for persons seeking habeas
relief to fall back on the text of the Constitution. See infra note 33 and accompanying
text (outlining the historic evolution of the statutory grant of habeas corpus). Second,
the protections of habeas corpus were formally suspended only on rare occasion and for
limited periods of time, providing the U.S. Supreme Court with few opportunities to
analyze the Clause even in that context. See An Act Temporarily to Provide for the
Administration of the Affairs of Civil Government in the Philippine Islands, and for
Other Purposes § 5, ch. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, 692 (1902) (used as authority to suspend the
writ in a territory during an insurrection in 1905); Hawaiian Organic Act § 67, ch. 339,
31 Stat. 141, 153 (1900) (used as authority to suspend the writ in Hawaii after the 1941
attack on Pearl Harbor); An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for Other Purposes § 4, ch.
22, 17 Stat. 13, 14–15 (1871) (authorizing President Grant to suspend the writ to quell
the Ku Klux Klan rising in the southern United States); An Act Relating to Habeas
Corpus, and Regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain Cases § 1, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755,
755 (1863) (authorizing President Lincoln to suspend the writ during the Civil War).
For an intriguing presentation on what is achieved by a valid suspension, see Amanda L.
Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600 (2009) (arguing that
suspension acts as a temporary displacement of core due process rights).
14. See infra notes 214–19 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of recent
acts passed by Congress in connection with the “war on terror”).
15. The only recent case before the Supreme Court to take up a meaningful
consideration of the Suspension Clause prior to Boumediene was Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). But see Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S.
651, 664 (1996) (concluding that an act barring Supreme Court review an appellate
body’s denial of leave to file a second habeas petition did not amount to a constitutional
suspension of the writ); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977) (rejecting the argument
that the alternative collateral review procedure for state prisoners in the District of
Columbia did not work a constitutional suspension). The significance of St. Cyr with
regard to the Suspension Clause is discussed infra at note 33.
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A. Foundations of Habeas Corpus in U.S. Law
Historical authorities depict the writ of habeas corpus as a
“bulwark” of individual liberty.16 To Thomas Jefferson its
protections represented one of the “essential principles of our
government.”17 This legal instrument has even gained the status
of the “Great Writ” among U.S. jurists.18 Yet, the phrase “habeas
corpus” translates rather plainly from Latin as “that you have the
body.”19 So how do the elegant descriptions and bland definition
reconcile?
A writ is a written court order that requires an authority to
carry out a specific directive.20 A writ of habeas corpus, more
specifically, commands a custodian to produce the body of a
prisoner before the court at a specific time and place so that the
court may inquire into the basis of their detention.21 The
16. In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 147 (1852) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (“The
writ has always been justly regarded as the stable bulwark of civil liberty.”); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 512 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (arguing
that habeas corpus is a “bulwark” against arbitrary punishment). Blackstone was first to
describe the common-law writ as a “stable bulwark of our liberties.” WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *137.
17. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in 3 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 317, 321–22 (Albert E. Bergh ed., 1905).
18. See, e.g., Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95–96 (1807) (first U.S. case
identifying habeas corpus as the “great writ”). This language was likely borrowed from
Blackstone, who described habeas corpus as the “great and efficacious writ.”
BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at 3 COMMENTARIES *131. Paul Halliday and Edward White
identify, however, that the earliest use of the term is found in GILES JACOB, A NEW LAWDICTIONARY 348 (London, 1729). See Paul D. Halliday & Edward White, The Suspension
Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575, 580
n.10 (2008).
19. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004); BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY AND
CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA 1400 (8th ed. 1914) [hereinafter BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY].
20. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 1640; BOUVIER’S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 3496.
21. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY , supra note 19, at 728 (defining habeas corpus as
“[a] writ employed to bring a person before a court . . . to ensure that the party’s
imprisonment or detention is not illegal”); BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19,
at 1400 (defining habeas corpus as “[a] writ directed to the person detaining another
and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a certain time and place
. . . to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court or judge awarding the writ shall
consider in that behalf.”); see also, e.g., Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201 (1830)
(“This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to bring the body of Tobias Watkins
before this court, for the purpose of inquiring into the legality of his confinement in
gaol [sic].”). The phrase “writ of habeas corpus” as it is used in this Note and
throughout U.S. law refers to the common law writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum et
recipiendum. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. at 95 (“It has been truly said, that [habeas
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traditional function of a habeas corpus action is to secure release
from an illegal detention.22 An application for a writ of habeas
corpus is in essence an attack on the legality of someone’s
custody over another person.23 Thus, the court does not pass on a
prisoner’s guilt or innocence, but rather examines whether the
prisoner’s liberty was restrained in a manner consistent with the
law.24 In order to make this determination, the writ demands that
the prisoner’s jailer provide a sound legal basis for the
confinement.25 If a court is satisfied that a person’s liberty was
corpus] is a generic term, and includes every species of that writ. To this it may be
added, that when used singly—when we say the writ of habeas corpus, without addition, we
most generally mean the great writ which is now applied for; and in that sense it is used
in the constitution.”); BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 1400 (“This writ was
in like manner designated as habeas corpus ad subjiciendum et recipiendum; but, having
acquired in public esteem a marked importance by reason of the nobler uses to which it
has been devoted, it has so far appropriated that generic term . . . The Writ of Habeas
Corpus.”). At common law, the writ of habeas corpus took on several other forms that
acted on the body of a prisoner including ad deliberandum, ad prosequendum, ad
respondendum, ad satisfaciendum, and ad testificandum. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at 3
COMMENTARIES *129-30 (defining each of the habeas corpus varieties); see also Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U.S. at 97–98 (considering the use of each of the lesser-known habeas corpus
writs in relation to U.S. law).
22. See R.J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 5 (2d ed. 1989) (conveying that
the writ tests “the legality of [the] cause” of a prisoner’s confinement); see also Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 576 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The role of habeas corpus is
to determine the legality of executive detention, not to supply the omitted process
necessary to make it legal.”); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (“[T]he
traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”).
23. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 484 (“[T]he very essence of habeas corpus is an attack
by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody . . . .”); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.
545, 586 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (“[T]he very purpose of the Great Writ is to
provide some means by which the legality of an individual’s incarceration may be
tested.” (citations omitted)).
24. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963) (“[I]n a civilized society, government
must always be accountable [and] if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with
the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his immediate
release.”), abrogated by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 745 (1991) ("Our cases
after Fay that have considered the effect of state procedural default on federal habeas
review have taken a markedly different view of the important interests served by state
procedural rules."); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8 (1946) (“[O]n application for habeas
corpus we are not concerned with the guilt or innocence of the petitioners. We consider
here only the lawful power of the [military] commission to try the petitioner . . . .”).
25. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2247 (2008) (“The [writ of habeas
corpus] protects the rights of the detained by affirming the duty and authority of the
Judiciary to call the jailer to account.”); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410
U.S. 484, 494–95 (1973) (“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner
who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful
custody.” (citing Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574–75 (1885))).
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deprived in a manner contrary to the law, the writ will issue and
direct their release.26
The writ of habeas corpus finds its roots deep in common
law tradition.27 Early colonists brought its protections to the
United States as a self-evident aspect of their civil heritage in the
formative years of the Nation.28 After achieving independence
26. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 342 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(“[H]abeas is a challenge to unlawful custody, and when the writ issues it prevents
further illegal custody.” (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 489)); Wales, 114 U.S. at 571
(“[The] purpose [of the writ] is to enable the court to inquire, first, if the petitioner is
restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the court can do nothing but discharge the writ. If
there is such restraint, the court can then inquire into the cause of it, and if the alleged
cause be unlawful, it must then discharge the prisoner.”); cf. Eagles v. United States ex
rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304, 311 (1946) (“If the writ is to issue, mere error in the
proceeding which resulted in the detention is not sufficient.” (citing United States ex rel.
Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131 (1924))); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 347 (1915) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (“We are not speaking of mere disorder, or mere irregularities in
procedure, but of a case where the processes of justice are actually subverted. In such a
case, the Federal court has jurisdiction to issue the writ.”).
27. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004) (“Habeas corpus . . . throw[s] its
root deep into the genius of our common law.’” (quoting Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S.
471, 484 n.2 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (in turn quoting Sec’y of State for
Home Affairs v. O’Brien, [1923] A.C. 603, 609 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.)))). In
1215, Magna Carta established that “[n]o free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or
stripped of his rights or possessions . . . except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by
the law of the land.” Magna Carta art. 39 (1215), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES:
DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND BILL OF RIGHTS 17 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959). The final
version of Magna Carta, confirmed by Henry III when he assumed control of the throne
in 1225, which differs slightly from the charter established in 1215, can be found in THE
BIRTHRIGHT OF BRITONS: OR THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION, WITH A SKETCH OF ITS
HISTORY, AND INCIDENTAL REMARKS 23–29 (London, L. Waylon 1792). In short, habeas
corpus is believed to derive from this vernacular. See, e.g., 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES
OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND *52–53 (reflecting on the origins of the writ); WILLIAM S.
CHURCH, A TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS INCLUDING JURISDICTION, FALSE
IMPRISONMENT, WRIT OF ERROR, EXTRADITION, MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI, JUDGMENTS
ETC. WITH PRACTICE AND FORMS 3 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2002) (1886)
(grounding earliest arguments for habeas corpus in Magna Carta); ROLLIN C. HURD, A
TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY, AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
AND THE PRACTICE CONNECTED WITH IT 85–89 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2003)
(1858) (same). A discussion on the common-law evolution of the writ is beyond the
scope of this Note because Boumediene incorporates the history of the writ into its
analytic framework. See infra note 225 (concluding that common-law history was not
dispositive as to the writ’s geographic reach). However, for an illuminating presentation
of the Anglo-American history of the writ of habeas corpus see generally Halliday &
White, supra note 18 (presenting a thorough examination of habeas corpus in English
history through a review of rare common-law texts).
28. See Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868) (“[The writ] was brought to
America by the colonists, and claimed as among the immemorial rights descended to
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from British rule, the writ received prominent endorsement in
the original text of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the
Suspension Clause of the Constitution reads: “The Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”29 Fully
aware of the writ’s fundamental place in preventing arbitrary and
oppressive governmental power, the Framers specifically
sanctioned the writ in order to ensure its vitality in the new
republic.30 Individually, habeas corpus is a mode of procedure.31
them from their ancestors.”); WILLIAM WAIT, 5 THE PRACTICE AT LAW, IN EQUITY, AND IN
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, IN ALL THE COURTS OF RECORD IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 502
(Albany, W. Gould 1875) (quoting colonists as regarding the writ as the “dearest
birthright of Britons.”); see also CHURCH, supra note 27, at 35–40 (illustrating that the
writ was in use in the early colonies of Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Jersey, and
Virginia prior to the Revolution); A.H. Carpenter, Habeas Corpus in the Colonies, 8 AM.
HIST. REV. 18, 20–26 (1903) (specifying that early colonists employed the common-law
privilege of habeas corpus until Queen Anne extended the Habeas Corpus Act to the
colonies in 1710).
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The caution used to narrowly circumscribe the
grounds for the suspension of the writ provides further evidence of how highly the
Framers regarded its protections. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2246 (“That the Framers
considered the writ a vital instrument for the protection of individual liberty is evident
from the care taken to specify the limited grounds for its suspension . . . .” (citing Akhil
Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1509 n.329 (1987)));
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights,
and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2037 (2007) (“[T]he Suspension Clause
[itself] signals the historic importance of habeas corpus . . . .”). This ancient protection
has achieved a similar status in U.S. jurisprudence. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,
126 (1982) (“The writ of habeas corpus indisputably holds an honored position in our
jurisprudence.”); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 291 (1969) (contending that the writ of
habeas corpus is “jealously guarded” by the courts); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. at 95 (“The
great writ of habeas corpus has been for centuries esteemed the best and only sufficient
defence of personal freedom.”).
30. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2244 (“[T]he common-law writ all too often had
been insufficient to guard against the abuse of monarchial power. That history
counseled the necessity for specific language in the Constitution to secure the writ and
ensure its place in our legal system.”); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 48 n.9 (1986)
(“[E]xplicit reference in the Constitution . . . testifies to the importance of the writ of
habeas corpus.”). Blackstone described habeas corpus as “the most celebrated writ in
the English law.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at 3 COMMENTARIES *129. The writ was
central to the preservation of common-law liberties. See id. at 1 COMMENTARIES *135
(“Of great importance to the public is the preservation of this personal liberty; for if
once it were left in the power of any, the highest, magistrate to imprison arbitrarily
whoever he or his officers thought proper . . . there would soon be an end of all other
rights and immunities.”); David L. Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Detention:
Another View, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV 59, 64 (2006) (noting that “the development of the
writ in England was closely linked with the need to make effective the guarantees of the
Magna Carta, especially that of due process of law” (citing ROBERT S. WALKER, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS THE WRIT OF LIBERTY
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But, more generally, by holding all branches of government
accountable for their actions, the writ has the salutary effect of
securing personal liberty for all and establishing the rule of law.32
This protection is currently codified in section 2241 of the
judicial code.33 That section provides that federal courts may
88 (1960))). Consistent with these beliefs, Alexander Hamilton denounced arbitrary
imprisonment as “the favorite and most formidable instrument[] of tyranny.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 511–12 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
31. See supra note 22 (characterizing habeas corpus as a tool to secure release from
illegal detention).
32. See, e.g., Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2246 (appreciating habeas corpus as
strengthening the separation-of-powers design); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401–02
(1963) (“Although in form the Great Writ is simply a mode of procedure, its history is
inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty.”);
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (“All the officers of the government, from
the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. [The writ] is
the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting
office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that
supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the
authority which it gives.”); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 126 (1866) (perceiving
habeas corpus as “guarding the foundations of civil liberty against the abuses of
unlimited power”).
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006). The writ of habeas corpus was originally enacted
into federal law by the first Congress in 1789 as a consequence of the newly ratified
Constitution. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789); see also Ex parte Bollman,
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (describing the first Congress as enacting the Judiciary
Act under the “immediate influence” of the “injunction” imposed by the Suspension
Clause). Several amendments to the habeas statute were precipitated by significant
sociopolitical events, but section 2241 is the direct successor to the original grant
conferred in 1789. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305 (“Federal courts have been authorized to
issue writs of habeas corpus since the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789 . . . .”);
Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 n.2 (1981) (“The present codification [in § 2241 et
seq.] of the federal habeas statute is the successor to ‘the first congressional grant of
jurisdiction to the federal courts’ . . . .” (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 485)); see also Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 n.9 (1963) (conveying that “[a]ll significant statutory changes
in the federal writ have been prompted by grave political crises” and listing
amendments). Prior to Boumediene, it at least remained analytically possible to conclude
that the Suspension Clause did not embody an inviolate right to habeas corpus and
instead stood as a congressional directive because it is framed in prohibitory language
and located in article I of the Constitution. Compare Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV.
1362, 1372 (1953) (implied in the Constitution), with Rex A. Collings, Jr., Habeas Corpus
for Convicts—Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 CAL. L. REV. 335, 344 (1952)
(requires congressional authorization), and RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND
WESCHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1287 n.3 (5th ed. 2003)
(collecting literature arguing that the exclusive source of habeas corpus is statutory). In
2001, the Court avoided the delicate question of whether the Suspension Clause
contains a parallel right to habeas corpus by invoking the canon of constitutional
avoidance and concluding that the petitioner’s statutory ability to seek habeas relief was
not repealed. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314–15 (2001).
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issue a writ of habeas corpus “within their respective
jurisdictions”34 so long as the prisoner seeking the writ falls
within one of five enumerated categories.35 For purposes of
section 2241, a court acts “within” its jurisdiction when the
custodian of the person seeking release may be reached by that
court’s process.36 It bears mention, however, that Congress is free
to alter or expand its statutory habeas corpus scheme to the
extent that it does not transgress the Constitution.37
The writ has evolved since colonial times to cover a wide
34. § 2241(a). For a discussion on the history and meaning of the jurisdictional
limitation in the federal habeas statute, see Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442–43
(2004) (noting that the jurisdictional clause was added by Congress to avoid the
possibility of judges issuing the writ from afar).
35. See § 2241(c). Specifically, the writ will not extend to a prisoner under §
2241(c) unless:
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or
is committed for trial before some court thereof; or (2) He is in custody for an
act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or [a directive] of a
court or judge of the United States; or (3) He is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States; or (4) He, being a citizen
of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in custody for an act done or
omitted under any [authority] claimed under the [directive] of a foreign state,
or under color thereof, the validity and effect of which depend upon the law
of nations; or (5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify for trial.
Id.
36. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973)
(“[T]he language of § 2241(a) requires nothing more than that the court issuing the
writ have jurisdiction over the custodian. So long as the custodian can be reached by
service of process, the court can issue the writ ‘within its jurisdiction’ . . . even if the
prisoner himself is confined outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.”); cf. Ex parte
Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 307 (1944) (explaining that jurisdiction still rests “if a respondent
who has custody of the prisoner is within reach of the court’s process even though the
prisoner has been removed from the district since the suit [began]” because the
jurisdiction of the of the District Court under section 2241 “may be in no way impaired
or defeated by the removal of the prisoner from the territorial jurisdiction for the
District Court”).
37. See Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323 (1996) (“Within constitutional
constraints,” judgments about the scope of the habeas corpus statute are “normally for
Congress to make.”); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 285 (1941) (“[There is] no
doubt of the authority of the Congress to thus liberalize the common law procedure on
habeas corpus.” (quoting Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 331 (1915)); cf. Boumediene,
128 S. Ct. at 2276 (“[Prior case law] stand[s] for the proposition that the Suspension
Clause does not resist innovation in the field of habeas corpus.”); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466, 474 (2004) (“As it has evolved over the past two centuries, the habeas statute clearly
has expanded habeas corpus ‘beyond the limits that obtained during the 17th and 18th
centuries.’” (quoting Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 380 n.13 (1977))); Felker v.
Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663 (1996) (detailing expansion of statutory habeas relief from
time of first Congress to present).

DALOIA_K-FINAL

2010]

5/22/2010 4:17 PM

THE REACH OF THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE

967

range of restraints on liberty,38 but is historically intended to
serve as a vehicle to review the propriety of executive detention.39
Therefore the writ, at its core, ensures that executive detentions
are carried out in accordance with law.40
B.

The Fringe of the Constitution: Beyond U.S. Borders

A natural point of departure for analyzing the
extraterritorial scope of the Suspension Clause is the Supreme
Court’s methodology for determining the general reach of the
overall Constitution. But there is no settled approach to extricate
from the Court’s case law.41 This section will provide a brief
narrative on the historic evolution of this topic.
At the time the Constitution was drafted, the Framers
contemplated that the United States would acquire new lands.42
38. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973) (explaining that “over
the years, the writ of habeas corpus evolved as a remedy available to effect discharge
from any confinement contrary to the Constitution or fundamental law” and listing
numerous examples); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58 (1968) (observing that the writ of
habeas corpus “is a procedural device for subjecting executive, judicial, or private
restrains on liberty” and collecting cases).
39. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (“At
its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the
legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been
strongest.” (citing Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus: Extra Judicial Detentions,
83 HARV. L. REV. 1208, 1238 (1970))); Pressley, 430 U.S. at 386 (Powell, J., concurring)
(observing that the “Great Writ was [traditionally] a remedy against executive
detention” (citing P. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1513–14 (2d ed. 1973))); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1948)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (contending that “[t]he historic purpose of the writ has been
to relieve detention by executive authorities without judicial trial”). An English court
recounted its historic uses similarly: “[The writ] has through the ages been jealously
maintained by Courts of Law as a check upon the illegal usurpation of power by the
Executive at the cost of the liege.” Sec’y of State for Home Affairs v. O’Brien, [1923]
A.C. 603, 609 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
40. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (“At all other times [other
than during suspension], it has remained a critical check on the Executive, ensuring
that it does not detain individuals except in accordance with law.” (citing St. Cyr, 533
U.S. at 301)); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 260 (1882) (“[T]he writ of habeas corpus
has been often used to defend the liberty of the citizen, and even his life, against the
assertion of unlawful authority on the part of the executive . . . .” (citing Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. at 2)).
41. See supra note 7 (recognizing that no clear rubric exists for determining the
extraterritorial application of the Constitution).
42. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cls. 1–2 (granting Congress the power to annex
new states and promulgate rules for U.S. territories); see also Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of
Cotton (Canter), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828) (proclaiming that under the authority
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Yet, with few exceptions, there was little need to explore the
outer limits of the Constitution’s geographic coverage during this
era because Congress usually “extended” the Constitution by
statute to newly acquired territories during the era of westward
expansion.43
One such exception arose in 1891. In the case of In re Ross44
a U.S. sailor45 was tried and convicted by a U.S. consular tribunal
for murdering a fellow crewman in a Japanese harbor.46 As to his

of the Constitution the United States possesses the inherent power to “acquir[e]
territory, either by conquest or by treaty”).
43. For an exhaustive list of these statutes relating to the Louisiana Purchase
through the annexation of Hawaii, see Burnett, supra note 8, at 825 n.127 and
accompanying text. This is not to say that constitutional questions never arose in the
outer territories during this period. See, e.g., Canter, 26 U.S. at 542 (passing on the
constitutional question by relying on treaty provisions); Webster v. Reid, 52 U.S. (11
How.) 437, 460 (1850) (providing Seventh Amendment protection to the Iowa territory
without clearly identifying the Constitution or statute as the source); Benner v. Porter,
50 U.S. (9 How.) 235, 242 (1850) (article III does not serve as Florida’s “organic law”);
United States v. Dawson, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 467, 488 (1853) (holding section 2 of article
III controls venue for offenses committed outside of State jurisdiction); Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1856) (applying the Fifth Amendment to
territories to provide slaveholders with property rights); Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 154 (1878) (applying the Constitution of its own force to the Utah Territory);
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 550 (1888) (same for District of Columbia); Ex parte
Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 183 (1888) (implicitly recognizing Double Jeopardy rights of a
Utah resident); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 28 (1889) (relying on statute for
protection in Montana); The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 40 (1890) (questioning the applicability of the
Constitution and relying instead on statute); McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174,
184–85 (1891) (observing the ambiguity as to the application of article III to U.S.
territory); American Publ’g Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 466–68 (1897) (extending the
jury trial right to Utah without identifying the source of protection); Springville v.
Thomas, 166 U.S. 707, 709 (1897) (identifying the Constitution as applying of its own
force to the Utah territory); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 346 (1898) (resolving that
jury trial rights applied of their own force to territories, generally). But the case-to-case
inconsistencies between the justices left open the question of whether the entire
Constitution applied of its own force within U.S. territories. Burnett, supra note 9, at 985
(noting that “a number of the nineteenth century cases on the application of the
Constitution to the territories were ambiguous”); Cleveland, supra note 6, at 207 (noting
tension between these decisions).
44. Ross v. McIntyre (In re Ross), 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
45. John Ross was technically a British citizen, but, consistent with maritime
custom, attained the fictitious benefit of U.S. citizenship as a result of his membership
on the boat. See id. at 472 (“By such enlistment [on an American ship] he became an
American seaman . . . and as such entitled to the protection and benefits of all the laws
passed by congress on behalf of American seamen, and subject to all their obligations
and liabilities.”).
46. See id. at 456–57 (outlining the events of the murder and trial).
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trial, the Supreme Court flatly concluded that the Constitution
has no operation outside of the legal border of the United
States.47 This bright-line interpretation was a display of what
many now refer to as a strict territorial view of constitutional
domain.48 More importantly, by couching its language in terms of
the claimant’s relative place,49 rather than the claimant’s class of
membership or cause for asserting constitutional coverage, the
Court solidified a geographic view of the Constitution’s province
that would predominate in case law for years to come.50
The issue garnered significant attention at the turn of the
century as a result of U.S. imperial ambitions to expand
overseas.51 Considerable dispute surrounded the acquisition of
Hawaii and other islands ceded to the United States in the
Spanish-American war.52 In a series of opinions generically
known as the Insular Cases,53 the Court resolved the lingering
47. See id. at 464 (“The constitution can have no operation in another country.”).
48. See Burnett, supra note 9, at 997 (portraying Ross Court as espousing a model of
“strict territoriality”); Neuman, supra note 6, at 918 n.39 (same); see also Cleveland, supra
note 6, at 23 (explaining territoriality as deriving from principle that “a sovereign’s
jurisdiction to legally regulate conduct was coterminous with its territory”).
49. See In re Ross, 140 U.S. at 464 (“[The Fifth and Sixth Amendments] apply only
to citizens and others within the United States, or who are brought there for trial for
alleged offenses committed elsewhere, and not to residents or temporary sojourners
abroad.” (citing Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157, 181 (1891))).
50. See Neuman, supra note 6, at 918 (“Strict territoriality prevailed as dogma for
most of American constitutional history, until its overthrow in [the mid-twentieth
century].”); Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2521
(2005) (equating the “demise” of strict territoriality with developments in the midtwentieth century). But see Kent, supra note 7, at 492–96 (2007) (acknowledging that
legal thought prior to the mid-twentieth century was predominantly “territorial” but
arguing that the United States did acknowledge rights of citizens abroad during this
era).
51. See Cleveland, supra note 6, at 208 (“The acquisition provoked extensive
academic and political debate over the legal status of the territories, the scope of
congressional authority over them, and the extent of constitutional protections . . . .”);
Neuman, supra note 6, at 958–59 (describing period as age of “imperialist competition
with other great powers”).
52. See Neuman, supra note 6, at 959 (noting political controversy surrounding
constitutional status of new territorial acquisitions).
53. “Insular Cases” is an imperfect term that is used to collectively refer to the
series of cases relating to the governance of newly acquired, non-contiguous territories
at the turn of the century. E.g., JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO
RICO: THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 3 n.1 (1985). The list of cases includes
De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901), Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901),
Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901), Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244
(1901), Huus v. N.Y. & P.R. S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901), Dooley v. United States, 182
U.S. 222 (Dooley I) (1901), Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901) (Dooley II),
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issue of the Constitution’s independent force in the territorial
possessions of the United States.54 Justice White’s theory of
“territorial incorporation” emerged through these cases as the
new paradigm.55 Under this model, lands ordained by Congress
as territories gained status as part of the “United States” and thus
fell under the full umbrella of the Constitution, but
“unincorporated” possessions, which ultimately retain their
institutions and traditions, only received fundamental liberties.56
Many cite the Insular Cases for the ready proposition that the
Constitution applies “in full” within the United States, but only
provides “fundamental” coverage to unincorporated territories.57
However, the distinction is a bit more subtle: the creation of a
new legal hierarchy of territories was based on the difference in

Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901), Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190
U.S. 197 (1903), Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904), Kepner v. United States, 195
U.S. 100 (1904), Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Mendezona v. United
States, 195 U.S. 158 (1904), Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905), Trono v.
United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905), Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907), Kent
v. Porto Rico, 207 U.S. 113 (1907), Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468 (1909), Dowdell v.
United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911), Ochoa v. Hernandez, 230 U.S. 139 (1913), Ocampo
v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914), and finally Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298
(1922).
54. Of the entire group, only a handful of the Insular Cases actually reached
constitutional issues. See Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312–13 (right to jury trial); Ocampo, 234 U.S.
at 98 (same); Dowdell, 221 U.S. at 329–32 (same); Rassmussen, 197 U.S. at 528 (same);
Dorr, 195 U.S. at 148–49 (same); Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 217–18 (same); Dooley II, 183 U.S.
at 157 (Export Clause); Downes, 182 U.S. at 287 (Uniformity Clause).
55. See TORRUELLA, supra note 53, at 62–84 (identifying Justice White’s theory of
“territorial incorporation” as model to gain majority opinion in cases); Frederic R.
Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, 26 COLUM. L. REV. 823
(1926) (same).
56. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 291–93 (White, J., concurring) (first case articulating
White’s theory that distinguishes between incorporated and unincorporated territories).
57. See, e.g., José Julián Alvarez González, The Empire Strikes Out: Congressional
Ruminations on the Citizenship Status of Puerto Ricans, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 309, 319 n.38
(1990) (describing Insular Cases as standing for authority that Constitution applies in full
within incorporated territories, but only fundamental protections run to unincorporated
territories); Daniel E. Hall, Curfews, Culture and Custom in American Samoa: An Analytical
Map for Applying the U.S. Constitution to U.S. Territories, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 69, 79–
80 (2001) (same); Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., Cultural Preservation in Pacific Islands: Still a
Good Idea—and Constitutional, 27 U. HAW. L. REV. 331, 343 (2005) (same); John M. Van
Dyke, The Evolving Legal Relationships Between the United States and Its Affiliated U.S.-Flag
Islands, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 445, 449 (1992) (same). These authorities were originally
compiled by Christina Duffy Burnett in Burnett, supra note 9, at 1020 n.171, and
Burnett, supra note 8, at 808 n.40.
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objective ties to the United States.58 This doctrine again advanced
a constitutional synthesis that fell along geographic lines, but it
also inched away from strict territoriality by sustaining the
Constitution’s presence in lands not technically within the strict
legal borders of the United States due to the objective
circumstances of those places.59
The Court revisited the reach of the Constitution in 1956. In
relatively brief opinions, the Court relied on the precedent of
Ross and the Insular opinions to dispose of a set of companion
cases brought by citizens convicted abroad for the murder of
their military spouses by courts-martial without a jury trial.60 But
the following term the Court took the rare step of granting a
petition for rehearing61 and reversed itself.62 Justice Black, writing
for a plurality, started with a sweeping passage:
At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United
States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill
of Rights. The United States . . . can only act in accordance
with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution [and if]
the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is
abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of
58. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 293 (basing applicability of constitutional protection on
“an inquiry into the situation of the territory and its relations to the United States”); see
also Burnett, supra note 9, at 983–94 (contending that “the difference between
[incorporated and unincorporated] territories with respect to the application of
constitutional provisions has never been as great as courts and commentators have
argued.”).
59. See Burnett, supra note 9, at 993–99 (arguing that Boumediene was correct to
observe that the Insular Cases are best understood as extending, rather than retracting,
constitutional protections); Neuman, supra note 6, at 918 n.39 (postulating that a form
of “global due process” can be seen in the Insular Cases with regard to unincorporated
territories). Though shying away from a strict view of territoriality, this model still found
citizenship irrelevant. See Cleveland, supra note 6, at 237 (remarking that citizenship
proved “irrelevant” in the Insular Cases); Neuman, supra note 6, at 981 (perceiving that
“not even the Insular Cases relied on a distinction between the rights of American
citizens and the rights of subject peoples in the territories”).
60. See Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 475 (1956) (denying article III jury trial
right and Sixth Amendment protection to citizens convicted abroad by courts-martial);
Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956) (disposing case on basis of Kinsella).
61. See Reid v. Covert, 352 U.S. 901 (1956) (granting petition for rehearing).
62. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (plurality opinion) (“[A]fter further . . .
consideration, we conclude that the previous decisions cannot be permitted to stand.”).
Justice Harlan, the only member to flip from the original majority, curiously cited time
constraints as his reason for granting the rehearing. See id. at 65 (claiming that a serious
consideration of the questions presented “was [not] possible in the short interval
between the argument and decision of the cases in the closing days of last Term.”).

DALOIA_K-FINAL

972

5/22/2010 4:17 PM

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:957
the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should
not be stripped away just because he happens to be in
another land. This is not a novel concept.63

Black treaded directly through Ross and the Insular Cases. He
found Ross “erroneous”64 and sharply criticized the Insular Cases
for discriminating between which essential liberties to extend to
a population over which the United States exercises plenary
control.65 By making full constitutional coverage coextensive with
government action, Black favored an absolute extraterritorial
design of the Constitution—at least to the extent that citizens
were implicated.66 Although the concurring opinions of Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan reached the same result, they would have
remained true to the spirit of the Insular Cases and only afforded
citizens located abroad an abridged set of core rights.67
Specifically, Justice Harlan proposed that constitutional
protections should apply abroad in all instances when not

63. Id. at 5–6 (internal citations omitted). Ex parte Quirin bears mention because in
that case a citizen combatant was not entitled to protections of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments even though he was convicted and held within the United States. 317 U.S.
1, 44 (1942). But he was denied these protections not due to his citizenship or status,
but rather because the constitutional rights he claimed depended on the crime(s)
charged and his offenses did not give rise to their protections. See id.
64. Reid, 354 U.S. at 12.
65. See id. at 9 (“[W]e can find no warrant, in logic or otherwise, for picking and
choosing among the remarkable collection of ‘Thou shalt nots’ which were explicitly
fastened on all departments and agencies of the Federal Government by the
Constitution and its Amendments.”). Black manifested his dissatisfaction with the
Insular Cases by declaring that “neither the cases nor their reasoning should be given
any further expansion.” Id. at 14.
66. See id. (“If our foreign commitments become of such nature that the
Government can no longer satisfactorily operate within the bounds laid down by the
Constitution, that instrument can be amended by the method which it prescribes.”).
67. See id. at 53 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (advocating the “‘fundamental right’
test” as the proper basis for resolving the case); id. at 65 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I
cannot agree with the suggestion that every provision of the Constitution must always be
deemed automatically applicable to American citizens in every part of the world.”).
Those who sided with Justice Black must have perceived the unsavory consequence of
taking the position of the concurring justices in the case at hand because the jury trial
right in issue was already rejected in a series of Insular decisions as not carrying
“fundamental” status. See supra note 54 (listing the subset of Insular Cases that reached
constitutional issues). Gerald Neuman, in his seminal 1990 work, supra note 6, at 970,
notes that Justice Black’s position eventually garnered a majority three years later in a
series of companion cases involving similar issues. See Kinsella v. United States ex rel.
Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); McElroy v.
Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
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“impracticable and anomalous” to do so.68 Notwithstanding the
lack of consensus amongst the plurality, one noteworthy
observation is the Court’s shift away from a tradition steeped in
geography towards one that favors the citizen’s individual
rights.69
After over thirty years, the Court, in 1990, put limits on the
potential of Reid. Again as a plurality, the Court determined in
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez70 that the Fourth Amendment did
not prohibit a warrantless search by federal agents of an alien’s
home in Mexico after he was arrested and extradited to the
United States.71 Chief Justice Rehnquist, invoking a characteristic
social contract theory of the Constitution, reasoned that “the
people” referenced in the Fourth Amendment was a term of art
that was intentionally narrower than “person” and did not
encompass
Verdugo-Urquidez.72
Verdugo-Urquidez
was
involuntarily in the United States for only several days at the time
of the search and lacked the “substantial connections” that vest
other resident aliens with constitutional privileges.73 The Chief
Justice also dismissed Reid as limited strictly to citizens.74 Justice
Kennedy concurred, but instead endorsed Harlan’s earlier
“impracticable and anomalous” test in order to make a case-bycase determination based on the totality of circumstances.75 Many
describe Kennedy’s approach as a “global due process” view of
the Constitution that favors global application as balanced
against countervailing administrative exigencies.76 The contrast
68. Reid, 345 U.S. at 74.
69. See Neuman, supra note 6, at 968 (“Reid v. Covert thus represents a modern
realignment of the municipal law approach, taking into fuller account the exercise of
prescriptive jurisdiction over American citizens worldwide under the nationality
principle.”); Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights
Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 31 (1985) (“Reid and its progeny
abandoned the territorial view of the compact, affirming that individual rights must be
respected wherever federal officials act.”).
70. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
71. See id. at 274–75 (rejecting the contention that the Fourth Amendment protects
an alien from government search abroad).
72. Id. at 265–66.
73. Id. at 271–72.
74. See id. at 270 (“Since respondent is not a United States citizen, he can derive no
comfort from the Reid holding.”).
75. Id. at 277–78 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
76. Gerald Neuman was the first to coin this term and ascribe it to Kennedy’s
concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez. See Neuman, supra note 6, at 920 (associating global
due process with Kennedy). This characterization has gained significant recognition in
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between Rehnquist and Kennedy is of great practical import—
both would agree that the Constitution is not omnipresent, but
Kennedy’s approach suggests that, at least in some circumstances,
aliens abroad can find solace in the protections found in
Constitution.77
As the foregoing illustrates, there is a constant exchange in
the Court that precludes a settled line of precedent from
emerging from its extraterritorial jurisprudence. The resulting
impact is an uncertain normative and legal framework for
conclusively determining the geographic range of the
Constitution.
C. Habeas Corpus at the Fringe: An Issue of Standing
The judicial power of the federal courts is limited by article
III of the Constitution to the resolution of “Cases” and
“Controversies.”78 This fundamental precept ensures the
judiciary’s proper role in the tripartite system of government
envisioned in the Constitution.79 The requirement stems from a
belief that the judiciary should not use its remedial powers in a
case not properly before the courts.80
recent years. See Burnett, supra note 9, at 1030–31 (referencing Neuman’s model of
“global due process”); A. Hays Butler, The Supreme Court’s Decision in Boumediene v. Bush:
The Military Commissions Act of 2006 and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, 6 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 149, 173 (2008) (same); Kent, supra note 7, at 470 (citing Verdugo-Urquidez as a
prototypical example of “global due process”); Robert Knowles & Marc D. Falkoff,
Toward a Limited-Government Theory of Extraterritorial Detention, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 637, 661 (2007) (mentioning the concept of “global due process”).
77. See Kent, supra note 7, at 477 n.83 (indicating Kennedy left the issue of whether
aliens outside the United States can invoke Constitution open); Neuman, supra note 6,
at 975–76 (postulating that the history of “political and jurisprudential assumptions . . .
demonstrates that the distance between Rehnquist’s opinion and Kennedy’s
concurrence is wider than a superficial reading might suggest”).
78. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
79. See DiamlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (“[T]he case-orcontroversy limitation is crucial in maintaining the ‘tripartite allocation of power’ set
forth in the Constitution.” (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)); Simon v. E.
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) (stating that “[n]o principle is more
fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our system of government than the
constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies”).
80. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 341 (“If a dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the
courts have no business deciding it, or expounding the law in the course of doing so.”);
Fed. Elections Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998) (conveying that case or
controversy requirement “assures[s] that courts will not ‘pass upon . . . abstract,
intellectual problems,’ but adjudicate ‘concrete, living contest[s] between adversaries.’”
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Every party that invokes the courts’ powers must have some
personal interest at the outset of litigation in order to display that
they have “standing” in the dispute.81 To satisfy this aspect of the
case or controversy requirement, a plaintiff must, in the familiar
words of the Court, “allege personal injury fairly traceable to the
defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed
by the requested relief.”82 Standing in no way rests on the merits
of a claim; but, in a circular way, the personal injury asserted can
often turn on the legal source of the alleged harm.83 Stated
differently, the alleged injury must result from the invasion of a
legally protected interest,84 and where there is no legal right to
that interest, statutory or otherwise, a claimed invasion of that
protection results in no legal injury.85
In a habeas corpus action, there are two parties attendant to
the writ: the prisoner seeking relief and the custodian to whom

(quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(second alteration in original)).
81. U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980) (indicating that
litigants must have a “‘personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the
litigation’” to satisfy standing (quoting Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication:
The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973))); see also Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[T]he core component of standing is an essential
and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.”).
82. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
83. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (“Although standing in no way
depends on the merits of the plaintiff's contention that particular conduct is illegal, it
often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted. The actual or threatened
injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the
invasion of which creates standing.” (internal citations omitted)); Linda R.S. v. Richard
D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973) (“Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the
invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the
statute.” (citing Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (White, J.,
concurring))); Hardin v. Ky. Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 6 (1968))).
84. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 227 (2003) (“[T]o satisfy
our standing requirements, a plaintiff's alleged injury must be an invasion of a concrete
and particularized legally protected interest.” (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560)); Raines,
521 U.S. at 819 (“We have also stressed that the alleged injury must be legally and
judicially cognizable.”); cf. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 (“[T]he standing question . . . is
whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can
be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief.”).
85. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 227 (dismissing claim for lack of standing based
on interest that is not a “legally recognizable right”); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737,
752 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Because these appellees have not alleged any
legally cognizable injury . . . they lack standing.”).
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the writ is directed.86 Under current law, a federal court acts
within its jurisdiction when the custodian may be reached by the
court’s process.87 However, the prisoner seeking relief must first
have standing in order to invoke the court’s equitable power.88 In
the vast majority of habeas applications, this is not usually an
issue because it is widely recognized that the writ of habeas
corpus is available to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States.89 As a result, the Court has entertained a
variety of habeas petitions from enemy alien and enemy citizen
combatants detained within the sovereign territory of the United
States and its possessions.90
But for prisoners held abroad, the immediate question
becomes whether they are entitled to the protections of the writ
and thus have standing to challenge their detention.91 Courts
addressing the rare situation have often framed the issue in terms

86. See supra notes 21, 25, 36 and accompanying text (recognizing the prisoner who
seeks relief and his or her jailer as the two individuals involved in a habeas corpus
proceeding).
87. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (requiring the jailer’s presence in the
jurisdiction of the district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus).
88. See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text (describing the “standing” aspect
of the article III “case or controversy” requirement).
89. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (“[A]bsent suspension, the
writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual detained within the United
States.” (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2) (emphasis added)); cf. Foley Bros., Inc. v.
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (“[L]egislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is [presumed] to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.”). Quite importantly, this construction does not discriminate between aliens and
citizens. See, e.g., Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 234–35 (1953) (implying that an alien
may challenge deportation proceeding by habeas corpus under the Constitution); Clark
v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 400 (2005) (noting the historic use of statutory habeas corpus
by noncitizens (citing United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621 (1888); In re Kaine,
55 U.S. (14 How.) 103 (1852))).
90. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (entertaining application by enemy citizen
captured abroad and held on U.S. mainland); Heikkila, 345 U.S. 229 (alien subject to
deportation due to alleged membership in Communist Party); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (same); United States ex rel. Eicenlaub v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521 (alien subject to deportation for violation of Espionage Act);
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (enemy alien detained in United States and
subject to removal order); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (enemy alien tried and
detained in U.S. insular possession); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (enemy aliens
and enemy citizen imprisoned on U.S. mainland); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2
(1866) (enemy citizen held by Union state during the Civil War).
91. See supra note 85 (discerning that standing rests on protected legal interests).
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of jurisdiction.92 Jurisdiction, however, is an imprecise term with
diverse meaning.93 At bottom, the threshold issue in these cases is
more appropriately one of whether the prisoner seeking relief
has standing—i.e. that they hold a legally protected interest in
habeas review—to challenge their detention.94 This is the
primary focus of the hypothetical cases presented in Part III.C.
II. THE CONTEXT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION
Boumediene broke historic ground in June 2008 by
undertaking a thorough review of the Suspension Clause and
extending its protections to a group of prisoners detained
outside of the United States.95 The case, however, did not arise by
mere happenstance. It was one of many challenges initiated by
prisoners detained in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001.96 This Part will set out the events that forced
the Court to focus on the Suspension Clause for the first time in
92. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004) (“These two cases present the
narrow but important question whether the United States courts lack jurisdiction to
consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured
abroad.”); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765 (1950) (“The ultimate question in
this case is one of jurisdiction of civil courts of the United States vis-a-vis military
authorities in dealing with enemy aliens overseas.”); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197,
199 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“There is an important question of jurisdiction
that lies at the threshold of these cases.”).
93. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 867–71 (listing numerous
meanings). As observed by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in Al
Maqaleh v. Gates, “jurisdiction” is a nebulous term that carries with it over fifty
recognized definitions. 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 222–23 (2009).
94. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct.. 2229, 2262 (2008) (“Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of
the Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo Bay. . . . Petitioners, therefore, are
entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention.”);
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475 (“The question now before us is whether the habeas statute
confers a right to judicial review of the legality of executive detentions of aliens in a
territory over which the United States exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, but
not ‘ultimate sovereignty.’”); cf. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777 (“The foregoing
demonstrates how much further we must go if we are to invest these enemy aliens . . .
with standing to demand access to our courts.”).
95. See infa notes 242–51.
96. For a sampling of important federal cases initiated by these prisoners, see
Torture’sNotUs.net, Court Cases, http://www.torturesnotus.net/pb/wp_162218b9/
wp_162218b9.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (listing various cases at different stages of
litigation in federal courts). The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia also
maintains a website that provides regular updates on all pending cases related to
Guantánamo detentions. See U.S. Dist. Ct. for the D.C., Guantanamo Bay Case
Information, http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/public-docs/gitmo (last visited Apr. 3, 2010)
(supplying docket updates on all pending cases).
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recent history. First, Part II.A provides a brief summary of the
U.S. commitment to embark on a “war on terror,” and the
nature of the military campaigns waged as part of that resolve.
Part II.B explains the character of the detentions carried out by
U.S. forces during this war. Part II.C rounds out the discussion
with an overview of the legal challenges to these detentions that
set the stage for a modern revival of the Suspension Clause.
A. September 11th and the “War on Terror”
On September 11, 2001, commercial airplanes were used to
attack the World Trade Center in New York City and the
Pentagon defense complex in Arlington, Virginia (“September
11th” or “9/11”), causing the single largest loss of life on U.S.
soil due to a hostile attack.97 President Bush soon informed
Congress and the public that the Al Qaeda terrorist network was
behind the attacks and described a new approach that the United
States would take against those responsible as a “war on terror.”98
Congress swiftly reacted with a joint resolution known as the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) that granted
the President the power to use “all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
[September 11th attacks] or harbored such organizations.”99
97. See 9/11 COMM’N, 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 311 (2004), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf. The report estimates that a total of
2973 persons lost their life as an immediate result of the attacks. Id.
98. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response
to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1347 (Sept. 20,
2001) [hereinafter 9/11 Joint Session Speech] (reproducing text of speech). Al Qaeda
eventually conceded involvement, see Full Transcript of Bin Laden’s Speech, AL-JAZEERA,
Nov.
2,
2004,
http://web.archive.org/web/20070613014620/http://
english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=7403 (providing translation of
original video aired on the Arab media network Al-Jazeera), after initially equivocating.
see Bin Laden Says He Wasn’t Behind Attacks, CNN, Sept. 17, 2001,
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/inv.binladen.denial/ (quoting Bin Laden as
stating “I would like to assure the world that I did not plan the recent attacks, which
seems to have been planned by people for personal reasons.”); Tom Bowman et al.,
Taliban Face Ultimatum Warnings: Give Up Bin Laden or Feel the ‘Full Wrath’ of U.S., BALT.
SUN, Sept. 17, 2001, at 1A (reporting that bin Laden issued a statement denying
responsibility for attacks).
99. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, §2(a), 115 Stat. 224
(codified in note at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)).
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Vested with this broad authority, the President issued an
expansive military directive on November 13, 2001 that
authorized the indefinite detainment of individuals suspected of
terrorism without formal charges100 and the option to try them by
military commission.101
As is described at length elsewhere,102 the United States
initiated attacks in Afghanistan and later in Iraq in order to
achieve its ambition of obstructing terrorism. While both
missions were successful in ousting the incumbent government
from control,103 U.S. forces have since remained in each country
in order to fulfill a handful of responsibilities.
During the nascent stages of the military campaign in
Afghanistan in 2001, the United Nations (“U.N.”) Security
Council authorized the creation of a temporary international
security assistance force (“ISAF”) comprised of several dozen
countries to patrol Kabul and the surrounding locale.104 At the
request of the U.N. and the Afghan government, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) assumed responsibility
over the ISAF and expanded operations to the whole of the
country.105 In late 2002, the United States and the Afghan
100. See Military Order—Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens
in the War Against Terrorism, § 2(a)(1), 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1665, 1666 (Nov.
13, 2001) (subjecting to the order any person who “is or was a member of . . . al Qaida”
or “has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international
terrorism” that are adverse to the United States).
101. See id. § 4(a) (“Any individual subject to this order shall, when tried, be tried
by military commission for any and all offenses triable by military commission . . . .”).
102. See generally AMERICA’S WAR ON TERROR (Tom Lansford et al. eds., 2d ed.
2009) (collecting essays on the causes and implications of the war on terror); RICHARD
A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES (2004) (providing a detailed account on the
motivations to launch attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq); JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE:
THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN
IDEALS (2008) (same).
103. See generally TOMMY FRANKS, AMERICAN SOLDIER (2004) (providing a first-hand
account of the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq); DAVID E. THALER ET AL.,
FUTURE U.S. SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN (2008) (outlining
the U.S. objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq).
104. See S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (2001) (authorizing the creation of
a security force).
105. See Press Release, N. Atlantic Treaty Org. [NATO], NATO to Assume
Command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul on Monday, 11
August 2003 (Aug. 8, 2003) available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03091e.htm (announcing change in control); see also S.C. Res. 1510, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1510 (2003) (expanding mandate from Kabul to the entire country). Under the
command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, forty-two nations voluntarily
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government formalized a status of forces agreement (“SOFA-A”)
through an exchange of diplomatic notes that governs the
presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.106 In part due to the
agreement’s broad language, U.S. forces are endowed with
considerable authority to act as they need and the instrument
cedes criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel to the United
States.107 Most recently, U.S. President Barack Obama authorized
a 17,000-soldier troop surge in Afghanistan in order to realize the
goal of uprooting Al-Qaeda.108
As for Iraq, the United States led a multinational force

contribute troops and each province in Afghanistan falls under the care of a
participating nation. See NATO, ISAF Contributing Nations, http://www.nato.int/isaf/
structure/nations/index.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (listing participating nations);
NATO, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/prt/
index.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (outlining regional breakdown). For a map
depicting the breakdown of forces, see NATO, Map of Afghanistan Showing the Regional
Commands (ISAF RCs) and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ISAF PRTs) (Apr. 3, 2009),
http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/maps/graphics/afganistan_prt_rc.pdf
(last
visited Apr. 3, 2010).
106. See Agreement Regarding the Status of United States Military and Civilian
Personnel of the U.S. Department of Defense Present in Afghanistan in Connection with
Cooperative Efforts in Response to Terrorism, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance,
Military Training and Exercises, and Other Activities, U.S.-Afg., May 23, 2003, Temp.
State Dep’t No. 03-67, 2003 WL 21754316 [hereinafter U.S.-Afg. SOFA]. For a copy of
the original documents, see Declaration of Colonel Charles A. Tennison Ex. 2 (attached
as Ex. 1 to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus), Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2009) (No. 06-CV01669), available at http://sites.google.com/a/ijnetwork.org/bagram-public-library/
Home/maqaleh/18.1Exhibits.pdf [hereinafter Tennison Decl.] (attaching as an exhibit
a copy of original diplomatic notes). Despite attempts to arrange a new compact, the
SOFA-A still remains in effect. See Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan
Strategic Partnership, U.S.-Afg., 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 863, 864 (May 23, 2005)
(committing to “develop appropriate arrangements and agreements” to spell out terms
of U.S. authority in Afghanistan); Karen DeYoung, Only a Two-Page 'Note' Governs U.S.
Military in Afghanistan, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2008, at A07 (reporting that the diplomatic
note still controls U.S. presence, notwithstanding the May 2005 Joint Declaration).
107. U.S.-Afg. SOFA, supra note 106, ¶¶ 5, 7 (granting to the United States the
right to “exercise criminal jurisdiction over United States personnel” and to “import
into, export out of, and use in the Republic of Afghanistan any personal property,
equipment, supplies, materials, technology, training or services required to implement
this agreement.”).
108. See Statement on United States Troop Levels in Afghanistanm 2009 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 89 (Feb. 17, 2009) (announcing a troop surge in Afghanistan); see also
Helene Cooper, Putting Stamp on Afghan War, Obama Will Send 17,000 Troops, Feb. 18,
2009, N.Y. TIMES, at A1 (specifying that President Obama authorized a deployment of
17,000 troops to Afghanistan).
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(“MNF-I”) under the authority of a sweeping mandate.109 The
Security Council periodically renewed the mandate of the MNF-I
at the request of the Iraqi government in order to quell surges in
violence.110 Before this grant expired, the Iraqi and U.S.
governments formalized a status of forces agreement (“SOFA-I”)
permitting U.S. forces, as separate from other MNF-I coalition
members, to remain in Iraq through the end of 2011.111 The
SOFA-I requests U.S. “assistance” in “maintain[ing] security and
stability in Iraq.”112 At first blush, this language may appear to
parallel the authority granted to the MNF-I by the U.N. Security
Council.113 But the SOFA-I makes all U.S. military actions subject
to the supervision of a joint oversight committee.114 This
partnership reflects the desire for Iraqi authorities to assume full
control over security detail as the United States gradually
withdraws forces.115 As part of this strategy, U.S. President Barack
109. See S.C. Res. 1511, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (2003) (authorizing “a
multinational force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute
to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq” for the lifetime of the interim
governing body known as the Coalition Provisional Authority); cf. Gregory H. Fox, The
Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO J. INT’L L. 195, 202 (2005) (qualifying the United States and
United Kingdom as “occupying powers” during this period).
110. See S.C. Res. 1546, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004) (extending
mandate of Iraq multinational force (“MNF-I”) in order to promote “restoration of
stability” in light of June 5, 2004 request from Iraqi authorities); S.C. Res. 1723, ¶ 1,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1723 (Nov. 28, 2006) (extending mandate through end of 2007); S.C.
Res. 1790, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1790 (Dec. 18, 2007) (extending mandate through
end of 2008).
111. See Agreement Between the United States of American and the Republic of
Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their
Activities During Their Temporary Presence In Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, art. 24, Nov. 17, 2008,
Temp. State Dep’t No. 09-6 [hereinafter U.S.-Iraq SOFA], available at https://www.mnfiraq.com/images/CGs_Messages/security_agreement.pdf (formalizing a timetable for
U.S. withdrawl).
112. Id. art. 4.
113. Compare id. (requesting U.S. forces “for the purposes of supporting Iraq in its
efforts to maintain security and stability in Iraq”), with S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 109
(authorizing a multinational force “to take all necessary measures to contribute to the
maintenance of security and stability in Iraq”).
114. U.S.-Iraq SOFA, supra note 111, art. 4 (“All military operations that are carried
out pursuant to this Agreement . . . shall be fully coordinated with Iraqi authorities
[under the supervision of] a Joint Military Operations Coordination Committee
(JMOCC) to be established pursuant to this agreement.”).
115. Id. art. 24 (“Recognizing the performance and increasing capacity of the Iraqi
Security Forces [and] the assumption of full responsibility by those Forces . . . [The
United States agrees to withdraw forces by December 31, 2011].”); Larisa Epatko,
Detention Centers in Iraq Move from 'Chaos' to Reform, NEWS HOUR, June 20, 2008,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/middle_east/iraq/jan-june08/
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Obama announced an expedited withdrawal of U.S. forces after
assuming office in January 2009, but made no mention of any
changes as to their on-ground responsibilities.116
B.

Detention Abroad and at Home

As an initial matter, it is worth noting that the war waged
against terrorism was not confined to the Afghan and Iraqi
borders. Detainees have alleged capture off the battlefield in
locations as diverse as Bosnia and Herzegovina,117 Djibouti,118
Dubai,119 Egypt,120 Gambia,121 Italy,122 Jordan,123 Macedonia,124
Pakistan,125 Thailand,126 Sweden,127 the United Arab Emirates,128
and even the United States.129 Ultimately, though, the vast
majority of individuals detained in this war ended up in one of
several notable long-term holding facilities and the United States
operates a number of other sites that could potentially be used
for similar purposes. This section will review the detention
practices engaged in by the United States as part of its war on
detainees_06-20.html (summarizing Iraqi official as stating “the goal is to put Iraqis in
charge and develop a way for the Iraqi legal system to handle the thousands of people
already in detention”).
116. See Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 109
(Feb. 27, 2009) (“Today, I can announce that . . . the United States will pursue a new
strategy to end the war in Iraq through a transition to full Iraqi responsibility. . . . [L]et
me say this as plainly as I can: by August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will
end.”).
117. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241 (2008).
118. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen
“High Value Detainees” in CIA Custody 5 (Feb. 2007), http://www.nybooks.com/icrcreport.pdf [hereinafter ICRC RENDITION REPORT] (prisoner Guleed).
119. Id. (prisoner Nashiri).
120. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 472 n.4 (2004).
121. Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2241.
122. European Parliament Resoution on the Alleged Use of European Countries by
the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, 2007 O.J. C 287
E/309, at 316 [hereinafter European Parliament Rendition Report].
123. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1131 (N.D. Cal.
2008).
124. El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532–33 (E.D. Va. 2006).
125. E.g., Mohamed, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1130.
126. E.g., Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209 (D.D.C. 2009) (petitioner
al Bakri).
127. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Communication No. 233/2003 (Agiza v. Sweden),
¶ 1.1, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (May 24, 2005).
128. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 209 (petitioner Wazir).
129. E.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004).
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terror.
1. Detention Abroad
At the inception of the Afghan offensive in late 2001, the
U.S. military preferred that Afghan militiamen hold valuable
prisoners detained in the conflict.130 As U.S. presence grew, the
Department of Defense (“DOD”) announced that they sought to
take custody of prisoners in order to gather intelligence.131 As for
the separate mission in Iraq, U.S. forces performed several
functions for the Iraqi government under the broad U.N.
mandate of the MNF-I.132 One of their functions was to detain
individuals posing a threat to Iraqi security.133 In addition to
persons posing a security risk to Iraq, the MNF-I also agreed to
take custody of individuals standing trial on domestic charges for
the Iraqi government because a large portion of the country’s
security infrastructure was impaired as a result of the U.S.
invasion.134

130. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Rumsfeld: Taliban, Al Qaeda
Dangerous
Like
Wounded
Animals
(Dec.
11,
2001),
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44377 (“Till [sic] now, American
commanders had preferred to allow opposition groups to handle all prisoners, saying
America didn’t have enough of a presence in the region to effectively handle
prisoners.”).
131. See id. (“American forces in Afghanistan w[ill] soon start taking prisoners . . . .
American forces can gather valuable intelligence information from ‘detainees.’”)
132. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text (vesting MNF-I with authority
to provide security in Iraq).
133. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text (permitting detention as an
aspect of providing security in Iraq).
134. See Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2213 (2008) (“Iraq retains ultimate
responsibility for the arrest and imprisonment of individuals who violate its laws, but
because many of Iraq’s prison facilities have been destroyed, the MNF-I agreed to
maintain physical custody of many such individuals during Iraqi criminal
proceedings.”); U.S. Military May Abandon Abu Ghraib, USA TODAY, Mar. 8, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-03-08-abu-ghraib_x.htm
(paraphrasing a U.S. commander as stating, “prisoners [detained by U.S. forces] were
divided into two groups—‘security detainees’ under American control, and common
Iraqi criminals under the control of the Iraqi judicial system.”); ANTONIO TAGUBA, U.S.
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE
BRIGADE
10
(2004),
available
at
http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/
prison_abuse_report.pdf [hereinafter TAGUBA REPORT] (“[D]ue to a lack of adequate
Iraqi facilities, Iraqi criminals (generally Iraqi-on-Iraqi crimes) are detained with security
internees (generally Iraqi-on-Coalition offenses) . . . in the same facilities.”).
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a. Guantánamo Bay Naval Station

The first long-term holding facility used by the United States
to detain individuals captured on the battlefield was, rather
unusually, located far off the battlefield at a site known as
Guantánamo Bay. Guantánamo Bay is a naturally fortified inlet
on the southeastern edge of Cuba.135
By way of historic background, U.S. forces overtook the area
around Guantánamo Bay during the Spanish-American War and
established military barracks as a base of operations.136 The
United States assumed control over the whole of Cuba following
the end of the war in 1898.137 Although the United States
eventually ceded control back to Cuba, they retained a small
portion of the island as their own. A rider appended to a U.S.
army appropriations bill and likewise annexed to the newly
ratified Cuban constitution, popularly known as the Platt
Amendment, outlined the terms of U.S. withdrawal from the
country.138 Among the conditions was a demand that Cuba agree
to lease or sell territory on the island to the United States for
purposes of coaling and a naval station.139 In 1903, the first
President of Cuba granted a lease agreement to the United States
135. See 5 ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA 532 (2002).
136. See MARION EMERSON MURPHY, THE HISTORY OF GUANTANAMO BAY ch. 2
(1953) (outlining the Cuba invasion); With the Fleet Off Santiago; A $200,000
Bombardment—Cubans Capture a Spanish Camp—Famine Menaces the Enemy, N.Y. TIMES,
June 14, 1898, at A1 (reporting that “the fine harbor [at Guantánamo Bay] will make a
good American base”).
137. See Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Spain, art. I, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754 (“Spain
relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.”); see also KENNETH E.
HENDRICKSON, THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 77 (2003) (suggesting political interests as
the reason for U.S. post-war occupation of Cuba); HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492–PRESENT 309 (2003) (observing that the United States
assumed military control of Cuba after defeating Spain).
138. See Act of Mar. 12, 1901, ch. 803, 31 Stat. 895, 897–98 (1901); The United States,
Cuba, and the Platt Amendment, 1901, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
ho/time/ip/86557.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (detailing the history of the Platt
Amendment).
139. See Act of Mar. 12, 1901 § 7 (“[T]he government of Cuba will sell or lease to
the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations . . . to be agreed upon
with the President of the United States.”). The language employed in the Platt
Amendment superseded a prior U.S. commitment, made at the outset of the SpanishAmerican war, to “disclaim[] any . . . intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or
control over [Cuba]” and furthermore “leave the government and control of [Cuba] to
its people” following the defeat of Spain. Act of April 20, 1898, ch. 24, art. 4, 30 Stat.
738, 739 (1898) (joint resolution of Congress popularly known as the “Teller
Amendment”).
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over an area comprising about forty-five square miles of land and
water around Guantánamo Bay.140 Notably, the lease stipulated
that the United States would exercise “complete jurisdiction and
control” over the area while Cuba would retain “ultimate
sovereignty.”141 In 1934, the two parties entered into a treaty
containing a proviso that the lease would remain in effect “[s]o
long as the United States of America shall not abandon the said
naval station,” or both parties agree to abandon the lease.142
On December 21, 2001, the United States announced that it
would use the naval station at Guantánamo Bay to hold suspects
recently detained by the military in Afghanistan.143 The Bush
administration sought a location to house detainees where it
could exercise a high level of control with minimal oversight or
restraint and turned to the base at Guantánamo Bay for its
unique location and legal status.144 The President was advised by
140. See MURPHY, supra note 136, ch. 3 (describing in detail the geography of land
TODAY,
acquired
under
lease);
History
of
Guantanamo,
CUBA
http://www.cubatoday.com/guantanamo-bay/history/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2010)
(recognizing the first Cuban President Tomás Estrada Palma as the individual to offer
the lease). For the full text of the lease, see Agreement Between the United States and
Cuba for the Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, February 23,
1903, T.S. No. 418 [hereinafter 1903 Cuba Lease] (reproducing the text of the
agreement).
141. 1903 Cuba Lease, supra note 140, art. 3 (emphasis added); see also MURPHY,
supra note 136, ch. 3 (interpreting the jurisdiction and control provisions as
interrupting Cuban sovereignty).
142. See Treaty Between the United States and Cuba Defining Their Relations, May
29, 1934, U.S.-Cuba, Art. 3, 48 Stat. 1682. The 1934 treaty effectively abrogated the Platt
Amendment, which defined Cuban-American relations up through that time, but most
of its language was substantially incorporated into the text of the agreement. See id.
pmbl. (incorporating an excerpt of the Platt Amendment into the body of the
agreement).
143. See News Briefing, Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Defense (Dec. 27, 2001),
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2696
(conceeding that U.S. government is “making preparations to hold detainees” at
Guantánamo Bay); Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: The Detention Camp; U.S. to
Hold Taliban Detainees in ‘the Least Worst Place,’ N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2001 at B6 (reporting
that U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that Guantánamo Bay
would be used to detain Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters).
144. See KAREN J. GREENBERG, THE LEAST WORST PLACE: GUANTANAMO’S FIRST 100
DAYS 5–6 (2009) (providing that officials sought a location that would not be hampered
by diplomatic negotiations, intergovernmental oversight, or U.S. law); JANE MAYER,
supra note 102, at 147 (indicating that Guantánamo Bay was selected for its “unique
legal status” of being “under U.S. control but not under U.S. law”). The administration
initially considered a diverse host of other locations as potential sites for detention, but
discarded them for various practical or political reasons. See GREENBERG, supra, at 4–5
(citing America Samoa, Diego Garcia, Germany, Guam, the Marshall Islands, Pakistan,
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attorneys within the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) that
Guantánamo Bay fell beyond the reach of U.S. courts and that
the Geneva Conventions were inapplicable to anyone detained at
the base.145 On the advice of the DOJ, the Bush administration
began labeling individuals captured as part of the U.S. war on
terror as “illegal enemy combatants,”146 in an effort to sidestep
Poland, Tinian, and Wake Island as other areas considered by administration); see also
Esther Schrader, POWs Will Go to Base in Cuba; Military: Rumsfeld Calls Guantanamo Bay
‘Least Worst Place’ for Taliban and Al Qaeda Fighters, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2001, at A1
(“Other, more remote sites mentioned have included Guam and Wake Island in the
Pacific.”); Seelye, supra note 143 (“Officials said the other options had included Guam
. . . and ships at sea . . . .”).
145. See Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, & John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Possible Habeas
Jurisdiction Over Aliens Held in Guantanamo Bay Cuba 1 (Dec. 28, 2001) (“We
conclude that the great weight of legal authority indicates that a federal court could not
properly exercise habeas jurisdiction over an alien detained at [Guantánamo Bay].”);
Draft Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
& Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to William J. Haynes, II,
General Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda
and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002) (“We conclude that [the Geneva Conventions] do
not protect members of the al Qaeda organization . . . . We further conclude that these
treaties do not apply to the Taliban militia.”). These, along with other U.S. Department
of Justice memoranda from the same time period, are collected in THE TORTURE
PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 29–79 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua l. Dratel eds.,
2005). The third Geneva Convention is one in a series of international treaties that
provides various minimal protections for “prisoners of war.” Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.
135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]. U.S. case law embraces the international
and customary understanding that “lawful combatants” receive “prisoner of war” status,
whereas those unlawfully engaged in hostilities are separately subject to trial under
domestic law. See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) (proclaiming that “[b]y
universal agreement and practice the law of war draws a distinction between . . . those
who are lawful and unlawful combatants”); Official Statement, ICRC, The Relevance of
IHL in the Context of Terrorism (July 21, 2005), http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/
siteeng0.nsf/html/terrorism-ihl-210705 (“Unlawful combatants do not qualify for
prisoner of war status. . . . This protection is not the same as that afforded to lawful
combatants. To the contrary, [such persons] may be prosecuted under domestic law for
directly participating in hostilities.”).
146. The status “illegal enemy combatant” is a mix of several terms of art. The laws
of war differentiate between “combatants,” as members of a nation’s militia, and
“citizens,” as all other persons. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 145, arts. 2, 4,
5, (defining the legal status of “prisoner of war”); Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 (defining the legal status of “protected persons” not taking part in
hostilities). Civilian, therefore, is a legal class of persons not subject to military seizure.
Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 178 n.8 (4th Cir. 2007) (indicating that civilians are
not subject to military seizure under international humanitarian law). Likewise,
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these requirements.147 The practical effect of concurrently
precluding U.S. jurisdiction and international humanitarian law
from Guantánamo Bay was the creation of a law-free zone that
many labeled as a “legal black hole.”148 As a result, the
administration quickly garnered sharp criticism from
international
non-profit
organizations,149
professional

“combatant” does not imply wrongdoing but is simply a category of persons with
different rights than “citizens.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522 n.1 (2004)
(characterizing “combatant” status as a “legal category”). Although the term “enemy
combatant” is the source of recent controversy, the Court has historically used it with
regularity to refer to a combatant with adversarial allegiances. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 522
n.1; Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 355 (1952); In re Yamashita 327 U.S. 1, 7 (1946);
Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31. Consistent with these principles, an enemy combatant
who commits hostile acts beyond the bounds prescribed by the laws of war is subject to
military tribunal as an unlawful, or illegal, combatant. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 35 (“[O]ur
Government has likewise recognized that those who during time of war pass
surreptitiously from enemy territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry,
for the commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life or property, have the
status of unlawful combatants punishable as such by military commission.”); see also
Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (recognizing that the trial of “unlawful combatants” is
widely accepted).
147. See Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 107 (“Soon
after September 11th, [Justice Department lawyers] began advising President Bush that
he did not have to comply with the Geneva Conventions in handling detainees in the
war on terror. The lawyers classified these detainees not as civilians or prisoners of war—
two categories of individuals protected by the Conventions—but as ‘illegal enemy
combatants.’”); see also Adam Roberts, The Laws of War, in ATTACKING TERRORISM:
ELEMENTS OF A GRAND STRATEGY 186, 202–06 (Audrey Kurth Cronin & James M. Ludes
eds., 2004) (identifying origins and initial use of an indeterminate status with fewer
protections than “prisoner of war” following September 11th attacks).
148. See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 50, at 2547 (utilizing the term “black hole” with
reference to Guantánamo); Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122
HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1133 (2009) (same). Johan Steyn, a prominent English jurist, is
generally credited as the first to coin this term during a November 23, 2003, speech that
is reproduced in Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 1
(2004) (“The most powerful democracy is detaining hundreds of suspected foot soldiers
of the Taliban in a legal black hole at the United States naval base at Guantanamo
Bay . . . .”). The term, as used in reference to the detention camp at Guantánamo Bay,
however, first originated in an earlier English Court of Appeals case. R ex rel. Abbasi v.
Sec’y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598, [22],
(2002) 126 I.L.R. 686, 697 (paraphrasing counsel as arguing that his client sits in a
“legal black hole”).
149. See, e.g., Richard Wilson, Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: The Inter-American
Human Rights Commission Responds to a “Legal Black Hole”, 10 HUM. RIGHTS BRIEF 2
(2003) (denouncing the ongoing detention practices at Guantánamo); Amnesty Int’l,
USA: AI Calls on the USA to End Legal Limbo of Guantánamo Prisoners, AI Index No. AMR
51/009/2002 (Jan. 15, 2002) (calling on the United States to end “legal limbo” of
detainees); Press Release, ICRC, ICRC President Urges Progress on Detention-Related
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associations,150 and scholars151 worldwide.
b. Afghanistan
The first facilities used for detaining prisoners captured in
the Afghan offensive were, quite practically, makeshift sites
located near the battlefront in Afghanistan.152 A camp at Bagram
airfield evolved to become the sole U.S.-managed detention site
in Afghanistan.153
The United States took possession of the abandoned
Bagram airfield after removing the Taliban from control during
the 2001 invasion.154 Without an aviation need for the space, the
Issues (Jan. 16, 2004), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/
5v9te8?opendocument (lamenting that detention conditions are subpar).
150. See, e.g., Press Release, Int’l Bar Ass’n, Guantanamo Bay Detainees are Entitled
to Challenge Their Detention in Court, IBA Human Rights Institute Briefs US Supreme
Court (Jan. 25, 2004), available at http://www.ibanet.org/article/detail.aspx?articleuid=
dbb08456-daF6-42e4-b6d5-204141e6457a (criticizing military for holding detainees
outside legal framework); see also Jonathan D. Glater, A.B.A. Urges Wider Rights in Cases
Tried by Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2003, at A18 (lobbying for access to lawyers).
151. See, e.g., Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt:
Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002) (arguing that the military tribunal
erected to try Guantánamo detainees is unconstitutional); Harold Hongju Koh, The Case
Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 337 (2002) (contending that the military
commission at Guantánamo undermines the separation-of-powers design).
152. See Linda Kozaryn, U.S. to Question Detainees, AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Dec.
18, 2001, available at http://www.defense.gov//news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44340
(reporting that the initial detainees were en route to facilities at Kandahar Airport and
aboard the U.S.S. Peleliu); News Briefing, U.S. Gen. Richard B. Myers (Jan. 7, 2002),
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1082
(“There are 302 being held at Kandahar, 38 at Bagram, 16 at Mazar-e Sharif [sic], and
eight on the [U.S.S.] Bataan.”); News Briefing, Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Defense
(Jan.
16,
2002),
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2197 (recounting that “[t]he preliminary interrogations
took place in the locations where the detainees had previously been in custody,
essentially Kandahar and Bagram, but also some other places”).
153. See News Briefing, U.S. Gen. Tommy Franks (Oct. 29, 2002), available at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3800 (“I think at one
point we had perhaps two—one in Kandahar, one up in the vicinity of Kabul at Bagram
air base. Now we use one that is up in the vicinity of Bagram.”); see also Eric Schmitt &
Tim Golden, U.S. Set to Build Big New Prison in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2008, at
A1 (confirming that “[a]fter [Bagram] was set up in early 2002, it became the primary
site for screening prisoners captured in the fighting.”).
154. See Michael R. Gordon, Securing Base, U.S. Makes Its Brawn Blend In, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 3, 2001, at B1 (detailing U.S. occupation of base in December 2001); Eliza
Griswold, The Other Guantanamo: Black Hole, NEW REPUBLIC, May 2, 2007, at 9 (“In late
2001, as it trounced the Taliban, the United States took possession of the base and
outfitted [the base] to detain captured combatants.”).
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military converted a vacant hangar into a makeshift detention
facility now known as Bagram Theater Internment Facility
(“Bagram”).155 The United States eventually legitimized its use of
the space in an indefinite lease agreement with the Afghan
government on September 28, 2006.156 By its terms, U.S. forces
are provided with exclusive use of the base.157 Although the lease
is theoretically indefinite, the United States has signaled that it
intends to occupy Bagram only as long as necessary to complete
its military mission and assist Afghanistan in attaining full
sovereignty.158
The military initially used Bagram as a clearinghouse to
screen out from the pool of worldwide prisoners those who
merited transfer to Guantánamo Bay.159 However, after a
155. See Tim Golden, Topics, Bagram Detention Center (Afghanistan), N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 2, 2009, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/b/
bagram_air_base_afghanistan/index.html (describing location of detention center and
name of facility); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 101st Division Soldiers to
Relieve 15th MEU in Afghanistan (Dec. 31, 2001) available at http://www.defense.gov/
news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44313 (first official statement acknowledging seven detainees
at Bagram air base).
156. See Accommodation Consignment Agreement for Lands and Facilities at
Bagram Airfield Between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Represented by His
Excellency General Abdul Rahim Wardak Minister of Defense of the Office of the
Ministry of Defense and the United States of America, U.S.-Afg., ¶ 4, U.S.-Afg., Sept. 28,
2006 [hereinafter Bagram Lease] (“[T]his Agreement . . . shall continue until the
United States or its successors determine that the Premises are no longer required for its
use.”). For the full text of this lease, see Declaration of Colonel Rose M. Miller Ex. 1,
(attached as Ex. A to Respondent’s Response to Order to Show Cause and Motion to
Dismiss or Lack of Jurisdiction), Ruzatullah v. Gates, No. 06-CV-01707 (D.D.C. Nov. 20,
2006), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-ofcolumbia/dcdce/1:2006cv01707/122762/5/2.pdf [hereinafter Miller Decl.].
157. See Bagram Lease, supra note 156, ¶ 9 (granting the United States “exclusive,
peaceable, undisturbed and uninterrupted possession” of the airbase).
158. See Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership,
supra note 106 (embracing a partnership that envisions Afghan assumption of full
control as resources increase); Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for
Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 196, at 4 (Mar. 27, 2009)
(“[W]e will shift the emphasis of our mission to training and increasing the size of
Afghan security forces, so that they can eventually take the lead in securing their country
[and] bring our own troops home.”).
159. See News Briefing, Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Defense (Jan. 27, 2002),
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2348
(“[W]hat they’ve done at Bagram and Kandahar is to sort through these people . . . and
make judgments as to who they believe to be ones that might prove to be particularly
useful from an information standpoint and sent a group of them [to Guantánamo].”);
see also Tim Golden & Eric Schmitt, A Growing Afghan Prison Rivals Bleak Guantánamo,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, at A1 (explaining that in early days of Bagram “[m]ilitary and
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Supreme Court ruling adverse to the Guantánamo detention
practice,160 this process ceased and Bagram became the preferred
destination for indefinite detention.161 Because of this
reshuffling, the prison’s population increased six fold by 2009 to
a level of somewhere between 550 and 630.162 A vast majority of
these detainees came from the Afghan battlefield, but a small
segment of prisoners were relocated to Bagram from remote
areas of the world.163

intelligence personnel there sifted through captured Afghan rebels and suspected
terrorists seized in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere, sending the most valuable and
dangerous to Guantánamo for extensive interrogation, and generally releasing the
rest.”); Griswold, supra note 154 (“The detention facility was [initially] designed as a
short-term collection point, where American interrogators sorted erroneous and lowlevel captures from those of higher intelligence value.”); Human Rights First, Arbitrary
Justice: Trials of Bagram and Guantánamo Detainees in Afghanistan 8 (2008), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/usls-080409-arbitrary-justice-report.pdf
(“Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, many detainees initially were held in
Bagram and then transferred to Guantánamo.”).
160. See discussion infra notes 209–12 (extending statutory habeas corpus relief to
prisoners detained at Guantánamo).
161. See Golden, supra note 159 (ascribing the influx of detainees to the “Bush
administration decision to shut off the flow of detainees into Guantánamo after the
Supreme Court ruled that those prisoners had some basic due-process rights”); Daphne
Eviatar, Bagram’s Black Hole: Guantanamo Bay Was Bad Enough—Bagram Is Worse, AM.
LAW., Fall 2008 Supp., at 78 (providing that the “unintended consequence” of successful
lawsuits prompted the U.S. military to “stop[] sending captured suspects to
Guantánamo”); see also JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 176 (2007) (identifying “a cabinet-level meeting [on] September
14, 2004” as time at which the decision was made). The official change of title from
Bagram Collection Point to Bagram Theater Internment Facility is indicative of this
shift. Compare News Briefing, Lt. Gen. David Barno (June 17, 2004), available at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3345
(“Bagram
Collection Point”), with Battle in Afhanistan Leaves One U.S. Servicemember, One Enemy
Dead, AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 15, 2005, http://www.defense.gov/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=18526 (“Bagram Theater Internment Facility”).
162. Compare Golden, supra note 155 (estimating 630 as the prison’s population as
of November 2009), with US Detention Related to the Fight Against Terrorism—The Role of the
ICRC, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (Apr. 3, 2009) (estimating 550 as the population in mid2009).
163. See Golden, supra note 155 (observing that “all but about 30 [of the 630
Bagram detainees] are Afghans” but some are “brought there from as far away as central
Africa and Southeast Asia”); ACLU on Obama, Bagram and Secrecy (Salon Radio broadcast
Feb. 24, 2009), available at http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/radio/2009/02/
24/aclu/index1.html (quoting an American Civil Liberties Union lawyer as stating that
“there are two different groups [of detainees]. There are individuals who were seized in
Afghanistan . . . and the second group, broadly is individuals who . . . were not seized in
Afghanistan at all. [This latter group] are the exact same people that were brought to
Guantanamo in 2004.”).
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Consistent with its position on Guantánamo, the U.S.
government has asserted that article III courts lack jurisdiction
over prisoners at Bagram164 and that the prisoners are likewise
ineligible for “prisoner of war” status under the Geneva
Conventions.165 As a result, several commentators refer to
Bagram as yet another “black hole.”166 The Obama
administration recently endorsed this policy, arguing that
prisoners at Bagram have no right to challenge their detention in
U.S. courts.167
Because Bagram was not designed to accommodate a large
volume of prisoners and U.S. commitment in the region is longterm, there was speculation that the DOD intended to construct
a larger detention camp in Afghanistan.168 As part of a broader
effort to increase transparency on detainee operations,
government officials unveiled a new prison on the edge of
Bagram airfield in late 2009 that will be used in place of the

164. Notably, this belief is based not on the fact that Bagram is located outside of
the United States, but rather because it is located in an active theater of war. See, e.g.,
Pauline Jelinek, Afghan Detainees Get More Rights Prisoners May Now Challenge Detentions,
PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 14, 2009, at A4 (“[T]he U.S. military argues that
Bagram detainees should be treated differently because they are being held in an active
theater of war.”); Wilber, supra note 11 (contending that prisoners lack rights because
they are detained “in the zone of war”).
165. See News Briefing, Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Defense (Jan. 30, 2002),
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2418
(explaining reasons for denying prisoner of war statuts); see also Tim Golden, In U.S.
Report, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates’ Deaths, N.Y. Times, May 20, 2005, at A1
(paraphrasing a U.S. Sergeant stationed at Bagram as believing that the Geneva
Conventions did not apply to detainees); Tom Lasseter, Abuse Plagued Afghan Camps Too;
Guantanamo: Beyond the Law, SEATTLE TIMES, June 16, 2008, at A3 (summarizing the U.S.
policy to “withhold Geneva Conventions protections” from Bagram detainees).
166. See e.g., Eviatar, supra note 161; Carlotta Gall, Video Link Plucks Afghan Detainees
From Black Hole of Isolation, N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 2008, at A8; Griswold, supra note 154.
167. See Government’s Response to This Court’s Order of January 22, 2009 at 2, Al
Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 06-CV-01669) (“Having
considered the matter, the Government adheres to its previously articulated position.”);
see also Charlie Savage, Embracing Bush Argument, Obama Upholds a Policy on Detainees in
Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2009, at A6 (reporting that the Obama administration
endorsed the Bush policy that “military detainees in Afghanistan have no legal right to
challenge their imprisonment”); Stephen Foley, Obama Denies Terror Suspects Right to
Trial, INDEP. (London), Feb. 22, 2009, at 38 (same).
168. See Eric Schmitt & Tim Golden, supra note 153 (outlining plans for a new
facility); Tim Golden, Defying U.S. Plan, Prison Expands in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
2008, A1 (pinpointing volume as an issue).
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facility located in the airport hangar.169 Recent reports put the
number of detainees held in the new complex at somewhere
between 800 and 1100.170 The new facility is also expected to
serve as the default location for indefinite detention, although
the practice of relocating prisoners captured elsewhere to
Bagram has ceased since President Obama took office in January
2009.171 Regardless of the number or location of these facilities,
the foregoing illustrates that the United States, under the auspice
of NATO, asserts substantial authority through the AUMF and
consent of the Afghan government to indefinitely detain
individuals in Afghanistan.172
c.

Iraq

Eight hundred miles away, the United States was also
involved in restructuring the public institutions of Iraq. Part of
this transformation involved the internment of both civilians and
security detainees.173 As in Afghanistan, the military used a
number of sites near the battlefield to screen initial detainees,174
but all long-term prisoners were generally transferred to one of
three theater-level internment sites at Camp Bucca, Camp
169. See Alan Cullison, U.S. Set to Open New Afghan Prison—Pentagon Pledges Improved
Transparency and Plans Open Hearings in a Move to ‘Increase Credibility,’ WALL ST. J., Nov.
16, 2009, at A10; Alissa J. Rubin, U.S. Readies New Facility for Afghanistan Detainees, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2009, at A8.
170. Compare David S. Cloud & Julian E. Barnes, U.S. May Expand Use of Its Afghan
Prison, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2010, at A1 (reporting that there are about 800 detainees in
the new prison), and Alissa J. Rubin, As U.S. Frees Detainees, Afghans Ask Why They Were
Held, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2010, at A4 (estimating the current population at about 800),
with ICRC, Afghanistan: Homemade Bombs and Improvised Mines Kill and Maim Civilians in
South (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/afghanistanupdate-140410 (indicating that there are roughly 1,100 detainees receiving
humanitarian assistance).
171. See Cloud & Barnes, supra note 170.
172. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra note 99, § 2(a) (authorizing
the President to use “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations”); Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic
Partnership, supra note 106, at 864 (“It is understood that in order to achieve the
objectives contained herein, . . . U.S. and Coalition forces are to continue to have the
freedom of action required to conduct appropriate military operations based on
consultations pre-arranged procedures.”).
173. See supra notes 133–34 (establishing that U.S. forces in Iraq carried out
detentions in several capacities).
174. See News Briefing, Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller, (May 4, 2004), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2963 (recognizing
existence of “14 or 15 tactical facilities” where detainees receive a “first assessment”).
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Cropper, or a pre-existing prison located in the city of Abu
Ghraib.175
In October 2002, an estimated 13,000 prisoners deserted the
Abu Ghraib jail after President Saddam Hussein announced an
unprecedented general amnesty.176 The United States took
possession of the vacant prison after assuming control of Iraq
and quickly converted the preexisting compound into an
internment facility.177 Long-term, large-scale detention facilities
were also erected at several military bases, most notably Camp
Bucca in the south and Camp Cropper at Baghdad International
Airport.178 In response to backlash over widely publicized reports
of detainee abuse, the U.S. military announced that all detainees
held at Abu Ghraib would be transferred to other camps and
control of the prison relinquished to Iraqi authorities.179 At their
peak, these U.S. facilities collectively held some 26,000

175. See id. (clarifying that Abu Ghraib, Camp Bucca, and Camp Cropper are the
“three main theater-level facilities” where all detainees end up after initial assessments).
176. See EA Torriero, Hussein Frees Prisoner; Tens of Thousands Let Go in What U.S.
Calls a Ploy, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 2002, at A1 (reporting on the prisoner release); Iraq
‘Empties Its Jails,’ BBC NEWS, Oct. 20, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/
2343843.stm (describing the release as “an unprecedented general amnesty”); see also
GlobalSecurity.org, Abu Ghurayb Prison, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/
iraq/abu-ghurayb-prison.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (estimating that 13,000 were
released from Abu Ghraib).
177. See Martin Asser, Abu Ghraib: Dark Stain on Iraq’s Past, BBC NEWS, May 25,
2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3747005.stm (providing a first hand
account of the April 2003 take-over of the prison and indicating that it “has been redesignated as the Baghdad Central Detention Center, now holding up to 5,000 Iraqis
detained by US forces for a variety of offences”); Suzanne Goldenberg, End of Infamous
Prison: Abu Ghraib, Symbol of America’s Shame, to Close Within Three Months, GUARDIAN
(London), Mar. 10, 2006, at 3 (reporting that U.S. troops set up at Abu Ghraib in April
2003 to “hold the overflow of detainees”).
178. See David Enders, Camp Bucca: Iraq's Guantánamo Bay, NATION, Oct. 27, 2008,
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20081027/enders (quoting a retired U.S. colonel as
describing the use of Camp Bucca as a holding center for the “massive population of . . .
detainees that have no intelligence value” and Camp Cropper as a “center for
interrogations.”); Robert F. Worth, U.S. to Abandon Abu Ahraib and Move Prisoners to a
New Center, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, at A10 (listing Camp Cropper, Camp Bucca, and
Fort Suse as operating detainee prisons in Iraq); see also TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 134,
at 7 (acknowledging the use of Abu Ghraib prison, Camp Ashraf, Camp Bucca, and the
“high-value” internment center at Camp Cropper as U.S. detention facilities in a
confidential report).
179. See Goldenberg, supra note 177 (reporting that the prison would be closed
and prisoners transferred to other U.S. facilities); Worth, supra note 178
(supplementing that the prison will be handed over to the Iraqi government after all
prisoners are transferred).
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detainees.180
A U.S. military unit under U.S. chain of command known as
task force 134 administers all detention operations in Iraq.181 The
SOFA-I, however, significantly alters their detention practice by
requiring all detainees in U.S. custody to be released or turned
over to Iraqi authorities.182 The agreement further proscribes the
active detention of Iraqi citizens without official sanction from
Iraq.183 In continuing the gradual transition to full control,
detainee operations at Camp Bucca ended on September 17,
2009.184 According to the MNF-I, there still are roughly 6000
detainees remaining in U.S. camps as of March 2010.185
d. Extraordinary Rendition and Black Sites
The U.S. government also utilized several other facilities
located off the battlefield to hold detainees captured in the war
on terror. In early 2005, the media began to reveal several covert
tactics employed by the U.S. government in their effort to gain
180. See Enders, supra note 178 (estimating that “[t]he total number of those
officially in US custody in Iraq has fluctuated between a low of 7,200 and more than
26,000 since 2005”); Solomon Moore, In Decrepit Court System, Prisoners ja Iraq’s Jails, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2008, at A16 (projecting total number at about 26,000).
181. See Task Foce 134, Camp Bucca Changes Hands, U.S. NAVY, Jan. 11, 2008,
http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=34256 (self-describing Task
Force 134 as the U.S. military group that “manages detainee operations for all of Iraq”);
Coalition Begins Releasing Detainees Under New Security Agreement, MULTI-NATIONAL
FORCE—IRAQ,
Feb.
3,
2009,
http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=
com_content&task=view&id=25249&itemid=128 (identifying task force 134 as “the
organization that handles detainee affairs for MNF-I.”).
182. See U.S.-Iraq SOFA, supra note 111, art. 22 (“The United States Forces shall . . .
turn over custody of such wanted detainees to Iraqi authorities pursuant to a valid Iraqi
arrest warrant and shall release all the remaining detainees in a safe and orderly
manner . . . .”).
183. See id. (“No detention or arrest shall be carried out by the United States
Forces . . . except through an Iraqi decision issued in accordance with Iraqi law . . . .”).
184. See Camp Bucca Detention Center Closes in Iraq, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE—IRAQ,
Sept. 18, 2009, http://www.usf-iraq.com/news/headlines/camp-bucca-detention-centercloses-in-iraq (proclaiming that the detention practice at Camp Bucca ended on
September 17, 2009, in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq strategic agreement); Martin
Chulov, Prison Break-Up: Camp Bucca to Shut, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 16, 2009, at 15
(“The largest of America’s two prisons in Iraq, Camp Bucca, will close by the weekend
. . . .”).
185. See Maria Mengrone, US Forces Begin Transfer of Detainees to GoI, MULTINATIONAL FORCE—IRAQ, Mar. 17, 2010, http://www.usf-iraq.com/news/headlines/usforces-begin-transfer-of-detainees-to-goi (declaring that there are approximately 6000
prisoners left in the U.S.-controlled detainee population).
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intelligence in the war on terror. First, it was reported that the
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) transferred suspected
terrorists under a clandestine process of rendition to the
temporary custody of countries with questionable records of
human rights practices—such as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and
Syria—for purposes of interrogation.186 Unlike extradition or
“ordinary” rendition, there is no connection between the person
rendered and the country to which they are sent; hence the term
for this process: “extraordinary rendition.”187
In addition, a number of high-value suspects were also held
in a global network of secret CIA holding facilities, known as
“black sites” due to the secrecy of the stations.188 In one of several
executive orders issued on January 22, 2009, President Obama
expressly ordered that all CIA detention facilities be
decommissioned.189 However, a fleeting clause in the same order
ostensibly left open the continued use of extraordinary rendition
186. One of the first journalists to propel extraordinary rendition into the public
spotlight was Jane Mayer in her highly publicized article Outsourcing Torture: The Secret
History of America’s “Extraordinary Rendition” Program, supra note 147, at 106–07 (revealing
the use of extraordinary rendition in the war on terror). See generally European
Parliament Rendition Report, supra note 122, 2007 O.J. C 387 E/309 (noting the
operation of rendition systems within Europe).
187. See Ingrid Detter Frankopan, Extraordinary Rendition and the Law of War, 33
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 657, 662 (“The difference to ordinary rendition and to
deportation or extradition is essentially that, in the case of extraordinary rendition,
there is no link between the person ‘rendered’ and the country to which he is sent.”);
James R. Silkenat & Peter M. Norman, Jack Bauer and the Rule of Law: The Case of
Extraordinary Rendition, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 535, 535 (2007) (“Extraordinary
rendition . . . differs from ordinary forms of rendition, since the latter refers broadly to
any circumstance where a government takes or transfers custody of a person by means of
procedures outside those of extradition treaties.”).
188. See Mayer, supra note 147, at 107 (“Rendition is just one element of of the
[Bush] Administration’s New Paradigm. The C.I.A. itself is holding dozens of ‘high
value’ terrorist suspects outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. . . . .”); see also
U.S. President George W. Bush, Remarks on the War on Terror, 42 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PRES. DOCS. 1569, 1570 (Sept. 6, 2006) (disclosing to the public the existence of a secret
detention program run by the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”)); ICRC RENDITION
REPORT, supra note 118 (providing detailed account of CIA detention program in the
case of fourteen prisoners later transferred to Guantánamo Bay); Jane Mayer, The Black
Sites, NEW YORKER, Aug. 13, 2007, at 46 (describing black sites as “secret prisons outside
the United States.”).
189. See Exec. Order No. 13,491, § 4(a), 74 Fed. Reg. 4,893 (Jan. 22, 2009) (“The
CIA shall close as expeditiously as possible any detention facilities that it currently
operates and shall not operate any such detention facility in the future.”); see also Greg
Miller, Obama Preserves Renditions as Counter-Terrorism Tool, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, at
A1 (“The CIA’s secret prisons are being shuttered.”).
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as a political option.190
2. Detention at Home
The U.S. naval base in Charleston, South Carolina, is home
to a 288-person consolidated military prison—or “brig,”191 in
Navy parlance—that serves the Army, Navy, and Air Force.192 In
addition to its traditional purpose as a confinement center for
military personnel, this brig also served as an indefinite detention
facility for a discrete population of enemy combatants who either
held U.S. citizenship193 or were apprehended within the
territorial United States.194 Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri was the last
remaining enemy combatant held without charges in the United
States following the resolution of cases involving the other
detainees in this category.195 Al-Marri has since been released

190. See Exec. Order No. 13,491, supra note 189, § 2(g) (“The terms ‘detention
facilities’ and ‘detention facility’ in [the section relating to closing CIA detention sites]
do not refer to facilities used only to hold people on a short-term, transitory basis.”);
Miller, supra note 189 (citing the clause and stating that “the CIA still has authority to
carry out what are known as renditions, secret abductions and transfers of prisoners to
countries that cooperate with the United States”).
191. The purpose of a “brig,” as defined by the U.S. Navy, is to provide a secure
confinement facility for persons pending or serving sentences under the Uniform Code
of Military Justice or courts-martial. See, e.g., U.S. NAVY, TEMPLATE BRIG INSTRUCTIONS §
101(a)-(b) (n.d.), available at http://www.npc.navy.mil/NR/rdonlyres/4e4c623c-3d184a27-9a35-1f6feae4bf01/0/sampleafloatbriginst.doc.
192. See U.S. Navy, Navy Corrections History, http://www.npc.navy.mil/NR/
rdonlyres/8860EA92-5DAA-4C27-B9E1-7423C7186474/0/navycorrectionshistory.doc
(last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (advising that the Charleston brig serves all military branches
and carries a 288-person capacity); see also Sophia Yan, If Not Gitmo, Then Where Should
Detainees Be Held?, TIME, Jan. 24, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/nation/articles/
0,8599,1873669,00.html (describing the Charleston brig as “[a] medium-security prison,
[that] can hold up to 288 inmates”).
193. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 511 (2004) (plurality opinion)
(transferred to Charleston naval brig upon learning of U.S. citizenship).
194. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004) (arrested at O’Hare
airport); Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2008) (arrested at home in
Illinois), vacated as moot on other grounds, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009).
195. See Memorandum from Barack Obama, U.S. President, to The Attorney
General et al., Review of the Detention of Ali Saleh Kahlah, 2009 DAILY COMP. OF PRES.
DOC. 11 (Jan. 22, 2009) (“Al-Marri is the only individual the Department of Defense is
currently holding as an enemy combatant within the United States.”); see also Jane
Mayer, The Hard Cases: Will Obama Institute a New Kind of Preventive Detention for Terrorist
Suspects?, NEW YORKER, Feb. 23, 2009, at 38 (“The last ‘enemy combatant’ being
detained in America is incarcerated at the U.S. Naval Consolidated Brig in Charleston,
South Carolina . . . .”).
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into the civilian court system,196 and there are now no remaining
prisoners held on U.S. soil as enemy combatants.197
3. Other Facilities Available for Combatant Detention
On the campaign trail, Barack Obama pledged to shut down
the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay.198 Anticipating the
news, media outlets began to speculate that a U.S. military base
or federal prison would replace the Cuban camp.199
The U.S. military maintains its own corrections system under
which each branch of the Armed Forces operates a number of
detention centers at varying levels of security to accommodate
different terms of confinement.200 The only maximum-security
detention barracks is located in Fort Leaventhal, Kansas, and is
intended to serve members from all branches of the military
subject to long-term sentences.201 Apart from these mainland
196. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
197. See Around the Nation, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2009, at A2 (noting that Al-Marri
was “the only ‘enemy combatant’ held on U.S. soil”); Mayer, supra note 195 (observing
that Al-Marri is the last enemy combatant in the United States); see also Government
Motion to Dismiss Or, In the Alternative, To Vacate the Judgment Below and Remand
with Directions to Dismiss the Case as Moot at 14, Al-Marri v. Spagone, No. 08-368
(2009) (warning that “upon [Al-Marri’s] release and transfer, there will be no remaining
individuals detained as enemy combatants on American soil.”).
198. See, e.g., Suzanne Goldenberg, Closing Down Detention Centre ‘Not so Easy,’
GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 11, 2008, at 18 (“Obama has repeatedly promised to shut
down Guantánamo . . . .”); Eugene Robinson, After the Torture Era, WASH. POST, Nov. 18,
2008, at A27 (quoting then-Senator Obama as declaring “I have said repeatedly that I
intend to close Guantanamo, and I will follow through on that”).
199. See, e.g., Solomon Moore, Pentagon Studies Bases as Alternative to Guantánamo;
G.O.P. Lawmakers Object, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2009, at A10 (reporting that Pentagon
officials were considering “several military bases in the United States” or “federal
prisons” that could be used to replace Guantánamo Bay); Yan, supra note 192
(speculating on six possible alternative mainland locations for detaining Guantánamo
inmates).
200. See David K. Haasenritter, The Military Correctional System: An Overview,
CORRECTIONS TODAY, Dec. 2003, at 58, available at http://www.aca.org/publications/
ctarchivespdf/dec03/hassenrittter.pdf [hereinafter Haasenritter, Military Corrections
Overview] (describing the structure of the military corrections system); Timothy E.
Purcell & William E. Peck, U.S. Navy Corrections: Purpose and Policy, CORRECTIONS TODAY,
at 35, Dec. 2008, available at http://www.aca.org/fileupload/177/ahaidar/
Purcell_Peck.pdf (same); see also David K. Haasenritter, Military Corrections and ACA
Evolve Together, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Dec. 2008, at 8, available at http://www.aca.org/
fileupload/177/ahaidar/1_1_1_Commentary.pdf (“Today, the military correction
system consists of . . . 64 correctional facilities throughout the world.”).
201. See Haasenritter, Military Corrections Overview, supra note 200 at 59 (“Fort
Leavenworth is the only facility in the third and highest tier of the military correctional
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penal facilities, the military also operates a number of short-term
sites overseas in a number of different locations.202 The Navy
additionally carries a group of brigs aboard twenty-one of its
active vessels, although their uses are limited.203 Unlike their
civilian counterparts, these military detention facilities are
historically under-occupied.204 Most importantly, any military
facility run by the United States, either home or abroad, will
usually be within its indefinite and full operational control.205
system and is the only Department of Defense maximum-security confinement facility.
For the most part . . . inmates with sentences longer than seven years are confined
[there].”); U.S. Disciplinary Barracks Homepage, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/usdb/
(last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (“[Our] mission is to incarcerate U.S. military prisoners
sentenced to long terms of confinement.”).
202. See Haasenritter, Military Corrections Overview, supra note 200 at 59 (listing
Germany, Japan, and Korea as temporary facilities); Ashore Western Region, U.S. Navy,
http://www.npc.navy.mil/CommandSupport/CorrectionsandPrograms/Brigs/Ashore/
AshoreWesternRegion.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (providing the contact information
of a U.S. correctional facility in Japan); see also Detention Facilities, U.S. Navy,
http://www.npc.navy.mil/CommandSupport/CorrectionsandPrograms/
Detention+Facilities.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (indicating the existence of U.S.
detention facilities in Diego Garcia, Guam, Iceland, and Italy).
203. See Purcell & Peck, supra note 200, at 35 (noting that there are twenty-one
such brigs, but that they “generally . . . function similarly to small jails supporting
individuals in pretrial confinement, post-trial inmates with short sentences (less than 30
days) or inmates awaiting transfer to a longer-term facility.”); see also U.S. Navy, Afloat
Western
Region,
http://www.npc.navy.mil/commandsupport/
correctionsandprograms/brigs/afloat/afloat+western+region.htm (last visited Apr. 3,
2010) (acknowledging a variety of afloat brigs on the western coast); U.S. Navy, Afloat
Eastern Region, http://www.npc.navy.mil/commandsupport/correctionsandprograms/
brigs/afloat/afloat+eastern+region.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (acknowledging a
variety of afloat brigs on the eastern coast).
204. See Haasenritter, Military Corrections Overview, supra note 200 at 58 (“The total
population in military facilities at year-end 2002 was 2,377, comprising 57 percent of its
design capacity and 73 percent of its operational capacity.”). Bureau of Justice statistics
compiled at the end of 2005 confirm that these figures remained static. See BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2005, 11 (Nov. 2006), available
at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p05.pdf (“There were 2,322 prisoners
under military jurisdiction at yearend 2005. . . . The operational capacity of the 58
military confinement facilities was 3,286 [or about] 71% of their operational capacity.”).
In fact, the latest figures show that the number of military prisoners decreased to 1,944
by the end of 2008. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS
IN 2008 at 8 tbl. 9 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
p08.pdf.
205. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225 (D.D.C. 2009) (observing
that “long-term leases . . . are not uncommon” for leases on military bases located
abroad); id. at 222 (quoting a government stipulation that “near-total operational
control” will be “true of any military facility that the United States runs anywhere in the
world.” (quoting Transcript of January 7, 2009 Hearing at 39, Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp.
2d 205 (Civ. No. 1:06-CV-01669))).
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C. Legal Challenges
The detention practices at Guantánamo went largely
unchallenged for nearly a year and a half. In fact, the Supreme
Court proclaimed in 2004 that the President’s power to detain
individuals fighting U.S. forces abroad in the course of a conflict
“is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an
exercise of ‘necessary and appropriate force,’” within the
meaning of the AUMF.206 This war power comprises the right to
detain citizen enemy combatants to the same extent as it pertains
to alien enemy combatants.207 In either case, the obvious concern
is that a conflict and therefore detention could easily drag out
over the course of a prisoner’s entire lifetime, given the
unprecedented realities of the ongoing war on terror.208
The first major impediment to the post-9/11 detention
practice manifested in the landmark, albeit concise, decision of
Rasul v. Bush.209 The Court held that alien detainees secured at
Guantánamo were entitled to invoke the federal habeas corpus

206. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion). The Court
agreed in 2008 to hear a case challenging the President’s power to indefinitely detain an
individual lawfully in the United States on suspicion of engaging in terrorism. See Al-Marri
v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 680 (2008), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
orders/courtorders/120508zr.pdf (order granting writ of certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit). The case, however, was dismissed as moot after
the government changed its position, opting instead to transfer the detainee to a civilian
jail for indictment on traditional criminal charges. See Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct.
1545 (2009), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/
030609zr.pdf (order granting the application of transfer and dismissing the case as
moot). Notably, the order of the Supreme Court vacates a decision of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that upheld the President’s ability to detain suspected
terrorists that are lawfully in the United States without trial—the only precedent on the
matter. See generally Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 543 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc),
vacated as moot, Al-Marri, 129 S. Ct. 1545.
207. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519 (“There is no bar to this Nation’s holding one of its
own citizens as an enemy combatant. . . . [S]uch a citizen, if released, would pose the
same threat of returning to the front during the ongoing conflict.”).
208. See id. at 520 (“[T]he national security underpinnings of the ‘war on terror,’
although crucially important, are broad and malleable. As the Government concedes,
‘given its unconventional nature, the current conflict is unlikely to end with a formal
cease-fire’ . . . [and] detention could last for [a lifetime].”). The Court cautioned,
however, that although the current case did not yet warrant such a drastic departure,
“[i]f the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the
conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that understanding may
unravel.” Id. at 521.
209. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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statute.210 Under the peculiar terms of the Guantánamo lease
agreement the United States exercised exclusive jurisdiction over
the naval station, and the statute required nothing more for a
court to entertain a habeas petition.211 Moreover, the protections
of the habeas statute ran to alien petitioners because the statutory
language was not strictly confined to U.S. citizens.212
Viewing these holdings as an invitation rather than a
restriction, the Pentagon ordered the creation of Combatant
Status Review Tribunals (“CSRT”) on July 7, 2004, in order to
formally review the “enemy combatant” status of each detainee,
as defined by the DOD.213 Congress supplemented this action
with the enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.214
The Act covers a variety of matters related to detainees, but in
relevant part amended section 2241 of the U.S. Judicial Code to
strip article III courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions
from alien detainees held at Guantánamo.215 The Court held,
soon after, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld216 that, “[o]rdinary principles
of statutory construction” rendered this amendment inapplicable

210. See id. at 481 (“Aliens held at the base . . . are entitled to invoke the federal
courts’ authority under [28 U.S.C.] § 2241.”).
211. See id. at 480 (“By the express terms of its agreement with Cuba, the United
States exercises ‘complete jurisdiction and control’ over the Guantanamo Bay,” and the
habeas statute requires no more); see also supra note 35 (providing the precise language
of the habeas statute).
212. See id. at 481 (“Considering that the statute draws no distinction between
Americans and aliens held in federal custody, there is little reason to think that Congress
intended the geographical coverage of the state to vary depending on the detainee’s
citizenship.”).
213. See Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. Deputy Sec’y of Defense, to the
Sec’y of the U.S. Navy § d (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/
jul2004/d20040707review.pdf (“[A] Tribunal shall be convened to review the detainee’s
status as an enemy combatant.”). The order defines “enemy combatant” as “an
individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaeda forces or associated
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.”
Id. § a. This definition was amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2006 to be “a
person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported
hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents . . . .” 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006).
214. Pub. L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
215. See id. § 1005(e), 119 Stat. at 2741–42. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
appended the federal habeas statute (28 U.S.C. § 2241) with the following language at
section 2241(e): “no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear . . . an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained [at]
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.” Id.
216. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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to cases that were pending at the time of its enactment.217 In
order to void this legal gap, Congress passed the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (“MCA”),218 which expressly extended
these provisions to pending cases and broadened its scope to
cover all aliens detained by the United States.219
1. Boumediene
In June 2008, the Supreme Court directly addressed these
maneuvers in Boumediene v. Bush.220 Petitioners in this
consolidated appeal were alien detainees held at Guantánamo
who, notwithstanding the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the
MCA, challenged their CSRT designation as enemy combatants
by asserting a common law right to habeas corpus.221 The Court
held that alien prisoners maintained a right to pursue a writ of
habeas corpus in U.S. courts in order to challenge the legality of
their detention because the Suspension Clause of the U.S.
Constitution “has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.”222 In order to
reach this conclusion, the Court isolated several factors relevant
to defining the extraterritorial reach of the Suspension Clause:
(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the

217. Id. at 575–78. At the time of the ruling, there were over 100 cases pending at
the district court level and nearly 450 detainees held at the camp. See Tim Golden, After
Ruling, Uncertainty Hovers at Cuba Prison, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2006, at A1 (citing “more
than 100 district court cases” as being unaffected by ruling); Transcript of
Teleconference with Senior Officials Regarding the Supreme Court’s Ruling in the
Hamdan Case, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (June 30, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2006/June/06_opa_411.html (quoting a senior Department of Justice member
as stating that “there are hundreds of [pending] cases” as of that date).
218. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of
10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
219. See id. § 7(a)–(b), 120 Stat. at 2635–36. The Military Commissions Act of 2006
(“MCA”) specifically amends section 2241(e) to read:
No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien
detained by the United States who has been determined by the United States
to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such
determination.
Id. The Act conspicuously makes no mention of U.S. citizens and, by its very terms, only
applies to “alien[s] detained by the United States.” Id. (emphasis added).
220. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
221. Id. at 2241 (describing characteristics of petitioners); Brief for Petitioners at
9–10, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (No.06-1195), 2007 WL 2441590
(advancing argument that petitioners hold a common-law right to habeas corpus).
222. Id. at 2262 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2).

DALOIA_K-FINAL

5/22/2010 4:17 PM

1002 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:957
adequacy of the process through which that status
determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where
apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the
practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s
entitlement to the writ.223

These components were selected only after a careful survey
of the historical record. At the outset, Justice Kennedy, writing
for the majority, stated the well-recognized principle that the
Framers intended the writ to hold a central role in the tripartite
system of government as a check on each political branch.224 He
found founding-era English authority, however, to be
inconclusive as to the reach of this ancient protection.225
U.S. case law, on the other hand, provided greater guidance.
The Court pointed to the Insular Cases as the first to address the
general extra-sovereign reach of the U.S. Constitution.226 Rather
than interpreting the Insular decisions as placing a limit on the
reach of the Constitution, Kennedy emphasized that they stood
for the proposition that fundamental rights apply in distant and
dissimilar lands.227 Citing heavily to Justice Harlan and
223. Id. at 2259.
224. See id. at 2246 (“[T]he Framers deemed the writ to be an essential mechanism
in the separation-of-powers scheme.”).
225. See id. at 2248. It was plain that the writ was not denied to prisoners at
common law merely due to their status as an alien or enemy alien. See id. (citing Khera v.
Sec’y of State for the Home Dept., [1984] A.C. 74, 111 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.);
Case of Three Spanish Sailors, (1779) 96 Eng. Rep. 775 (C.P.); R. v. Knowles ex parte
Somersett, (1772) 20 How. St. Tr. 1, 80, 82 (K.B.); King v. Schiever, (1759) 97 Eng. Rep.
551 (K.B.); Du Castro’s Case, (1697) 92 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B.)). English common-law
courts regularly exercised habeas jurisdiction over claims put forward by aliens
imprisoned within the territorial realm of the Crown. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 446, 481
(2002) (collecting common-law cases). Early U.S. courts followed this practice as well. Id.
(citing Wilson v. Izard, 30 F. Cas. 131 (No. 17,810) (C.C. Mass. 1813); Ex parte D’Olivera,
7 F. Cas. 853 (No. 3, 967) (C.C. Mass. 1813); United States v. Villato, 2 Dall. 370 (C.C.
Pa. 1797)). But the precise geographic reach of the writ beyond the Crown’s sovereign
territory remained unclear, given the unique circumstances of the limited case law,
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2249 (“Guantanamo Bay . . . and the exempt jurisdictions
discussed in the English authorities are not similarly situated” and “[t]he Supreme
Court of Judicature (the British Court) sat in Calcutta; but no federal court sits at
Guantanamo.”), and “prudential concerns” present at the time of those cases. Id. at
2250.
226. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2253–54 (“Fundamental questions regarding the
Constitution’s geographic scope first arose at the dawn of the 20th century when the
Nation acquired noncontinguous Territories . . . .”).
227. See id. at 2253–54 (“[These cases] held that the Constitution has independent
force in these territories, a force not contingent upon acts of legislative grace.”).
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Frankfurter’s concurring opinions in Reid, the Court went on to
confirm that the “‘specific circumstances of each particular case’
are relevant in determining the geographic scope of the
Constitution.”228 The prisoner’s U.S. citizenship in that case was
clearly important.229 But “practical considerations,” among them
the place of the confinement and courts-martial, also received
attention.230
Justice Kennedy pronounced that the Court’s precedent
underscored a “functional approach” toward determining the
Constitution’s reach.231 Under this functional framework,
“questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and
practical concerns, not formalism.”232 Consistent with this
principal, the Court observed that de jure sovereignty in the strict
legal sense was not outcome-determinative for purposes of the
writ of habeas corpus.233 Indeed, such an arrangement would
raise troubling separation-of-powers concerns because the
political branches would be authorized sub silentio to act without
legal check by surrendering formal sovereignty while retaining
plenary control of an area (such as in the Guantánamo lease)—a
result which the Suspension Clause was conceived to prevent.234
To the contrary, courts should “inquire into the objective degree
of control [a] Nation asserts over foreign territory.”235
Prior to the Guantánamo line of cases, the Court’s only
other occasion to analyze the extraterritorial contours of the

228. Id. at 2255 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957)). The Boumediene
Court also discussed the precedential value of Ross v. McIntyre (In re Ross), 140 U.S. 453
(1891). 128 S. Ct. at 2256. Kennedy reconciled this case with Reid by explaining that it
was decided correctly because it, too, turned on “practical considerations.” Id.
229. See id. (“That the petitioners in Reid were American citizens was a key factor in
the case and was central to the plurality’s conclusion that the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments apply to American civilians tried outside the United States.”).
230. See id. (intimating that the prisoner’s citizenship and place of confinement
“were relevant to each member of the Reid majority” and “decisive” for the concurring
justices).
231. See id. at 2258 (indicating that the Insular Cases and, later, Reid mark a
“functional approach to questions of extraterritoriality”).
232. Id.
233. See id. at 2252. (“[T]hat de jure sovereignty is the touchstone of habeas corpus
jurisdiction . . . is unfounded [and] inconsistent with our precedents.”).
234. See id. 2258–59 (admonishing that “[o]ur basic charter cannot be contracted
away like this” and observing that “the writ of habeas corpus is itself an indispensable
mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers”).
235. Id. at 2252.
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habeas corpus writ was in Johnson v. Eisentrager236 at the end of
the Second World War. The case involved alien saboteurs that
were repatriated to a U.S.-run prison in occupied Germany
(“Landsberg”) after being tried for war crimes in China and
petitioned for habeas corpus on both constitutional and statutory
grounds.237 The Eisentrager Court succinctly concluded that
“[n]othing in the text of the Constitution extends such a right,
nor does anything in our statutes.”238 The prisoners lacked
standing to claim entitlement to the writ due to several common
objective features concerning citizenship and location.239
However, Boumediene observed that practical concerns also played
a significant role in the case.240 Kennedy appreciated that at the
time of the decision the United States was responsible for
overseeing reconstruction efforts in an area covering 57,000
square miles and containing residual militants.241
Drawing on this rich history, the Boumediene Court
constructed the three-prong list that guided their analysis.242
236. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
237. See id. 765–66 (describing the procedural posture and nationality for each
petitioner); see also Brief for Respondent at 9, 27, Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (No. 306)
(advancing arguments under “28 U.S.C. § 2241” and “Article I, Section 9”).
238. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 768.
239. Those factors included that each petitioner:
(a) [was] an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the United States;
(c) was captured outside of our territory and there held as a prisoner of war;
(d) was tried by a Military Commission sitting outside of the United States; (e)
for offenses against laws of war committed outside of the United States; (f) and
is at all times imprisoned outside of the United States.
Id. at 777.
240. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257 (remarking that “[p]ractical considerations
[also] weighed heavily”). Justice Jackson, writing for the Court in Eisentrager, drew
particular attention to the difficulty in administering habeas petitioners from overseas:
A basic consideration in habeas corpus practice is that the prisoner will be
produced before the court. . . . To grant the writ to these prisoners might
mean that our army must transport them across the seas for hearing. This
would require allocation of shipping space, guarding personnel, billeting and
rations. It might also require transportation for whatever witnesses the
prisoners desired to call as well as transportation for those necessary to defend
legality of the sentence.
339 U.S. at 778–79.
241. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at at 2261 (“[T]he United States became responsible for
an occupation zone encompassing over 57,000 square miles with a population of 18
million. In addition . . . American forces stationed in Germany faced potential security
threats from a defeated enemy.” (citations omitted)).
242. See supra note 223 and accompanying text (laying out the three-factor test for
determining the extraterritorial reach of the Suspension Clause).
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Because Eisentrager previously denied access to the writ under
ostensibly similar circumstances, the Court went through pains to
distinguish the case. As to the first factor, the Court observed that
the alien petitioners deny their status as enemy combatants,243
and additionally did not receive the same procedural protections
as was provided by the military tribunals in Eisentrager.244 As to
the second factor, the precise nature of the German prison was
“critically differen[t]”245 because the United States shared what
authority it retained at Landsberg with the combined Allied
Forces, and instead maintains plenary control over the
Guantánamo naval base.246 The Court even squared Eisentrager
with the Insular Cases in light of the temporal occupation of the
Allied Forces at Landsberg.247 As for the third factor, military
operations at Guantánamo would remain virtually unaffected by
accommodating the petitioners,248 and U.S. intervention would
not usurp the authority of Cuban courts because the unique
terms of the Guantánamo lease precluded them from asserting
jurisdiction over the base.249 Kennedy cautioned, however, that
practical concerns are unique to each case and the result might
well come out differently under other circumstances.250 On the
243. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259 (“[P]etitioners in Eisentrager did not contest
. . . that they were ‘enemy aliens.’”).
244. See id. at 2260 (describing the procedures of the Combatant Status Review
Tribunals (“CSRT”) as “far more limited” and “fall[ing] well short of the procedures
and adversarial mechanisms that would eliminate the need for habeas corpus review”).
245. Id. at 2260.
246. See 1903 Cuba Lease, supra note 141 and accompanying text (vesting the
United States with full control); Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2252 (“Unlike its present
control over the naval station, the United States’ control over the prison in Germany was
neither absolute nor indefinite.”); see also id. at 2253 (“[T]he United States, by virtue of
its complete jurisdiction and control over the base, maintains de facto sovereignty . . . .”).
247. See id. at 2260–61 (“The Court’s holding in Eisentrager was thus consistent with
the Insular Cases . . . .”).
248. See id. at 2261 (“The Government presents no credible arguments that the
military mission at Guantanamo would be compromised if habeas corpus courts had
jurisdiction to hear the detainees’ claims. . . . The situation in Eisentrager was far
different . . . .”). In short, Guantánamo simply did not present any exigencies similar to
those in Eisentrager. See id. at 2262 (“Under the facts presented here . . . there are few
practical barriers to the running of the writ.”).
249. See id. at 2251 (“No Cuban court has jurisdiction to hear these petitioners’
claims, and no law other than the laws of the United States applies at the [Guantanamo
Bay] naval station.”).
250. See id. (“[T]he United States is, for all practical purposes, answerable to no
other sovereign for its acts on the [naval] base. Were that not the case, or if the
detention facility were located in an active theater of war, arguments that issuing the writ
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basis of these factors, the majority concluded that the Suspension
Clause extends to aliens detained at Guantánamo and that the
MCA therefore effects an unconstitutional suspension of that
right.251
The Court tackled the difficult question presented by
espousing a malleable “functional approach” toward the
extraterritorial application of the Suspension Clause.252 At the
very least, the Court eschewed a strict “territorial definition” of
constitutional domain for purposes of the Suspension Clause.253
Reading the holding at its broadest, some some assert that
Boumediene extends the protections of the Suspension Clause to
anyone in U.S. custody.254 Others in the academic community view
the Court’s shift as a signal that the functional model will become
the new paradigm for determining the geographic coverage of

would be ‘impracticable or anomalous’ would have more weight.” (quoting Reid v.
Covert 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring))).
251. See id. (“Art. I, §9, cl. 2, of the Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo Bay
[and] Congress must act in accordance with the requirements of the Suspension
Clause.”). Consequently, the Court concluded that “MCA § 7 thus effects an
unconstitutional suspension of the writ.” Id. at 2274. The Court keenly acknowledged
the novelty of extending constitutional rights to noncitizens in delivering its holding. Id.
at 2262 (“It is true that before today the Court has never held that noncitizens detained
by our Government in territory over which another country maintains de jure sovereignty
have any rights under our Constitution.”).
252. See supra notes 226–33 (extracting a “functional approach” from prior
precedent to the Constitution’s application beyond U.S. territory).
253. Timothy Zick, Constitutional Displacement, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 515, 594 (2009)
(“In Boumediene, the Supreme Court appeared to reject a narrowly territorial definition
of constitutional domain.”); see also Burnett, supra note 9, at 976 (“[T]he Boumediene
Court got it right when it rejected the proposition that the Constitution stops where de
jure sovereignty ends (a.k.a. ‘strict territoriality’) . . . .”). Burnett makes the provocative
argument that the functional test in fact strengthens the importance of strict
territoriality in the extraterritorial application of the Constitution by sharply contrasting
foreign and domestic circumstances in the assessment of practical considerations. See
Burnett, supra note 9, at 977 (“[The functional approach] assumes a sharp distinction
between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ territory for purposes of determining whether a given
element of the Constitution applies in a liminal or extraterritorial situation, and in that
way strengthens the basic premise of strict territoriality even as the same test purports to
follow from a rejection of strict territoriality.”).
254. See Kevin Lunday & Harvey Rishikof, Due Process Is a Strategic Choice: Legitimacy
and the Establishment of an Article III National Security Court, 39 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 87, 113
(2008) (“[S]weeping jurisdiction . . . to review the legal sufficiency of persons detained
by the government outside U.S. territory [w]as indicated by Boumedeine.”); Neuman,
supra note 11, at 286 (“For Kennedy, it appears from Boumediene and Verdugo-Urquidez
that persons in U.S. custody are [entitled to protection], at least for the purposes of the
Suspension Clause.”).
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the Constitution, generally.255 In this sense, the case might raise
more questions than it answers.
More generally, a common theme to the Guantánamo line
of cases is the judiciary’s willingness to temper the other braches
of government from operating without scrutiny. Despite
longstanding doctrine advocating deference in matters of foreign
affairs,256 particularly in times of war,257 these concerns gave way
to the writ’s central purpose—what Boumediene described as
“maintain[ing] the ‘delicate balance of government.’”258 In no
255. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Extraordinary Rendition and the Constitution: The Case of
Maher Arar, 28 REV. LITIG. 479, 493 (2008) (“Kennedy and the majority adopt a
‘functional approach’ to the question of the extraterritorial application of the
Constitution.”); Neuman, supra note 11, at 261 (“Boumediene confirms and illustrates the
current Supreme Court’s ‘functional approach’ to the extraterritorial application of
constitutional rights.”); Zick, supra note 253, at 595 (“If Boumediene’s functional
approach is any indication, we shall likely continue to see the Constitution’s domain
decided in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion.”); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s
Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107,
2145–49 (2009) (arguing that the separation-of-powers approach in Boumediene should
apply more broadly to all denial of access cases). It bears note that there is another camp
that questions the exact extent of constitutional coverage flowing from Boumediene. See
Robert M. Chesney, International Decision, Boumediene v. Bush, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 848,
853 (2008) (“Ultimately, the logic of Boumediene—particularly its emphasis on the
absence of security threats in Cuba—cuts against [extending the holding to Iraq or
Afghanistan].”); Anthony J. Colangelo, Brief Remarks on the Supreme Court’s Role After
9/11: Continuing the Legal Conversation in the War on Terror, 62 SMU L. REV. 17, 20 (2009)
(“In Boumediene, the Court . . . did not say that habeas extends to all persons in U.S.
custody around the globe.”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Creating Legal Rights for Suspected
Terrorists, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1975, 1981 (2009) (contending that the entire
Guantánamo line of cases will eventually be seen as “abberational and not a harbinger of
a Brave New World”); cf. Burnett, supra note 9 (suggesting that the functional model
conflates the distinct inquiries of whether the constitution should apply and abroad and
how the right should be enforced, if it applies).
256. See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984) (in executive actions) (citing
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)); Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64–65 (1981) (in congressional actions); see also Matthews v. Diaz,
426 U.S. 67, 81 n.17 (1976) (wartime decisions of government generally).
257. See, e.g., Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (noting the deference
afforded to “the Executive in military and national security affairs” and collecting cases).
258. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2235 (2008) (quoting Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2006) (plurality opinion)). Indeed, the Hamdi plurality
took this very position. 542 U.S. at 535–36 (“[W]e necessarily reject the Government’s
assertion that separation of powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for
the courts . . . this approach serves only to condense power into a single branch of
government.”). One of the key functions of the judiciary in the tripartite structure is to
ensure that the Executive operates within its wartime bounds. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at
2277 (“Within the Constitution’s separation-of-powers structure, few exercises of judicial
power are as legitimate or as necessary as the responsibility to hear challenges to the
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small part due to these cases, roughly 550 detainees have been
released from Guantánamo, reducing the total number of
inmates from about 779 at its peak to a current level of 183.259
Making good on campaign promises, U.S. President Barack
Obama issued an executive order on January 22, 2009, directing
that the Guantánamo detention site close at latest by January 22,
2010.260 As of the date of this Note, this has yet to occur.
2.

Beyond Guantánamo: Recent Developments

Although the U.S. missions in Guantánamo and Iraq are
winding up, the broader war on terror continues.261 The renewed
pledge to defeat terrorism, taken together with a troop surge in
Afghanistan,262 appears indicative of an overall U.S. plan to
continue the practice of detaining suspected terrorists in the war
on terror.263 The prior subsection focused solely on Guantánamo
authority of the Executive to imprison a person.”); see also Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2, 125 (1866) (“[The Framers] knew [that] the nation they were founding, be its
existence short or long, would be involved in war; how often or how long continued,
human foresight could not tell; and that unlimited power, wherever lodged at such a
time, was especially hazardous to freemen.”). Kennedy used this separation-of-powers
principle to validate the Court’s action: “[T]he exercise of [Presidential] powers is
vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the Judical Branch.” Boumediene, 128 S. Ct.
at 2277.
259. See The Guantánamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/
guantanamo (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
260. See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009); see also Closure
of Guantanamo Detention Facilities, The White House, Jan. 22, 2009,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
closure_of_guantanamo_detention_facilities/ (ordering the closure of Guantánamo
within one year).
261. See Christina Bellantoni, Obama Zeros In On Afghanistan: Pledges More Troops,
Funds and Diplomacy, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2009, at A1 (“President Obama . . . will send
more troops to Afghanistan, more money to Pakistan and push for renewed diplomatic
attention to the region to combat terrorism.”); Press Release, White House, What’s New
in the Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan (March 27, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Whats-New-in-the-Strategy-forAfghanistan-and-Pakistan/ (stating as the Obama administration’s mission to “disrupt,
dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens”).
262. See supra note 108 (discussing the authorization of the troop surge in
Afghanistan).
263. See Eric Schmitt, Two Prisons, Similar Issues for President, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
2009, at A1 (quoting a U.S. official as stating that no changes will be made in
Afghanistan); Mark Thompson, Another Gitmo Grows in Afghanistan, TIME, Jan. 5, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1869519,00.html
(“[E]ven
if
Guantánamo closes, the controversial U.S. practice of jailing suspected al-Qaeda
militants and other terrorists indefinitely won’t end, because such detentions continue

DALOIA_K-FINAL

2010]

5/22/2010 4:17 PM

THE REACH OF THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE

1009

Bay, but the case law is nonetheless illustrative of the Court’s
overall sensibility toward detention challenges mounted by
wartime prisoners. This subsection will explore case law that
arises from contexts other than Guantánamo but still provides
guidance on the overseas use of habeas corpus.
a. In the Supreme Court
On the same day as the Boumediene decision, the Court
issued another—often overlooked—opinion bearing on the
availability of habeas corpus to overseas prisoners. In Munaf v.
Geren264 a unanimous Court ruled that “American citizens held
overseas by American forces operating subject to an American
chain of command” may seek statutory habeas relief, even
though the forces holding them act as part of a multinational
coalition.265 The consolidated appeal was levied by two U.S.
citizens captured in Iraq by the MNF-I for engaging in suspicious
activities.266 The MNF-I held the two citizens at Camp Cropper
for the benefit of the Iraqi government during their criminal
proceedings in Iraqi court, under its role as outlined by U.N.
mandate.267 The government relied heavily on Hirota v.

on an even greater scale . . . at Bagram.”); USA: President Obama’s Executive Orders on
Detentions and Interrogations, AMNESTY INT’L, AI Index No. AMR 51/015/2009 (Jan. 30,
2009) (“The executive order appears to leave open the possibility of transferring
Guantánamo detainees to other US detention facilities outside of the USA, [such as]
Bagram air base in Afghanistan . . . .”). In fact, recent press releases by the Department
of Defense confirm that detentions are still taking place in Afghanistan under the
Obama presidency. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Forces Clash with Enemy
Fighters in Afghanistan (Sept. 6, 2009), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=54701 (“U.S. and Afghan forces killed an undetermined number of
enemy fighters and detained 13 suspected militants in three operations in Afghanistan
early today . . . .”).
264. 553 U.S. 674 (2008).
265. Id. at 2213. The U.S. prisoners sought relief under section 2241 because the
MCA only precluded its use by alien prisoners. See supra note 219 and accompanying
text (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) and its availability to U.S. citizens).
266. See Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2213 (“These consolidated cases concern the
availability of habeas corpus relief arising from the MNF-I’s detention of American
citizens who voluntarily traveled to Iraq and are alleged to have committed crimes
there.”).
267. See id. at 2214 (“At all times since his capture, Omar has remained in the
custody of the United States military operating as part of the MNF-I[,]” even though
“the Department of Justice informed Omar that the MNF-I had decided to refer him to
[Iraqi courts] for criminal proceedings.”); id. at 2215 (indicating Munaf stayed in
custody of the MNF-I pending outcome of criminal proceedings in Iraqi Court). As
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MacArthur,268 which summarily denied Japanese citizens, held in
Japan by a post-World War II multinational coalition, leave to file
petitions for writs of habeas corpus.269 The Court quickly
distinguished Hirota from the facts at hand because the tribunal
from which the Hirota petitioners appealed was subject to a
“broken” chain of U.S. command and therefore autonomous of
U.S. influence.270 Furthermore, petitioners in Hirota were
aliens.271 Jurisdiction under section 2241 lay for the Munaf
petitioners in the fact that the MNF-I, including the unit in
charge of detainee operations, was “[a]s a practical matter,”
under complete U.S. control.272 As was the case in Rasul, the
habeas statute requires no more.273 The Court made clear that its
jurisdictional holding was limited to U.S. citizens seeking relief
under the statutory habeas scheme and not under the
Suspension Clause.274
Turning to the merits, the Court was ultimately unable to
noted earlier, supra notes 133–34, the U.S.-led MNF-I held detained persons in Iraq both
posing a security threat and standing trial on domestic charges.
268. 338 U.S. 197 (1948) (per curium).
269. Id. at 198 (“[T]he courts of the United States have no power or authority to
review, to affirm, set aside or annul the judgments and sentences imposed on these
petitioners . . . .”).
270. See Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2217–18 (“General MacArthur, as pertinent, was not
subject to United States authority. . . . Here, in contrast, the Government acknowledges
that our military commanders do answer to the President.”). The war tribunal that
sentenced the Hirota petitioners was set up by a U.S. commander, but he only acted on
behalf of the occupying Allied Forces. Hirota, 338 U.S. at 197.
271. See Munaf, 128 S.Ct. at 2218 (“Even if the Government is correct that the
international authority at issue in Hirota is no different from the international authority
at issue here, . . . [t]hese cases concern American citizens while Hirota did not . . . .”).
272. Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2216 (“‘[A]s a practical matter,’ the Government
concedes, it is the ‘the President and the Pentagon, the Secretary of Defense, and the
American commanders that control . . . what American soldiers do,’ including the
soldiers holding Munaf and Omar.” (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Munaf,
128. S. Ct. 2207 (No. 06-1666), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/06-1666.pdf).
273. See id. at 2216–17 (“We think these concessions the end of the jurisdictional
inquiry . . . . The disjunctive ‘or’ in § 2241(c)(1) makes clear that actual custody by the
United States suffices for jurisdiction, even if that custody could be viewed as ‘under . . .
color of’ another authority, such as the MNF-I.”). The Court took notice that a prisoner
is “in custody” for purposes of section 2241 “when the United States official charged
with his detention has ‘the power to produce’ him.” Id. at 2217 (quoting Wales v.
Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885)).
274. See id. at 2216 n.2 (“These cases concern only American citizens and only the
statutory reach of the writ. Nothing herein addresses jurisdiction with respect to alien
petitioners or with respect to the constitutional scope of the writ.”).
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grant any form of relief to the prisoners. The petitioners sought
the unconventional remedy of a preliminary injunction enjoining
their transfer to Iraqi custody following their trial in domestic
courts.275 Prudential concerns of comity and international civility
precluded the Court, in its equitable capacity, from granting
relief out of respect for the “sovereign[’s] undoubted authority”
to prosecute the prisoners.276 In addition, MNF-I was holding the
prisoners at the behest of the Iraqi government,277 and in the
midst of ongoing hostilities.278 The forbearance exhibited by the
Court was based on the same policy underlying the general rule
of U.S. courts from refusing to engage in collateral review of
foreign judicial rulings.279
b. Lower Courts
Long before the Supreme Court delivered its decision in
Boumediene, the detentions taking place in Afghanistan received a

275. See id. at 2221 (“The typical remedy [afforded by habeas corpus] is, of course,
release. But here the last thing petitioners want is simple release; . . . what petitioners are
really after is a court order requiring the United States to shelter them from the
sovereign government seeking to have them answer for alleged crimes committed within
that sovereign’s borders.” (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973))).
276. Id. at 2223. To arrive at this conclusion, the Court first noted that “‘[a]
sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed
within its borders, unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its jurisdiction.’”
Id. at 2221–22 (quoting Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957)). The result stood
notwithstanding that the citizens might be subject to procedures that fall short of U.S.
constitutional standards. See id. at 2222 (“[The right of a sovereign to prosecute offenses
committed within its borders] is true with respect to American citizens . . . whether or
not the pertinent criminal process comes with all the rights guaranteed by our
Constitution.”).
277. See id. at 2223–24 (observing that “Omar and Munaf are being held by United
States Armed Forces at the behest of the Iraqi Government[,]” and “MNF-I detention is
an integral part of the Iraqi system of criminal justice [through] functioning, in essence,
as its jailor.”).
278. See id. at 2224 (“There is of course even more at issue here: . . . the detainees
were captured by our Armed Forces for engaging in serious hostile acts against an ally in
what the Government refers to as ‘an active theater of combat.’” (quoting Brief for the
Federal Parties at 16, Munaf, 128. S. Ct. 2207 (No. 06-1666), available at
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07394_FederalParties.pdf).
279. See id. at 2224 (“To allow United States courts to intervene in an ongoing
foreign criminal proceeding and pass judgment on its legitimacy seems at least as great
an intrusion as the plainly barred collateral review of foreign convictions.” (citing Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 417–18 (1964))).
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modest amount of attention in the shadow of Guantánamo.280
Reports surfaced in 2006 that indicated that the channels in
place to review a prisoner’s detention were substandard.281 Later
that year, several habeas actions were initiated in rapid succession
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on behalf
of a number of different Bagram detainees.282 Affidavits sworn by
military personnel stationed at Bagram that were filed in these
cases confirmed the use of a five-member Enemy Combatant
Review Board (“ECRB”) that sporadically inspects each
prisoner’s status in ex parte panels on the basis of “all reasonably
available and relevant information.”283 The government was
280. See Eviatar, supra note 161 (explaining that to date “the Bagram detainees
have failed to garner the same level of public attention and outrage [as Guantánamo]—
or the stampede of offers for pro bono representation from major commercial law
firms.”).
281. See Golden, supra note 159 (first to report identifying that Bagram detainees
“have no access to lawyers, no right to hear the allegations against them and [receive]
only rudimentary reviews of their status as ‘enemy combatants’ . . . .”); see also Amnesty
Int’l, Afghanistan ‘Success’ Ebbing Away, WIRE, March 2006, at 4, AI Index No. NWS
21/002/2006 (claiming that detainees are “held without charge, trial or access to legal
representation” after interviewing several prisoners).
282. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ruzatullah v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-CV01707 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2006), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/districtcourts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2006cv01707/122762/1/0.pdf (petition on behalf
of prisoner only known as “Ruzatullah” and his cousin); Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, Wazir v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-CV-01697 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2006) (petition on behalf
of four prisoners detained at Bagram); Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus,
Mohammed v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-CV-01680 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2006), available at
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/Bagram%20petition.pdf
(draft
amalgamated petition on behalf of twenty-five detainees); Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, Al Maqaleh v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-CV-01669 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2006), available at
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/
1:2006cv01669/122669/1/0.pdf (petition on behalf of sole Bagram prisoner).
283. The first time this information was disclosed on the public record was in a
November 2006 declaration by Colonel Rose M. Miller in the Ruzatullah case. See Miller
Decl., supra note 156, ¶¶ 10–12 (summarizing the general Enemy Combatant Review
Board (“ECRB”) procedure). Declarations subsequently submitted in connection with
the other cases by the commander who replaced Colonel Miller corroborate the same
review procedure. See, e.g., Declaration of Colonel James W. Gray ¶¶ 10–12 (attached as
Ex. B to Respondents’ Response to Order to Show Cause and Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Jurisdiction), Mohammed v. Rumsfeld, No. 06-CV-01680 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2006),
available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-columbia/
dcdce/1:2006cv01680/122640/4/2.pdf (utilizing the same text as included in Rose
Declaration); Declaration of James W. Gray ¶¶ 11–13 (attached as Ex. 1 in Respondents’
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction), Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C.
Mar. 5, 2007) (No. 06-CV-01669), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/
district-courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2006cv01669/122669/7/1.pdf (same). For
further discussion on the review procedure used by the ECRBs, see Eviatar, supra note
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afforded an opportunity to change its position after the 2009
election, but instead chose to rely on its previous filings.284
A decision recently issued in one of these cases marked the
first and only major application of Boumediene’s functional model
in a context other than Guantánamo. The district court in Al
Maqaleh v. Gates285 ruled that the protections of the Suspension
Clause extend to a limited group of alien prisoners who were
transferred to the Bagram internment facility from elsewhere and
therefore the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the MCA
worked an unconstitutional suspension of the writ as applied to
them.286
Al Maqaleh is important in several respects. First, the
161 (criticizing that ECRB procedures as “even more circumscribed” than the CSRTs
offered at Guantánamo). See also Eric Lewis, Custody Dispute: Why Is the U.S. Stashing
Detainees at Policharki Prison in Afghanistan?, SLATE, Aug. 16, 2007,
http://www.slate.com/id/2172334/ (chastising ECRB process, as “not made through
any evidentiary hearing, but rather by the commanding officer at Bagram, who has
discretion whether to gather evidence, hear witnesses, or allow the detainee to present
his story”).
284. See, e.g., Government’s Response to this Court’s Order of January 22, 2009 at
2, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 06-CV-01669), available
at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/us-reply-re-bagram-220-09.pdf (“Having considered the matter, the Government adheres to its previously
articulated position.”).
285. 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009).
286. See id. at 235 (“MCA § 7(a), the statute stripping habeas jurisdiction, is
unconstitutional as to three of the four petitioners. Under Boumediene, Bagram detainees
who are not Afghan citizens, who were not captured in Afghanistan, and who have been
held for an unreasonable amount of time . . . without adequate process may invoke the
protections of the Suspension Clause.”). On June 1, 2009 the same judge who issued the
ruling granted the government’s motion for an interlocutory appeal and stayed the case
pending appeal. See Del Quentin Wilber, Nation Digest: Bagram Detainees, WASH. POST, at
A16 (reporting that court granted motion); Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog,
http://www.scotusblog.com (June 2, 2009, 4:25pm) (same); see also Al Maqaleh v. Gates,
No. 06-1669 (D.D.C. June 1, 2009), http://www.docstoc.com/docs/6764307/almaqaleh-v-gates (reproducing a copy of the order). As of the date of this Note, the only
action taken in the appeal was a brief that was filed by the government on September 14,
2009. See Amnesty Int’l, USA: Government Opposes Habeas Corpus Review for Any Bagram
Detainees; Reveals ‘Enhanced’ Administrative Review Procedures, AI Index No. AMR
51/100/2009, Sept. 16, 2009 [hereinafter Amnesty Government Appellate Brief Review],
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/100/2009/en/825cb17759b8-4db6-a2b2-ac6874310ce3/amr511002009en.html (writing extensively on substance
of government filing); Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog,
http://www.scotusblog.com (Sept. 15, 2009, 11:40am) (reporting on filing); see also Brief
for Respondents-Appellants, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 09-5265 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 2009),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/US-Bagram-brief-9-1409.pdf (reproducing the filing).
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decision interprets Boumediene as holding section 7(a) of the
MCA unconstitutional only as applied to Guantánamo detainees,
rather than facially invalidating that provision.287 The result of
this distinction is that section 7(a) of the MCA remains intact as
against all aliens detained elsewhere and continues to foreclose
their use of statutory habeas corpus.288 Secondly, the case marks a
significant expansion of Boumediene by extending the reach of the
Suspension Clause to a select group of aliens detained both in a
theater of war and at a location where the United States does not
exercise de facto sovereignty.289
The district court’s opinion also provides a helpful
distillation of Boumediene’s functional model. The court
subdivided the three Boumediene factors into six for purposes of
analysis.290 As for their citizenship, detention status, and sites of
287. See Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 213 (“Fairly read, Boumediene was an as
applied rejection of MCA § 7.”). While Boumediene at times was framed in general terms,
the Court specifically focused on the unique character of Guantánamo and even noted
that it might reach a different conclusion if the prisoners were held somewhere else. See
id. (“The Supreme Court [in Boumediene] examined the history of the U.S. presence at
Guantanamo, the degree of U.S. control at Guantanamo, and the practical obstacles of
extending habeas rights to Guantanamo. The Supreme Court did not examine those
very fact-specific factors with regard to any other place the United States presently
operates or confines detainees.” (citations omitted)). Moreover, any broader reading
would conflict with the Supreme Court’s longstanding admonition for courts to favor
“‘partial, rather than facial, invalidation.’” Id. at 213–14 (quoting Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood, 546 U.S. 320, 328–29 (2006) (in turn quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades,
Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504 (1985))).
288. See id. at 214 (“Because the Court interprets Boumediene as a rejection of MCA
§ 7 as it applies to Guantanamo specifically, rather than a broader facial rejection, MCA
§ 7 (and, therefore, § 2241(e)(1)) continues to deprive this Court of statutory
jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by Bagram detainees.”).
289. See supra note 246 and accompanying text (explaining that the long-term lease
with Cuba provides the United States with “de facto sovereignty” over base). Notably,
Kennedy remarked that the result in Boumediene might be different if the petitioners
were detained “in an active theater of war.” See supra note 250.
290. See Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 215 (D.D.C. 2009) (“For the sake of
analysis, these three factors can be subdivided further into six.”). Specifically, the court
dissected the Boumediene factors as follows: “(1) the citizenship of the detainee; (2) the
status of the detainee; (3) the adequacy of the process through which the status
determination was made; (4) the nature of the site of apprehension; (5) the nature of
the site of detention; and (6) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the
petitioner’s entitlement to the writ.” Id. The court also noted that “the length of a
petitioner’s detention without adequate review” implicitly motivated the Boumediene
majority because of their care to caution that the Executive was entitled to a reasonable
amount of time to determine a detainee’s status before it would be practical for a court
to consider their habeas petition. Id. at 216. Even so, this implicit concern was
inapposite to the Bagram petitioners because they, like the Boumediene detainees, were
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apprehension, the Bagram petitioners were considered to be
“situated no differently than the detainees in Boumediene.”291
Consequently, the outcome of the case turned on the remaining
three considerations: detention site, adequacy of process, and
prudential concerns.292
Regarding the site of detention, the court took the position
that Boumediene’s lengthy comparison of Guantánamo and
Landsberg prison highlighted the need to examine the objective
“degree and duration of U.S. ‘control.’”293 The court started by
highlighting the several respects in which general U.S. presence
differs at Bagram from Guantánamo: it was authorized by the
sovereign Afghan government by means of the SOFA-A,294 the
jurisdiction granted to the United States is not exclusive,295 a
handful of non-U.S. personnel work out of the base,296 and U.S.

held for over six years, which was already seen in Boumediene as exceeding that threshold.
See id. (“The Boumediene petitioners—like petitioners here—had been held for six years
or more. Hence, whatever ‘reasonable period of time’ the Executive was entitled to had
long since passed.” (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008))).
291. Id. at 217–18. More precisely, each petitioner is an alien that was apprehended
outside of the United States, brought into Afghanistan, and later determined to be an
enemy combatant. Id. at 218. As was the case with Guantánamo detainees held in Cuba,
“[s]uch rendition resurrects the same specter of limitless Executive power the Supreme
Court sought to guard against in Boumediene—the concern that the Executive could
move detainees physically beyond the reach of the Constitution and detain them
indefinitely.” Id. at 220. The court aptly noted, however, that prisoners captured on the
Afghan battlefield are qualitatively different. Id. (“Bagram detainees captured in
Afghanistan are qualitatively different than Bagram detainees who . . . were captured
elsewhere.”).
292. See id. at 221 (“[F]or these three factors, petitioners are not much different
than the petitioners in Boumediene. . . . The primary comparison of these cases and
Boumediene, then, rests on an analysis of the remaining three factors.”).
293. See id. at 221–22; see also id. at 221 (“The touchstone of the site of detention
factor is the ‘objective degree of control’ the United States has over Bagram.” (quoting
Boumedeiene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2252 (2008))).
294. See id. at 222 (“A SOFA governs the terms of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan,
and the very existence of a SOFA is a ‘manifestation of the full sovereignty of the state
on whose territory it applies.’” (quoting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 13–15, Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C.
Sept. 15, 2009) (06-CV-01669))).
295. See id. at 222–23 (appreciating that the United States maintains a lesser degree
of jurisdiction at Bagram because the SOFA only provides criminal jurisdiction over U.S.
personnel).
296. See id. (“[I]n addition to the U.S. allies who operate out of the base, a sizable
population of Afghan workers and contractors is there.” (citing Tennison Decl., supra
note 106, ¶¶ 7–8)).
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forces operate with the support of NATO allies.297 But, to the
court, these differences did not significantly undercut the near
absolute day-to-day U.S. control at Bagram. First, the lack of
complete jurisdiction within the overall country did not
significantly curtail the absolute control of the air base enjoyed
by U.S. forces under the Bagram lease.298 Moreover, allied forces
also engaged in the country do not supervise or even share
control of the detention facility at Bagram with the United
States.299 Thus, the degree of practical U.S. control at Bagram is
“slightly less complete than at Guantanamo” but still vastly
greater than Landsberg.300 Temporally, the Bagram lease is
indefinite.301 The court distinguished the use of Bagram from
Guantánamo, however, on the basis that the U.S. long-term
objective in the region is not permanent.302 And prior U.S.
occupation of Bagram is nowhere near as extensive as it was at
Guantánamo.303 In short, U.S. ambitions at Bagram drew a closer
temporal parallel to Landsberg than Guantánamo, but the
United States still exercises exercised a high quantum of control
at Bagram on balance.304
A detailed analysis of the ECRB process was not warranted in
297. See id. at 224 (“To be sure, the United States is supported by allies in
Afghanistan.”).
298. See id. at 223 (reasoning that “[t]he existence of a SOFA . . . does not affect
the actual control the United States exercises at the Bagram detention facility, which is
practically absolute” and “[p]erhaps the difference in jurisdiction precludes the United
States from operating at Bagram [without] scrutiny of the host country [but] the lack of
complete ‘jurisdiction’ does not appreciably undermine the conclusion that the United
States exercises a very high ‘objective degree of control’”); see also Bagram Lease, supra
note 156 (granting “exclusive . . . and uninterrupted possession” of the airbase).
299. See Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 224 (“[I]t is the United States, not U.S.
allies, that detains people at the Bagram Theater Internment Facility and that operates
(and hence fully controls) that prison facility and its occupants, which was not the case
at Landsberg.” (citing Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948))).
300. Id.
301. See id. at 225 (noting the limited duration of the Bagram lease).
302. See id. at 224–25 (“At Bagram, the United States has declared that it only
intends to stay until the current military operations are concluded and Afghan
sovereignty is fully restored.” (citing Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan
Strategic Partnership, supra note 106).
303. See id. at 224 (analogizing that the short-lived U.S. presence at Bagram is a “far
cry” from the century-long occupation at Guantánamo).
304. See id. at 225–26 (“Whereas the site of detention factor in Boumediene plainly
supported application of the Suspension Clause, [the duration factor] does not favor
petitioners to quite the same extent here. Nonetheless, it is still fair to say that the
United States has a high objective degree of control at Bagram.”).
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the eyes of the court because it was enough to merely “recognize
that the [ECRB] process at Bagram falls well short of what the
Supreme Court found inadequate at Guantanamo.”305
The court finally turned to practical concerns, pinpointing
the impact on daily military operations and maintenance of
comity as those identified in Boumediene.306 Bagram, much like
Landsberg, is under the constant threat of attack by rebel forces
given its close proximity to the frontlines.307 Though diverting
resources in this type of forum may at first appear to thwart the
military mission,308 technological advances alleviate the stress
caused by managing the habeas petitions309 and only a limited
segment of the Bagram population would benefit from a narrow
ruling.310 In terms of diplomacy, the court warned of tension that
could result from reviewing petitions by Afghan detainees on
account of the U.S. policy to eventually transfer these prisoners
to Afghan authorities.311 All other prisoners, on the other hand,
remain in exclusive U.S. custody and therefore present no source

305. See id. at 227 (“Respondents concede, as they must, that the process used for
status determinations at Bagram is less comprehensive than the CSRT process used for
the Guantanamo detainees.” (quoting Transcript of Jan. 7, 2009 Hearing at 53, Al
Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 06-CV-01669))).
306. See id. (“The Supreme Court . . . focus[ed] on the impact that habeas review
would have on the military mission and on whether litigating habeas cases would cause
friction with the host government.”).
307. See id. at 228 (“Bagram resembles Landsberg more than Guantanamo, since it,
like Landsberg, is under constant threat by suicide bombers and other violent
elements.” (citing Bomber Strikes Outside Main US Base in Afghanistan, VOICE OF AMERICA,
Mar. 4, 2009, http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-03-04-voa30.cfm).
308. See id. (acknowledging that “the practical difficulties of providing habeas
review are enhanced in an active war zone”).
309. See id. (explaining that real-time video is a viable substitute for in-court
appearance and is currently in use for most habeas appeals by Guantánamo prisoners).
310. See id. at 230 (“Only a limited subset of detainees—non-Afghans captured
beyond Afghan borders—will be affected by this ruling . . . .”).
311. See id. (“[O]nly Wazir is an Afghan citizen, and hence only he is subject to
such transfer [to Afghan prison].”); see also Tennison Decl., supra note 106, ¶ 16 and
accompanying text. Quite problematically, a U.S. court adjudicating their habeas
petition may reach a different result than an Afghan tribunal or potentially usurp the
prerogative of the Afghan government by granting release. See Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp.
2d at 230 (pointing out that “[i]t is by no measure unlikely that a federal court . . .
would arrive at a different result than an Afghan court applying an entirely different
process and legal standards” and that “unilateral release of Bagram detainees [into
Afghanistan] could easily upset the delicate diplomatic balance the United States has
struck with the host government.”).
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of friction as against Afghanistan.312
Each of the four petitioners in the case was captured outside
of Afghanistan, but only one held Afghan citizenship.313 Thus,
the only real difference dividing the detainees in Boumediene and
the non-Afghan petitioners is that Bagram operates with a high,
but not plenary, level of U.S. control and each is afforded an
even less adequate review process.314 In essence, the three alien
detainees were more closely aligned with the prisoners at
Guantánamo, who were provided constitutional protection, than
with those at Landsberg, who were not. The Afghan petitioner
was situated differently, though, because his citizenship posed an
obstacle to habeas review.315 Based on this balancing, the court
held that non-Afghan detainees, captured outside Afghanistan,
can invoke the Suspension Clause to challenge their detention.316
The court lastly acknowledged Boumediene’s admonition that a
different outcome might result “if the detention facility were
located in an active theater of war.”317 However, detainees
transferred to Bagram from elsewhere are only in the theater by
strategic U.S. choice,318 which implicates an executive practice
unrestrained by authority.319
Seizing on language found in the district court’s opinion,
government officials in September 2009 signaled that they were
crafting a new review system that provided detainees at Bagram

312. See Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 230 (“[Non-Afghan petitioners] are not
subject to transfer to Afghan custody, so the United States is ‘answerable to no other
sovereign’ for their detention . . . .”).
313. See id. at 209 (indicating that each petitioner alleged capture outside of
Afghanistan and listing respective citizenship).
314. See id. at 232 (“It is worth repeating that the Bagram detainees in these cases
are virtually identical to the Guantanamo detainees in Boumediene . . . .”).
315. See id. at 231 (“[F]or detainees who are Afghan citizens, the possibility of
friction with the host country cannot be discounted and constitutes a significant
practical obstacle to habeas review.”).
316. See id. (“Providing habeas review for [the three non-Afghan petitioners] is not
so onerous, so fraught with danger, or so likely to cause friction with the Afghan
government as to warrant depriving them of the protections of the Great Writ.”).
317. Id. (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2261–62 (2008)).
318. See id. at 230–31 (“The only reason these petitioners are in an active theater of
war is because respondents brought them there.”).
319. See id. at 230 (“[I]t would be far more anomalous to allow respondents to
preclude a detainee’s habeas rights by choosing to put him in harm’s way through
detention in a theater of war.”).

DALOIA_K-FINAL

2010]

5/22/2010 4:17 PM

THE REACH OF THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE

1019

with greater rights.320 The details of these new tribunals, designed
to meet traditional standards of wartime detention, were revealed
just days later by the government in the merits brief it submitted
in connection with the interlocutory appeal of Al Maqaleh.321
III. MAKING SENSE OF THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE
EXECUTIVE DETENTION
In its traditional role, the executive branch is afforded wide
latitude to capture and detain prisoners during active
hostilities.322 But, as the aforementioned case law illustrates, the
atypical character of the war on terror has forced the U.S.
judiciary to reconsider the position of prisoners to challenge
their traditionally uncontroversial detention. Boumediene, for the
first time in U.S. history, extended constitutional protections to
aliens located beyond U.S. borders.323 More specifically, the
Court determined that the Suspension Clause provided wartime
prisoners with the ability to judicially challenge their military
detention on habeas review.324 But the holding was confined to
320. See Karen De Young and Peter Finn, U.S. Gives New Rights to Prisoners: Indefinite
Detention Can Be Challenged, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2009, at A01 (citing Obama officials
as indicating that prisoners in Afghanistan will soon receive enhanced rights in a new
review system); Eric Schmitt, U.S. Will Expand Detainee Review in Afghan Prison, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, at A1 (same).
321. Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 61, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 09-5265
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/
uploads/2009/09/US-Bagram-brief-9-14-09.pdf. Under the new review procedure,
detainees at Bagram would receive a “personal representative” as well as the ability to
testify and call witnesses in their favor. Id. at 61–62. The review board, moreover, reaches
its determination by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 62 (“The board will make
its determination using the well-established preponderance of evidence standard . . . .”).
For the government memoranda outlining the exact nature of the new review
procedures, see Id. adds. 1–8. For more information on the interlocutory appeal, see
supra note 286.
322. See supra notes 206–07 (recognizing detention of enemy combatants on hostile
ground for duration of conflict as a “fundamental . . . incident of war”); see also infra
notes 383–86 (elaborating on the discretion that the executive holds on the battlefront).
323. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (conceding the novelty of its
holding); see also supra notes 60–77 (establishing that citizens were the only class of
persons who received constitutional protection beyond U.S. border prior to Boumediene).
324. See supra note 251 (extending the protections of the Suspension Clause). As
noted earlier, the court had not, prior to Boumediene, expressly determined whether a
parallel right to habeas corpus inheres in the Suspension Clause. See supra note 33.
Justice Kennedy in Boumediene used language that could be seen as indicating that
habeas corpus rests implicitly in the Clause or, alternatively, that the Clause only
protects against the arbitrary repeal of the statutory grant of habeas corpus. Compare
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Guantánamo Bay.325 So while the Suspension Clause is capable of
reaching the shores of Cuba, the all-important question is where
else its protections may flow.326
As noted earlier, the writ of habeas corpus is presently
codified in our statutory scheme as positive law. Part III.A will
therefore delineate who can currently rely on the habeas statute
as a source of relief and who else must fall back on the
Suspension Clause. Part III.B turns to the Suspension Clause and
crytically examines Boumediene against the law that influenced the
case’s outcome in order to develop a guide for assessing who else
is entitled to the clause’s protections. Finally, Part III.C will then
use these principles in a set of hypothetical situations to more
clearly display the geographic coverage of the Suspension Clause,
as it stands under current law.
A. Statutory Habeas Corpus
The Court’s precedent on the extraterritorial reach of
section 2241 is inconsistent on the surface, but a more cogent
line of authority emerges by reading the case law in context. In
Eisentrager, Justice Jackson flatly proclaimed that “[n]othing in
. . . our statutes” confers aliens detained abroad with a right to
habeas corpus.327 Yet Rasul extended the protections of section
2241 to alien prisoners detained by the United States in Cuba.328
This anomaly can be ascribed to the fact that Eisentrager was

Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2228, 2248 (2008) (endorsing dicta in St. Cyr theorizing
that the Suspension Clause protects “at the absolute minimum” the privilege “‘as it
existed in 1789.’” (quoting Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,
301 (2001) (in turn quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663–64 (1996)))), with id. at
2262 (“We hold that Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo
Bay. If the privilege of habeas corpus is to be denied to the detainees now before us,
Congress must act in accordance with the requirements of the Suspension Clause.”).
The outcome under either interpretation is the same, so this article will use the term
“protections of the Suspension Clause” to refer to whatever right that provision
embodies.
325. See infra note 341 (recognizing that Boumediene only invalidated the MCA as
applied to the prisoners at Guantánamo Bay).
326. See supra note 11 (expressing curiosity as to where else the Suspension Clause
could provide protection beyond Guantánamo Bay).
327. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950).
328. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (permitting the use of statutory
habeas by Guantánamo prisoners).
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decided under the authority of Ahrens v. Clarke.329 As explained
by the Rasul Court, Ahrens demanded the prisoner’s presence—
as opposed to the jailor’s—within the territorial jurisdiction of
the district court in order to satisfy the statutory language of
section 2241.330 An individual detained in Germany would clearly
not be within the jurisdiction of a U.S. district court.331 But
Ahrens was overruled after Eisentrager was decided and section
2241 now only requires the custodian’s presence in the
jurisdiction of the trial court.332 Therefore, the use of section
2241 is not presently precluded merely because of a prisoner’s
location outside of the United States.333 In fact, some legal writers
contend that, after Munaf, section 2241 will now “follow the flag”
overseas.334
The use of section 2241 to challenge executive detention
does not presently turn on a prisoner’s location, but instead
centers on his or her citizenship. Previously, section 2241 was
available to citizens and aliens alike.335 Congress, however, made
several important amendments to section 2241 under the

329. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 778 (citing Ahrens v. Clarke, 335 U.S. 188 (1948),
abrogated by Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973)).
330. See 542 U.S. 466, 477 (2004) (“[Ahrens read] the phrase ‘within their
respective jurisdictions’ as used in the habeas statute to require the petitioners’ presence
within the district court’s territorial jurisdiction.”).
331. In fact, this is precisely why the district court dismissed the habeas application
of the Eisentrager prisoners at the trial level and the Supreme Court resorted to
“fundamentals.” Id.
332. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (settling that jurisdiction under
section 2241 is determined by the jailor’s location, not that of the prisoner). The
precedential value of the passage quoted above, supra note 327, must be seen in this
light.
333. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. Munaf is a prime example of a case
where section 2241 can run to a prisoner held abroad. See supra note 273 (holding that
section 2241 runs to U.S. prisoners abroad).
334. See,
e.g.,
Posting
of
Lyle
Denniston
to
SCOTUSblog,
http://www.scotusblog.com/ (June 13, 2008, 3:39pm EST) (“[T]he Court has dropped
a hint that, in the new global village, habeas will follow the American flag overseas—
possibly everywhere except an active battlefield.”); see also Harlan Grant Cohen,
International Decision, Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 854, 858
(2008) (“The Court’s decision is actually considerably broader than it might have
been . . . . [F]ederal courts have jurisdiction over a petitioner [under section 2241]
‘when the United States official charged with his detention has ‘‘the power to produce’
him.’” (citing Munaf, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2217 (2008) (in turn quoting Wales v. Whitney,
114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885)))).
335. See supra note 212 (proclaiming that section 2241 did not discriminate
between citizens and aliens as of the time of Rasul in 2004).
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MCA.336 By its very terms, the MCA only constricts the statutory
habeas rights of alien detainees.337 U.S. citizens can therefore still
turn to section 2241 following the enactment of the MCA,
irrespective of their location, in order to challenge their
detention by the U.S. military.338 Aliens are currently without this
protection.
As a result, alien detainees must overcome section 7(a) of
the MCA in order to mount a habeas petition in an article III
court.339 To be sure, this provision of the MCA was determined to
be constitutionally infirm in Boumediene.340 But Boumediene only
served as an invalidation of section 7(a) of the MCA as against
aliens detained at Guantánamo, so this provision still forecloses
the use of section 2241 by all other alien detainees imprisoned
elsewhere.341 Accordingly, alien detainees held at locations other
than Guantánamo must turn to the Suspension Clause in order
to invalidate section 7(a) of the MCA.342
Boumediene in substance recognized that the jurisdictionstripping provisions of the MCA are unconstitutional as used

336. See supra note 219 (detailing MCA’s amendments to section 2241); see also
supra note 37 and accompanying text (establishing that Congress may alter its statutory
scheme within constitutional bounds).
337. See supra note 219 (denying “alien detaine[es]” access to section 2241).
338. See supra notes 333–34 (indicating that section 2241 is not presently
dependent on a prisoner’s location within the United States); supra note 337
(recognizing that the MCA only denies aliens access to section 2241). Munaf again is
illustrative in displaying the ability of a U.S. citizen to invoke the protections of secion
2241 following the passage of the MCA. See supra note 273 (holding that section 2241
runs to U.S. prisoners abroad in spite of the MCA).
339. To clarify, the MCA does not simply deprive alien petitioners access to the
habeas statute, but more broadly deprives competent courts of “jurisdiction” to consider
habeas petitions filed by alien enemy detainees—which potentially includes claims
asserted under a constitutional right to habeas corpus. See supra note 219 (reproducing
text of MCA).
340. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (proclaiming section 7(a) of the
MCA to work an unconstitutional suspension of the writ).
341. See supra note 288 and accompanying text (clarifying that Boumediene was not a
facial invalidation of the MCA).
342. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (highlighting that Congress may only
amend its positive law to the extent that it comports with the Constitution); see also Al
Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 214 (2009) (explaining that Bagram petitioners
“must look to the constitutional right to habeas corpus as protected by the Suspension
Clause, and whether that provision extends to them” due to the MCA).
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against anyone who is protected by the Suspension Clause.343 The
majority, however, confined the application of this principle to
alien prisoners detained at Guantánamo Bay. As mentioned
earlier, a statute cannot possibly transgress the Constitution by
depriving a person of a protection to which they are not entitled
in the first instance.344 And the Court’s inconsistency in defining
the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution is indicative that
there is no clear-cut answer as to whether the Suspension Clause
is operative in remote locations or contexts other than
Guantánamo.345 Thus, entitlement to the protections of the
Suspension Clause becomes the threshold question for all aliens
imprisoned abroad at a facility other than Guantánamo who seek
to challenge the legality of their detention in a U.S. civilian
court.
B.

The Suspension Clause

Boumediene marks yet another sea change in the
extraterritorial jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. This
framework departs from a history steeped in a series of rigid
techniques for determining the force of constitutional provisions
beyond U.S. borders.346 Unfortunately, the ad hoc nature of the
functional approach suffers, as one prominent scholar put it,
“from the lack of certainty that bright-line rules would
provide.”347 Indeed, there appears to be wide disagreement in
academic circles over what implications Boumediene may hold.348
But the overall analysis in Boumediene is not entirely novel. The
343. See supra note 251 (determining that section 7 of the MCA “effects an
unconstitutional suspension of the writ” because the Suspension Clause protects
detainees held at Guantánamo Bay).
344. See supra note 85 (discussing the issue of standing).
345. See supra notes 43–77 and accompanying text (navigating the jurisprudential
shifts in the area of the Constitution’s extraterritorial application).
346. See supra notes 43–77 and accompanying text (distilling the case law
concerning the reach of the Constitution beyond the U.S. borders).
347. Neuman, supra note 255, at 273. This type of judicial minimalism is not
uncommon to the Court; it can be found with prominent use at various other points in
history where national security was threatened. See Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War,
2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 50–51 (2004) (identifying the Civil War, World Wars I and II, the
Cold War, and the current War on Terror as periods of judicial minimalism). For a more
elaborate discussion of judicial minimalism in the Supreme Court, see generally CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINAMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999).
348. See supra notes 253–55 (advancing several theories with regard to Boumediene’s
significance).
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functional model, as Kennedy called it, can be traced back to the
dissent of Justice Harlan in Reid.349 By the time that his
“impracticable and anomalous” test was advertised by Kennedy in
Verdugo-Urquidez, it was generally understood as a model that
favored global constitutional coverage under which protections
extend unless offset by operative barriers.350 Within this
framework, the elements isolated in Boumediene fit neatly into two
categories: objective indicia that establish a propensity for
constitutional
application
(“proclivity
factors”)
and
considerations that preclude the operation of constitutional
rights (“inhibiting factors”).351 This subsection will take up each
element of the Boumediene functional model, as they were
presented in Al Maqaleh, and critically analyze each in turn: (a)
citizenship; (b) detainee status; (c) process used to reach that
determination; (d) nature of the site of apprehension; (e) nature
of the site of detention; (f) practical obstacles; and (g) the
implicit element of the duration of a prisoner’s detention.
1. Citizenship
Citizenship is a central influence in the Court’s discussions
of the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution, but all that can
be gleaned from Boumediene is that a lack of citizenship is not
dispositive. To use the general outcome of Boumediene as a
starting point, alien detainees received protection under the
Suspension Clause.352 In this sense, the Court obviously did not
find their lack of citizenship dispositive to the constitutional
question.353 The district court in Al Maqaleh elaborated on this
point in observing that citizenship was not a “litmus test” for
determining the extraterritorial reach of the Suspension

349. See supra notes 67–68 (advancing an “impracticable or anomalous” test that
extends constitutional coverage overseas unless imprudent to do so).
350. See supra notes 75–77 (describing the “impracticable or anomalous” test as a
theory of “global due process” at the time Verdugo-Urquidez was decided).
351. See supra note 232 (distilling the functional model as turning on “objective
factors” and “practical concerns”); see also supra notes 75–77 (signaling that under
model of global due process factors that establish a proclivity for constitutional
application are weighed against practical considerations).
352. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (paraphrasing the general holding
of Boumediene).
353. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (recognizing the novelty of
providing noncitizens with constitutional coverage when located abroad).
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Clause.354 This assertion presupposes that holding citizenship is also
nondispositive as well. But this is not necessarily true; after all,
the Court was only confronted with an issue relating to alien
rights.355
The Court previously employed language in Reid v. Covert
that arguably extended the full range of constitutional rights to
all citizens affected by government action abroad.356 But
Boumediene qualified that passage. Kennedy chalked up the
holding in Reid as a result of practical considerations, and not
simply the petitioner’s citizenship.357 He also ascribed the
outcome in Ross as dependent on practical concerns as well.358
But all that this establishes is that citizenship, like any proclivity
factor, is subject to inhibiting limitations.
The Court’s past precedent underscores a strong favor for
citizenship. The law recognizes inherent distinctions between
aliens of hostile and friendly countries, as well as those who have
initiated the transition into the U.S. system of laws and those who
have not.359 Accordingly, aliens are afforded more robust
protections, in what is described as “an ascending scale of rights,”
as they increase their integration into U.S. institutions and
culture.360 But because the claim to these safeguards is not as
354. 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 218 (2009).
355. See supra note 221 (describing each petitioner as an alien to the United
States).
356. See supra note 63 (declaring “we reject the idea that when the United States
acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights”).
357. See supra notes 228–30 and accompanying text (dicussing Reid precedent).
358. See supra note 228 and accompanying text (providing brief description of
Ross).
359. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 (1950) (“[O]ur law does not
abolish inherent distinctions recognized throughout the civilized world between citizens
and aliens, nor between aliens of friendly and of enemy allegiance, nor between resident
enemy aliens who have submitted themselves to our laws and nonresident enemy aliens
who at all times have remained with, and adhered to, enemy governments.”); see also Ex
Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1942) (“By universal agreement and practice the law of
war draws a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful populations of
belligerent nations and also between those who are lawful and unlawful combatants.”).
360. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 770. For instance, (friendly) aliens are provided with
limited safeguards when they enter the doors of the United States. See, e.g., Plyer v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202 (1982) (Equal Protection to illegal aliens); Russian Volunteer Fleet v.
United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931) (Just Compensation of Fifth Amendment to nonresident “alien friend”); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (habeas
corpus to alien immigrants). After taking steps to establish residence in the country, they
receive greater protections. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (Due
Process of Fifth Amendment to resident aliens); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945)
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secure as a citizen’s, their protections may become circumscribed
in times of war if they hold allegiance to an enemy state.361 In
short, courts regard the quality of citizenship, in and of itself, in
high esteem.362
Because of its great importance, citizenship would likely play
a significant role in the Suspension Clause calculus. First,
Boumediene did not provide an occasion to discuss the impact of
citizenship on the domain of the Suspension Clause vis-à-vis the
functional model.363 Moreover, Ross and Reid only involved the
geographic scope of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.364 As
distinct from the supplementary nature of the protections at
issue in those cases, habeas corpus rather basically ensures that
executive detentions are carried out within lawful bounds.365 The
Court, accordingly, might be predisposed to give greater weight
to citizenship in this context. In fact, there exists strong language
in recent case law that resonates with this proposition: the Hamdi
plurality wrote that a citizen’s “interest in being free from
physical detention by one’s own government” is the most

(First Amendment to resident aliens); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
(Fourteenth Amendment to resident aliens); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (explaining that presence “within the territory of the United
States” was decisive to the above cases).
361. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587 (1952) (providing that due to
the “ambiguity of [an enemy’s] allegiance, his domicile here is held by a precarious
tenure” in times of war); Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 775 (“The resident enemy alien is
constitutionally subject to summary arrest, internment and deportation whenever a
‘declared war’ exists.”). Eisentrager clarifies that, even in this context, the settled practice
is to review an alien’s plea against executive action only to determine that there is, in
fact, a state of war and he is an enemy alien subject to the internment or deportation
provisions of federal law. 339 U.S. at 775.
362. See, e.g., Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 520 n.3 (1981) (expressing
that “the weighty interest in citizenship should be neither casually conferred nor lightly
revoked” in the immigration context (citing Berenyi v. District Director, 385 U.S. 630,
636–37 (1967))); Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 586 (recognizing that aliens of any type are not
afforded “legal parity with the citizen”); Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 770 (describing
citizenship as a “‘a high privilege’” (quoting United States v. Manzi, 276 U.S. 463, 467
(1928))).
363. In fact, the Court’s caution to not disturb other areas of constitutional law is
entirely consistent with the piecemeal practice of judicial minimalism. See supra note
347.
364. See supra notes 44–50, 60–69 and accompanying text (indicating that both Reid
and Ross involved the extraterritorial application of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to
citizens).
365. See supra notes 30–40, 224 (explaining that the writ of habeas corpus serves to
ensure that detentions are carried out in accordance with the law).
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“elemental of liberty interests” that is not offset by the accusation
of treasonous behavior.366 Though Hamdi was clearly entitled to
habeas corpus by virtue of his location within the United
States,367 it would be inconsistent and anomalous with the spirit
of the case law interpreting the high privilege of citizenship to
deny a U.S. citizen detained abroad the right to challenge the
denial of such a significant interest—the freedom of restraint
from one’s own government—short of some extraordinary
exigency.368
The foregoing discussion illustrates that a lack of citizenship
is clearly not outcome-determinative under the functional test.369
On the other hand, the Court’s strong favor of citizenship in
both historic and current case law makes clear that, all else being
equal, U.S. citizenship creates a very high proclivity for extending
the Suspension Clause to those detained abroad.370 The Court’s
precedent also establishes a nuanced approach for cases in the
middle—enemy aliens with ties to the United States.371
2. Status of the Detainee and Process Used to Reach that
Determination
A potential conflict arises in reading the precise wording of
these two intertwined criteria. It bears repeating that habeas
corpus is a tool used to challenge illegal detention in a variety of

366. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530 (2004) (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504
U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
367. Id. at 525 (explaining that “it is undisputed that Hamdi was properly before
an Article III court to challenge his detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241” even though he
was captured abroad because he was presently located in the United States).
368. See supra notes 359–62 (emphasizing the importance of citizenship in case
law).
369. See supra notes 354–55 (citing the outcome in Boumediene as an example).
370. See supra notes 366–68 and accompanying text (arguing that citizenship
carries a presumption that one’s government cannot detain an individual without
proper review). It is unlikely the Court would ever consider the question of a citizen’s
constitutional right to extraterritorial application of the Suspension Clause because
citizen-detainees are currently entitled to invoke the protections of 28 U.S.C. § 2241
beyond the border of the United States; the Court would only reach the hypothetical
situation if section 2241 were amended to the detriment of the citizenry or repealed. See
supra note 333 (illustrating that the protections of section 2241 run to citizens detained
abroad).
371. See supra note 360 (underscoring that the law accords greater levels of
protection to persons as they increase their connections to U.S. institutions).

DALOIA_K-FINAL

5/22/2010 4:17 PM

1028 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:957
contexts.372 And executive detention may result from a
preliminary finding that a prisoner is an enemy combatant373 or,
more permanently, after trial by military commission.374 But these
two elements (detainee status and process) are worded in
Boumediene in terms specific only to an initial status
determination.375
Nevertheless, Kennedy went on to compare the process used
to reach the status of the Boumediene prisoners with the process
used to try the Eisentrager prisoners before a military
commission.376 This comparative analysis suggests that the threeprong test in Boumediene is not limited solely to initial status
challenges, but is rather designed to encompass all
extraterritorial contexts where the Suspension Clause might be
invoked. Thus, the more appropriate inquiry is one of the
general basis for detention.
With this broader understanding in mind, another concern
arises in evaluating the two distinct bases for executive detention.
It is uncontroversial that the prisoners in both Eisentrager and
Boumediene were designated as enemy combatants.377 The
Boumediene majority made a point, though, of observing that the
Guantánamo detainees deny their status determinations.378 Yet, a
habeas petition inherently challenges some aspect of a prisoner’s
detention and thus implies a denial of legitimacy as to some

372. See supra note 90 (recognizing the variety of situations in which an executive
detention may be challenged and listing examples).
373. See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text (documenting the authority of
the President to detain prisoners captured on the battlefield as enemy combatants).
374. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8 (1946) (habeas petition by alien
combatant challenging authority of military commission to try and detain prisoner); Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (habeas petition by alien and citizen combatants
challenging the constitutionality of the military commission process).
375. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2228, 2259 (framing the inquiry in terms
of “status of the detainee” and “process through which that status determination was
made”).
376. See Id. at 2259–60 (“[U]nlike Eisentrager, there has been no trial by military
commission for violations of the laws of war. The difference is not trivial. The records
from the Eisentrager trials suggest that . . . there had been a rigorous adversarial
process.” (internal citation omitted)); id. at 2260 (“In comparison the procedural
protections afforded to the detainees in the CSRT hearing are far more limited.”).
377. See supra notes 221, 239 (indicating that the Eisentrager and Boumediene
prisoners were enemy aliens at the time of their military detentions).
378. See supra note 243 (identifying that the Boumediene petitioners deny their
status).
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process used to arrive at their imprisonment.379 Implicit in the
habeas petitions filed in Eisentrager was that the German
prisoners denied the legitimacy of their “trial, conviction, and
imprisonment.”380 Even so, Kennedy went on to write that in
contrast to the Eisentrager petitioners, the prisoners in Boumediene
deny their status.381 By elevating the claims brought by the
Guantánamo prisoners, Kennedy suggests that a challenge based
on an initial status determination carries more weight than one
based on a subsequent trial by military commission.382 Express
mention of their status denial signifies that the inquiry also
contemplates what aspect of the process is disputed.
3. Nature of the Site of Apprehension
Even prior to the ratification of the Constitution, militaries
have historically maintained considerable latitude to act against
all persons within a warzone due to the extraordinary
circumstances present on the battlefront.383 Among these actions,
the ability to detain enemy combatants for the duration of a
conflict is widely recognized as a legitimate practice of armed
conflict.384 As a result, the Court is willing to provide greater
leeway to the executive on the battlefront385 because separation379. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (clarifying the function served by
habeas corpus).
380. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 767 (1950).
381. See supra note 243 (comparing the challenge mounted in Eisentrager with
those presented by the Boumediene petitioners).
382. Though both challenges raise important questions, this hierarchy is
analytically sound because the status determination is usually the initial basis for
detention directly from the battlefield; if that detention is invalid, then so is any
subsequent action, such as trial by military commission. The Hamdi plurality indicated
that it was quite sensitive to the threat posed by capricious battlefield detentions. See
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530–31 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citing Ex Parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 125 (1866)).
383. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 (1957) (“In the face of an actively hostile enemy,
military commanders necessarily have broad power over persons on the battlefront.
From a time prior to the adoption of the Constitution the extraordinary circumstances
present in an area of actual fighting have been considered sufficient to permit
[executive action against civilians].”).
384. See supra notes 206–07 (recognizing the detention of enemy combatants on
hostile ground for the duration of a conflict as a “fundamental . . . incident to war”).
385. See supra notes 256–58 (displaying deference in various areas of government
affairs). In fact, the Court in Munaf made a point to observe that it was concerned about
intruding on the executive’s authority to conduct military operations because the
petitioners were captured and detained in “an active theater of combat.” 128 S. Ct. 2207,
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of-powers concerns are not as strong when detentions are borne
of military necessity.386
Since 9/11, however, suspects in the war on terror have
been captured throughout the world.387 A concern arises where
an alien is captured somewhere other than a battlefield.388
Outside of this universally accepted setting, military-led detention
implicates a type of executive action that does not enjoy the same
set of considerations. By securing broad diplomatic arrangements
and generous lease agreements with the host state, the executive
sets up a temporary system of governance where military action
can go unsupervised and without accountability.389 Prisoners
captured on the battlefield are sent through this system as a
practical consequence of their proximity to the detention site.
But prisoners captured elsewhere lack this proximate
connectivity. This raises a concern that their transfer to a zone of
lawlessness is made in part to operate outside of traditional
norms. Part of what animated Kennedy’s separation-of-powers
discussion in Boumediene was that the executive strategically sent
prisoners to a location where they could exert full control
without judicial review.390
This, however, does not entirely foreclose the possibility that
someone detained on a foreign battlefield can use habeas corpus.
In fact, the prisoners that successfully invoked habeas corpus in
Munaf were apprehended and detained in what the Court

2224 (2008) (quoting Brief for the Federal Parties at 16, Munaf, 128. S. Ct. 2207 (Nos.
06-1666, 07-394) available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/0708/07-394_FederalParties.pdf).
386. On the battlefield, separation-of-powers concerns simply do not find their way
into the functional analysis. In this context, the location of combatant detainee
confinement is a result of practicality and necessity, not strategy.
387. See supra notes 117–29 and accompanying text (listing various countries off
the battlefield in which detainees allege that their capture took place).
388. See supra note 291 (distinguishing that battlefield detainees are “qualitatively
different” from prisoners captured elsewhere).
389. See supra notes 32, 234, 317–19 (relying on separation-of-powers principles
when the executive creates authority for itself to act without accountability).
390. See supra note 234 (declaring that the executive branch cannot bypass judicial
oversight by strategically detaining prisoners in Cuba); cf. Neuman, supra note 11, at 279
(“[T]he Court's salutary inclusion of both the site of apprehension and the site of
detention as factors should prevent the government from evading constitutional
constraint by deliberately moving detainees from locations where the writ protects them
(including the mainland United States) to locations where it does not.”).
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described as “an active theater of combat.”391 Nevertheless, in
contrast to non-battlefield detainees, the Court is willing to
provide greater deference to the executive branch on the
battlefront because separation-of-powers concerns are not as
strongly implicated.392
4. Nature of the Site of Detention
The objective amount of control over the sites of detention
proved to be a pivotal factor in the cases that have addressed the
extraterritorial application of habeas corpus. The Court in
Boumediene was clearly influenced by the fact that the United
States exercised plenary control over Guantánamo.393 The brief
opinion in Hirota indicates, however, that there is a minimum
imperative—U.S. forces must operate under an undisrupted
command chain in order to attribute detention practices to
them.394 U.S. control (or lack thereof), in this sense, acts as an
absolute inhibitor to constitutional coverage unless and until that
minimum level is satisfied.395
The difficulty lies in assessing those cases falling between the
two extremes. The court in Al Maqaleh arrived at the conclusion
that the United States commands a degree of control over
Bagram that is not quite commensurate with Guantánamo but
still objectively high, notwithstanding the facts that U.S. forces
are aided by others and U.S. jurisdiction is not exclusive.396 The
391. Supra note 278. The precedential value of Munaf must be viewed in current
context: the opinion was delivered at a time before the promulgation of the U.S.-Iraq
status of forces agreement (“SOFA-I”) and before the focus of U.S. forces in the region
shifted from combating “terror” to helping restore stability in Iraq. See supra notes 111–
15, 183 (outlining character of U.S. presence in Iraq before and after formalizing the
SOFA-I). The prisoners also pursued relief under section 2241, which is considerably
more generous in its application than the Suspension Clause. See Cohen, supra note 334
(“The Court could have differentiated Hirota . . . [but i]nstead, the Court relies mainly
on the open-ended language of the habeas statute and the petitioners’ presence within
the ‘actual custody’ of the United States.”).
392. See supra notes 383–86 (recognizing that executive branch does not act with
unrestrained power when conducting universally recognized wartime activities).
393. See supra note 246 (describing U.S. control as “absolute” and “indefinite”).
394. See supra notes 269–71 and accompanying text (paraphrasing the case’s
holding).
395. See supra note 351 (differentiating between proclivity factors and inhibiting
factors).
396. See supra notes 294–97 and accompanying text (detailing the precise nature of
U.S. control at Bagram). To simplify matters, nearly every overseas U.S. military facility
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analysis of the court reveals that the strict language of the legal
documents governing U.S. presence is not conclusive; instead a
holistic examination is used to measure to practical day-to-day
authority asserted by the United States.397 Furthermore, any
discussion of U.S. control within the country as a whole would be
a non sequitur because the inquiry is concerned solely with the
control directly over the detention facility.398 Finally, Al Maqaleh
looked to past control as an aspect of its temporal inquiry, but
this conflicts with the basic premise of the Insular Cases.399 The
doctrine of territorial incorporation was unconcerned with past
presence because every new territory was de facto a “new
acquisition.”400
In sum, the Suspension Clause is inoperative unless a bare
minimum is established.401 But after meeting the initial
threshold, the greater the level of U.S. control, the greater the
proclivity for application of the Suspension Clause.402 Once the
proper scope of U.S. influence is identified, it is then possible to
isolate the constitutionally-relevant level of U.S. control.403
5. Practical Considerations
Two distinct prudential limitations can be discerned from
recent case law: issues relating to the ongoing military effort and
those regarding the maintenance of comity.
The Court in Boumediene devoted significant attention to the
impact that habeas review would have on military resources, but
will fit this classification absent some special diplomatic agreement. See supra note 205
(conceding that nearly all overseas U.S. facilities operate with a full degree of control).
397. See supra note 298 and accompanying text (pinpointing the “practical” U.S.
control).
398. See supra note 299 (discounting aid for allies in the control calculus as
unrelated to control at the detention facility). Of course, an instrument governing the
U.S. presence in the country as a whole may also bear on the authority the United States
exercises over its military bases.
399. See supra notes 226, 247 (discussing the doctrine of territorial incorporation).
400. See supra notes 51–59 accompanying text (supplying a brief background on
Insular Cases).
401. See supra notes 394–95 and accompanying text (recognizing that the
Suspension Clause is precluded from operating in places where the United States
cannot produce the prisoner).
402. See supra notes 350–51 (perceiving that proclivity factors strengthen alien
grounds for constitutional protection under a model of “global due process”).
403. See supra notes 396–400 and accompanying text (identifying the relevant
constitutional scope of U.S. control).
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did so without reference to military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.404 This omission implies that this consideration is
only concerned with strain imposed on the military unit directly
responsible for supervising the petitioning class of detainees and
not U.S. forces-at-large.405 Al Maqaleh further refined this inquiry
by breaking down the impact on military operations into
detention facility security,406 procedural difficulties in managing
habeas claims,407 and the number of prisoners who would benefit
from a favorable ruling.408 Given that military resources are not
static, it follows that the military unit directly responsible for a
detention facility may be strained at one point in time but not at
another when the same procedures are used.
Although Munaf was forced to bifurcate the analysis of the
habeas petition because the question on appeal was statutorilybased, the discussion of equitable barriers in the merits section
nevertheless carries constitutional significance.409 Because habeas
corpus is an equitable concept, concerns of interstate comity can
directly inhibit a court from exercising its habeas power.410 This
understanding rings with constitutional significance because it
teaches that prudential barriers arising from interstate comity
may deter a court from issuing the writ, even where all other facts
404. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (focusing solely on the “military
mission at Guantanamo”).
405. Cf. supra note 398 and accompanying text (limiting the degree of control to
that asserted over the detention facility alone).
406. See supra note 307 (describing the burden on detention security).
407. See supra note 309 (describing administrative difficulties). The district court in
Al Maqaleh quickly disposed of this issue because technological advances, which were
already in use in the Guantánamo cases, mitigate many administrative burdens. See supra
note 309 (downplaying the impact of administering habeas petitions due to
technological advances).
408. See supra note 310 (describing the number of affected detainees).
409. Munaf takes on even greater importance because, with the exception of one
Bagram petitioner, neither Boumediene nor Al Maqaleh disposed its case on the ground
that U.S. intervention would usurp the jurisdiction of a foreign court. See supra notes
249, 311 (punting the comity issue). Munaf, however, engages in a lengthy discussion on
comity. 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2221 (2008).
410. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 539 (1976) (“[C]onsiderations of
comity and concerns for the orderly administration of criminal justice [may] require a
federal court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power.” (citing Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963))); accord Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1040 (2008)
(indicating that courts “adjust the scope of the writ in accordance with equitable and
prudential considerations.” (citations omitted)); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 213
(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court has long recognized that habeas
corpus [is] governed by equitable principles”).
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favor its use.411 A common theme to modern-day international
relations is that “we live in a world of nation-states in which our
Government must be able to ‘functio[n] effectively in the
company of sovereign nations.’”412 As one aspect of this
understanding, it is undisputed that all nations have exclusive
jurisdiction to punish offenses by any person within its borders
unless they expressly or implicitly surrender jurisdiction.413 This
principle precludes domestic courts from reviewing habeas
claims that relate to an ongoing or concluded foreign tribunal.414
Al Maqaleh took this a step further by extending the principle to a
prisoner who was potentially subject to transfer to the host state
and did not necessarily even face criminal charges under their
custody.415
6. Reasonable Amount of Time
Finally, Al Maqaleh pointed to a passage in Boumediene that
indicated that the executive is entitled to a “reasonable period of
time” before habeas review would become practical.416
Specifically, the Court cautioned that it would be an
“unprecedented extension of judicial power to assume that
habeas corpus would be available at the moment the prisoner is
411. See Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2221 (“The question, therefore, even where a habeas
court has the power to issue the writ, is ‘whether this be a case in which [that power]
ought to be exercised.’” (quoting Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 201 (1830))).
412. Verdugo-Urdiquez v. United States, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990) (quoting Perez v.
Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958)).
413. See Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957) (“A sovereign nation has
exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders,
unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its jurisdiction.”). As to this latter
point, the Court declared nearly two hundred years ago that “[t]he jurisdiction of [a]
nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no
limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an
external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty.” Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). Justice Marshall went on to state that
“[a]ll exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own
territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no
other legitimate source.” Id.
414. See supra note 279 (citing authority that disfavors collateral review of foreign
tribunals).
415. See supra note 311 (precluding U.S. review on possible transfer to Afghan
authority). It bears note that Munaf involved prisoners who imminently faced transfer to
Iraqi authorities. See supra note 267 (tracing the procedural history of Munaf
petitioners).
416. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 216 (D.D.C. 2009).
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taken into custody.”417 In neither case did the courts address
where that point lies because six-plus years was seen as exceeding
a reasonable amount of time.418
This initial window of reasonableness, however, should not
be seen as a static concept. Kennedy explained that the initial
window of reasonable time is largely a function of the interplay
between the desire to carry out detentions under a streamlined
executive framework and the role of the judiciary to prevent
excessive executive power within the separation-of-powers
scheme.419 As noted earlier, however, detentions carried out
directly from the battlefield carry a level of implied legitimacy
under the laws of war that detentions off the battlefield do not
enjoy.420 The time it would take to reach a formal disposition
would not significantly differ in these two scenarios, but the
detention of a prisoner captured from the battlefield is already
sustained by international law and the initial window of time set
aside for them to exhaust administrative channels of relief should
reflect this understanding. While the exact point may be
uncertain in these two situations, the discussion of this issue by
the courts reveals that time at least initially acts as acts as a strict
bar to judicial review.421
Although all of the authorities to consider the influence of
time have thus far perceived it as an inhibiting factor, time can
also act as a proclivity consideration. The Court at other times
has displayed great sensitivity to the danger of prolonged
detention by an unchecked executive.422 And with no clear end
417. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008).
418. See supra note 290 and accompanying text (discussing “reasonable amount of
time” in cases of the Boumediene and Al Maqaleh petitioners).
419. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2275 (“Here, as is true with detainees
apprehended abroad, a relevant consideration in determining the courts’ [habeas] role
is whether there are suitable alternative processes in place to protect against the
arbitrary exercise of governmental power.”); see also supra notes 256–58 (recognizing the
prominence with which the separation-of-powers principle figured into the role of
habeas corpus in the Boumediene opinion).
420. See supra notes 383–86 (explaining that detentions carried out on the
battlefield do not involve the same separation-of-powers considerations because they are
widely accepted as a legitimate practice of war).
421. See supra note 351 (distinguishing between proclivity factors and inhibiting
factors).
422. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (hypothesizing that detention in
the current war on terror could last for a prisoner’s lifetime); see also supra note 258
(cautioning the necessity for restraint on unlimited executive power in times of war).
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in sight, the war on terror is already one of the longest in our
country’s history.423 The plurality in Hamdi took care to warn that
traditional laws of war concerning enemy imprisonment may
“unravel” in the face of protracted enemy detention.424 Because
the writ is used as a check on the executive, time is clearly a
significant consideration. Habeas corpus is a device used to
rectify illegal detention, so the longer that a prisoner is detained
under what is alleged to be unlawful authority, the graver the
potential breach of the principle underlying habeas corpus.425
Someone imprisoned for decades under the justification of war
would certainly have a greater interest in receiving judicial review
than someone freshly captured from the battlefield. On the
continuum of time, the longer that a prisoner is detained beyond
the initial window of reasonableness, the greater their claim to
the Suspension Clause would become.426
C. Implications Through Example
The Court recognizes the inherent authority of the
executive to detain persons on the battlefield as enemy
combatants.427 Although the Court has yet to squarely address
whether this power extends off the battlefield in the current war
on terror,428 it still remains theoretically possible for the
executive to capture suspected combatants anywhere in the
world.429 The following section fleshes out some of the concepts
addressed above to better illustrate the current geographic scope
of the Suspension Clause. Although this Note is centrally
423. See RICHARD HOLMES ET AL., OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN MILITARY
HISTORY 849 (2001) (specifying that terror conflict is among the longest wars in U.S.
history).
424. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (warning that the traditional laws of
war may “unravel” if war on terror continues into the future).
425. See supra notes 30–40, 224 (explaining that the writ of habeas corpus serves to
ensure that detentions are carried out within lawful bounds).
426. See supra notes 350–51 (explaining that proclivity factors strengthen alien
grounds for constitutional protection under a model of “global due process”).
427. See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text (authorizing battlefield
detentions for the duration of a conflict as a “fundamental . . . incident to war”).
428. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s decision to
vacate consideration of a case involving detention of a terror suspect off the battlefield);
see also supra note 208 (noting unconventional nature of war on terror).
429. See supra notes 117–29 and accompanying text (providing that captures off the
battlefield is still a viable option and listing countries in which current detainees were
captured).
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concerned with the extraterritorial application of the
constitutional right to habeas corpus, it is important to first
address who can invoke habeas corpus domestically in order to
provide a fuller picture of the Suspension Clause’s true domain.
Therefore, this section will proceed by exploring the habeas
rights of detainees domestically, and then internationally.
1. Detention within a U.S. Territory
a. Suspected Citizen Combatant
The writ of habeas corpus is plainly available in both its
statutory and constitutional forms to any citizen located within
the territory of the United States.430 This would seem to end the
inquiry for any suspected citizen combatant held at a facility
within the sovereign territory of the United States. It is of no
instance whether said citizen was initially apprehended outside
the sovereignty of the United States, even if on a foreign
battlefield, because any person presently located within the
United States or one of its territories is entitled to invoke the
protections of habeas corpus to challenge their detention.431
b. Suspected Alien Combatant
There are several under-occupied, high-security military
prisons located within the United States that many speculate may
be used as a detention site for the remaining Guantánamo Bay
inmates once the base is shut down.432 All aliens that are not
confined at Guantánamo Bay naval base remain deprived of
statutory habeas corpus by way of the MCA.433 Therefore, an alien
detained at a mainland holding facility must look to the
constitutional right to habeas corpus in order to overcome

430. See supra note 89 (synthesizing the statutory and constitutional right to habeas
corpus within U.S. territory); see also supra notes 335–38 (concluding that the MCA does
not affect citizens’ rights under section 2241).
431. See supra note 367 (entitling a citizen combatant to invoke habeas protection
because of their present location within the United States, even though captured
overseas).
432. See supra notes 198–202 and accompanying text (speculating as to where
Guantánamo detainees will be transferred).
433. See supra note 341 and accompanying text (clarifying that Boumediene only
served as an as-applied invalidation of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the MCA).
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section 7 of the MCA and receive review in an article III court.434
However, the functional approach intimated in Boumediene only
relates to the extraterritorial application of the Suspension Clause
and is therefore presumably inapplicable in the domestic
arena.435
Even without relying on the functional model, the
protections of the Suspension Clause should nevertheless run to
enemy aliens detained within U.S. borders. For aliens, physical
location within a U.S. territory strongly favors application of
constitutional protections.436 And because the Suspension Clause
does not discriminate between citizens and aliens, the Court
recognizes that it is available to all individuals within the United
States.437 This construction is consistent with the writ’s commonlaw application.438
It is true that the rights aliens enjoy domestically may be
constitutionally circumscribed in times of war if they hold enemy
allegiance.439 However, this general principle does not apply to
the entire panoply of limited protections that aliens receive
within the United States. The retraction of habeas corpus
privileges from aliens, even in times of war, would belie the
narrow constitutional grounds provided for its suspension by
Congress.440 The Eisentrager Court even acknowledged that aliens
with enemy ties are entitled to a brief judicial review of what is
referred to in Boumediene as their “status determination” if they
434. See supra notes 342–45 and accompanying text (concluding that alien
detainees must turn to Suspension Clause to receive habeas review in wake of MCA).
435. See supra note 223 (specifically defining the three-prong functional test as
relating to the general “reach” of the Suspension Clause beyond U.S. territory).
436. See supra note 360 and accompanying text (stating presumption that aliens
within U.S. territory receive limited constitutional protection).
437. See supra note 89 (maintaining that all persons within the United States may
turn to the Suspension Clause for its protections); cf. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,
142 U.S. 651 (1892) (vesting alien immigrants with the right to habeas corpus). Because
the right is available to anyone within the United States, and Guantánamo “[i]n every
practical sense . . . is not abroad,” Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 22261 (2008), the
Court extended statutory and, then later, constitutional habeas corpus to aliens detained
there.
438. See supra note 225 (collecting founding-era authority that displays aliens
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Crown had standing to levy a habeas action).
439. See supra note 361 and accompanying text (noting that the rights aliens enjoy
during peace may be restrained in times of war if they hold allegiance to an enemy
nation).
440. See supra note 29 (emphasizing the importance of writ of habeas corpus to
Framers given its narrow grounds for suspension).
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are detained within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.441 In part due to these considerations, the Court has
consistently entertained, although not always issued, habeas
petitions filed by or on behalf of enemy aliens located within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.442
Munaf instructs, however, that even outside of the functional
framework a court must consider equitable barriers before
issuing the writ.443 However, the traditional considerations are
inapposite in the case of domestically transferred Guantánamo
inmates. Holding prisoners in a U.S. military prison that is
already appropriately staffed for the purpose of prison security
would not divert or strain resources from the broader military
mission at home.444 And concerns of comity are irrelevant in the
domestic context because there is no other government with
which habeas proceedings would cause friction.445 In short, the
writ could issue domestically without any major prudential
obstacles. An enemy alien held at a detention facility within the
United States would thus have standing under the Suspension
Clause to challenge their detention on habeas corpus review.
2. Detention Outside of the United States
a. Citizen Combatant Outside the Territorial United States
Because the MCA does not impact citizens, section 2241 still
remains a valid avenue of relief for all U.S. citizens.446 Use of the
statute is not precluded by the presence of the citizen petitioner

441. See supra note 361 (conceding that an enemy alien is entitled to limited
judicial review of executive status determination).
442. See supra note 90 (collecting authority entertaining habeas applications by
enemy aliens).
443. See supra note 411 (subjecting habeas corpus to the equitable discretion of
court).
444. See supra notes 404–05 (restricting the scope of inquiry to the impact on the
military unit directly responsible for detainee operations); see also supra note 204
(quantifying how military penal facilities are historically under-occupied and adequately
staffed).
445. See supra notes 413–15 (indicating that comity relates to usurping authority of
another government).
446. See supra notes 335–38 (concluding that the MCA does not affect citizens
rights under section 2241).
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in a foreign country.447 This does not mean, however, that section
2241 will “follow the flag.”448 The most common subsection of
the statute used to seek relief requires U.S. “custody” over the
prisoner,449 which, in the extrajurisdictional context, is a function
of control.450 However, legal control is lacking where U.S. forces
are present but operate subject to a “broken” chain of
command.451 Moreover, prudential barriers may prevent an
otherwise cognizable habeas application from issuing.452 Thus, a
citizen’s overseas habeas rights turn on the level of U.S. control
and practical concerns.
i.

Detention at a U.S. Military Base

Take the situation of a U.S. citizen combatant captured on
the Afghan battlefield and detained at Bagram. Munaf found
custody satisfied for purposes of section 2241 where the official
charged with the prisoner’s detention exercises enough control
to produce the prisoner.453 This level of control was displayed at
Camp Cropper in Iraq, even though U.S. presence there was
uniquely fashioned by a set of diplomatic agreements unlikely to
ever be reproduced.454 But in most other contexts, U.S. control at
any of its overseas facilities will far exceed this low threshold.455 A
U.S. court would therefore usually have jurisdiction to hear a
claim filed by the U.S. detainee at Bagram.
447. See supra note 333 and accompanying text (elaborating that section 2241
jurisdiction will attach even where prisoner is located beyond the reach of a federal
district court).
448. Supra note 334 (quoting a commentator as portending that habeas will “follow
the flag” in the wake of Boumediene).
449. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1).
450. See supra note 273 and accompanying text (equating custody with the power to
produce the prisoner); see also, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 438 (2004)
(explaining that a prisoner may name “the entity or person who exercises legal control”
over their custody, when the immediate custodian is unreachable by the process of any
U.S. district court).
451. See supra notes 270, 394 and accompanying text (considering “chain of
command” theory on control and custody).
452. See supra note 411 (subjecting habeas corpus to the equitable discretion of
court).
453. See supra note 273 (holding that custody, for purposes of section 2241, lays
where the United States has the power to produce the prisoner).
454. See supra notes 110–16 and accompanying text (outlining the legal contours of
U.S. occupation in Iraq prior to the Munaf decision).
455. See supra note 205 (conceding that almost any overseas U.S. military facility
will necessarily operate with a high level of U.S. control).
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In this particular scenario, there is the added element of
battlefield capture. As a result, the Court may accord the
executive branch greater deference in its detention practice.456
This fact, however, only weighs on prudential concerns incident
to issuing the writ and is distinct from the jurisdictional inquiry
under section 2241.457 It bears noting that in Munaf U.S. citizens
were denied access to the writ when captured on the battlefield
in Iraq.458 However, the primary reason they were denied the writ
was due to concerns of friction with the host government; the
wartime authority of the executive branch was only mentioned as
a mere afterthought.459 Moreover, the usual leeway provided to
the executive branch in this context is unlikely to overcome the
citizen’s fundamental interest in being free from physical
detention by one’s own government in the face of treasonous
charges.460 Consequently, a U.S. citizen detained at any of the
U.S. military’s traditional bases, such as Bagram, would likely be
able to seek relief under section 2241 so long as it would not
jeapordize international diplomacy by undermining the
prerogative of some domestic entity of the host nation.
ii. Detention by Extraordinary Rendition
The nature of detention is significantly affected where the
prisoner is held at a location operated by a third party. The use
of extraordinary rendition was not conclusively prohibited by
President Obama’s January 22, 2009 executive order.461 Under
this program, prisoners are transferred to the temporary custody

456. See supra notes 384–86 and accompanying text (resolving that executive
decisions are accorded greater leeway in the area of battlefield detentions because laws
of war recognize practice as a legitimate use of executive power).
457. See supra notes 275–78, 409 and accompanying text (observing that practical
considerations in analyzing section 2241 in Munaf were relevant to the merits of the
petition and distinct from the jurisdictional inquiry).
458. See supra notes 275–79 and accompanying text (denying habeas relief to U.S.
prisoners captured in Iraq).
459. See supra note 278 (noting in passing that detentions occurred during active
hostilities).
460. Supra note 366 and accompanying text (explaining that the interest in being
free from one’s own government is a “fundamental” liberty interest of all U.S. citizens).
461. See supra notes 189–90 and accompanying text (ordering all secret holding
facilities run by the United States to close but holding open the continued vitality of
extraordinary rendition).
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of another country.462 As in Munaf, this simple reality would seem
“the end of the jurisdictional inquiry” for purposes of section
2241.463 After handing over the prisoner to the custody of another
entity, the United States relinquishes its control over their
person.464 And control over the prisoner is the touchstone of
section 2241 jurisdiction.465 Although the United States might be
in a position to request that the prisoner be released back to U.S.
custody, this is precisely the type of broken command chain that
proved fatal to the habeas application of the Japanese
commander in Hirota.466
Just because the citizen combatant lacks standing to use
section 2241 does not mean he is completely without recourse.
After all, citizenship is a crucial factor that strongly favors
extending constitutional protections.467 However, prudential
obstacles can stand in the way of habeas corpus, even where all
other factors favor its application.468 Skipping ahead directly to
the analysis of practical concerns, then, there exists a distinct
problem relating to comity. The relief that the hypothetical
prisoners would likely seek is release from the country in charge
of their detention.469 It is axiomatic that the United States cannot
dictate what another sovereign nation should or should not do.470
This type of unilateral directive would subvert the comity
essential to inter-state harmony471 far more severely than secondguessing another country’s institutions or usurping it of an

462. See supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text (summarizing the transfer
process involved in extraordinary rendition).
463. See supra note 273.
464. See supra note 450 (equating custody with control in the international
context).
465. Supra note 273 and accompanying text (providing that custody under section
2241 is measured by the control a state has over a prisoner).
466. See supra notes 270, 394–95 (displaying that broken command chain acts as an
absolute inhibitor to extraterritorial application of habeas corpus).
467. See supra notes 355–70 and accompanying text (underscoring the importance
of citizenship in assessing the reach of the Suspension Clause).
468. See supra note 411 (subjecting habeas corpus to the equitable discretion of
court).
469. See supra notes 22–26 (identifying the traditional relief secured by habeas
corpus as relief from custody).
470. See supra note 413 (proclaiming that the authority of a nation-state within its
own jurisdiction is absolute and exclusive).
471. See supra note 412 and accompanying text (perceiving that an essential aspect
of modern international relations is that governments must coexist with one another).
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opportunity to try suspected criminals.472 Consequently, a citizen
combatant in such a situation would be blocked from seeking
refuge under the Suspension Clause.473
b. Alien Combatant Outside of the Territorial United States
Unlike citizens, aliens detained abroad are foreclosed from
using section 2241 under the MCA.474 Therefore, they must turn
to the Suspension Clause for relief.475 To date, the two cases to
tackle an alien’s standing to mount a constitutional habeas
challenge involved situations where the petitioner was detained
in a location other than his or her point of capture.476 Justice
Kenedy’s opinion in Boumediene cautiously noted that the
constitutional balance would be different if the detention facility
was located in an area with ongoing hostilities.477 The natural
question is whether prisoners detained on the battlefield also
enjoy the protections of the Suspension Clause and therefore
have standing to challenge their detention on habeas review.
Constitutional coverage is generally favored under the theory of
“global due process” that is associated with the functional
model.478 On the other hand, generally accepted laws of war
recognize the inherent wartime authority of a nation to detain
enemy combatants from the battlefield.479
Take the three petitioners in Al Maqaleh who were provided
habeas corpus rights, but instead assume that they were captured
on the battlefield. The salient question is whether capture in a
472. See supra notes 279, 414–15 and accompanying text (restricting the use of
habeas corpus when issuing the writ would usurp jurisdiction of foreign tribunals).
473. Given the important prudential barriers present in this situation, the same
could be said for an alien combatant.
474. See supra note 341 and accompanying text (clarifying that Boumediene only
served as an as-applied invalidation of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the MCA).
475. See supra notes 342–45 and accompanying text (concluding that alien
detainees must turn to Suspension Clause to receive habeas review in the wake of the
MCA).
476. See supra notes 233–34, 317–19 (reaching conclusion in part due to separationof-power concerns present when prisoners are transferred to a remote detention
facility).
477. See supra note 250 (speculating that Boumediene might come out differently if
the detention site were located in an active theater of war).
478. See supra notes 75–77 (associating the theory of “global due process” that
favors constitutional protection with Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez).
479. See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text (authorizing battlefield
detentions as“fundamental” and “incident to war”).
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theater of war would alter the result reached in that case.
Clearly, the site of apprehension does not impact a
prisoner’s citizenship,480 the basis for their detention,481 or U.S.
control over the detention facility.482 These factors therefore
remain as they stood in Al Maqaleh. Notwithstanding these
consistencies, there are several notable differences. First, the
procedures used to reach a detainee’s status were recently
overhauled to conform to generally-accepted international
practices.483 Furthermore, the site of apprehension element is
diminished in value from its place in Boumediene and Al Maqaleh
because capture is made on a battlefield.484 Since these
detentions do not implicate the same prospect of unrestrained
executive power, they should receive an appropriate level of
deference.485 The issue is thus whether an alien combatant
should receive protection under the Suspension Clause when he
is held at a facility with a high, but not plenary, degree of control
and disputes a presumptively valid detention that was arrived at
through a standard process.
There is, however, even more at play when practical
concerns are considered. The vast majority of the roughly 800
detainees currently held at new facility at Bagram were detained
on the battlefield.486 The new facility also currently serves as the
preferred site for indefinite detention.487 By inference, a vast
majority of all new detainees to go through Bagram’s doors

480. See supra notes 362–71 and accompanying text (discussing relevant
considerations under the citizenship factor).
481. See supra notes 372–82 and accompanying text (discussing relevant
considerations under the status and process factors).
482. See supra notes 393–400 and accompanying text (discussing relevant
considerations under the site of detention factor).
483. See supra notes 320–21 (revealing new procedures in use at Bagram to
determine and periodically review a prisoner’s status).
484. See supra note 291 and accompanying text (qualifying that prisoners captured
on the battlefield are “qualitatively different” than other detainees); see also supra notes
206–207 and accompanying text (regarding battlefield detentions as “fundamental” and
“incident to war”).
485. See supra notes 384–86 and accompanying text (resolving that executive
decisions are accorded greater leeway in the area of battlefield detentions because laws
of war recognize the practice as a legitimate use of executive power).
486. See supra notes 163, 170 and accompanying text (disclosing that the current
detainee population is around 800, most of which come from the Afghan battlefield).
487. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (revealing that that Bagram is the
current default location for indefinite detention).
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would be battlefield combatants as well.488 Extending habeas
corpus rights to this class of detainees would benefit a large, and
continuously growing, number of prisoners.489 Even with the
technological advances used to administer habeas proceedings,490
the military resources necessary to accommodate this number of
habeas petitions would impose a significant strain on the military
mission in Afghanistan generally and, more precisely, on the
orderly management of the base itself.491
In terms of the functional model, these circumstances draw
a closer comparison to the situation in Eisentrager than
Boumediene on the Suspension Clause continuum. Standing in the
way of extending constitutional protection to these prisoners is
the practical difficulty in administering the sheer number of
habeas petitions, which bears a strong resemblance to the
concern identified by Justice Jackson in Eisentrager.492 Each
prisoner is an alien, captured in a location where military action
receives considerable deference, and detained on the basis of a
process designed to meet generally accepted standards—all of
which disfavor extending the protections of the Suspension
Clause. The strong, but not absolute, level of U.S. control at
Bagram provides a modicum of support for extending
constitutional safeguards493 but is unlikely, on its own, to
overcome the practical difficulties noted above. In sum, this
situation is more closely analogous to Eisentrager than Boumediene,
making it very likely that the Suspension Clause would not run to

488. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (announcing the troop surge in
Afghanistan).
489. See supra notes 310, 408 and accompanying text (displaying that the number
of prisoners that would benefit from a favorable ruling is a relevant practical
consideration).
490. See supra note 309 (identifying technological advances that mitigate the
impact of administering habeas corpus proceedings).
491. See supra notes 404–05 (specifying that practical impact on military activity
relates only to unit responsible for detainee operations).
492. See supra note 240 and accompanying text (drawing attention to the
difficulties facing military forces charged with administering habeas petitions overseas).
Justice Kennedy in Boumediene identified this consideration as playing a crucial role in
the outcome of Eisentrager. See supra note 241.
493. See supra notes 294–97 and accompanying text (detailing the precise nature of
U.S. control at Bagram).
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aliens captured and detained in Afghanistan.494
The outcome reached in the above example, however, could
be quite different if a prisoner is detained for a prolonged period
of time. Unlike all other objective factors, the length of time that
a prisoner is held is the only variable that increases at a constant
rate over the course of a conflict. As a result, a prisoner’s
assertion to the Suspension Clause would grow stronger the
longer that he or she is detained without judicial review.495
Speaking in the abstract, it is difficult to establish the type of
impact an unreasonably long detention would have on the
functional framework. Suffice it to say, a detention so
unreasonably long may tip the equities to the point where the
constitutional balance in the above example would vest the
prisoner with standing to lay claim to the Suspension Clause.
CONCLUSION
In Boumediene, the U.S. Supreme Court ventured into new
constitutional territory. After nearly two centuries of repose, the
basic influence of the Suspension Clause finally reached a head
when aliens imprisoned at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, looked to its
language in order to challenge the legality of their detentions.
Not only did the Court crystallize its nascent understanding of
the protection that inheres in the Clause, it also revealed its
current position on the Constitution’s extraterritorial force. But
the case arguably raised more questions than it answered. Most
significant to this Note, the case did not specifically address the
extraterritorial force of the Clause beyond Guantánamo Bay.
Boumediene only provides a loose framework—the “functional
model”—for answering this question. This framework, however,
assumes greater clarity when it is seen as part of the normative
model underpinning the majority’s opinion. Against that
backdrop, this Note explored the likely operation of the
Suspension Clause under the “functional model” in order to give
a full picture of its true domain. Simply put, the Suspension
494. See supra notes 236–40 and accompanying text (denying protection under the
Suspension Clause where there existed practical barriers to executing the writ and the
prisoner’s citizenship and location disfavored extension).
495. See supra notes 423–26 (concluding that a prisoner’s right to the protections of
the Suspension Clause grows stronger the longer that he or she is detained past the
initial “reasonable” window to reach a disposition on their status).
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Clause currently stands as a dynamic extraterritorial device in the
wake of Boumediene. While it might run halfway around in the
world, it could just as well stand impotent five feet across the U.S.
border. Its length and strength vary depending on the factspecific circumstances surrounding the prisoner invoking its
venerable protection. Although the intersection of constitutional
liberties and geography has plagued U.S. courts for as long as the
country is old, perhaps the “functional model” will serve as a new
panacea for courts confronting these difficult issues. As the “war
on terror” progresses and U.S. tribunals continue to adjudicate
habeas petitions mounted by prisoners in this war, the analysis
contained herein should serve as a useful resource for
practitioners, academics, and jurists alike.

